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Preface 
This dissertation is about inter-firm cooperation in different national contexts. In the 
past four years I have worked to formulate questions and find answers that shed more 
light on the influence of nationally distinct social institutions on the development of 
inter-firm cooperation. For this purpose, a cross-national comparative study was made 
of the highly competitive Dutch and UK potato industries. In tune with the inherent dual 
nature of the major audience of business studies, some results of this research project 
are of interest to practitioners, while others are more relevant to academics. The major 
findings indicate that both bilateral and multilateral forms of inter-firm cooperation are 
important means to gain competitive advantages and that the nature and degree of inter-
firm cooperation can differ greatly between the same industries in different countries. 
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Part I: Purpose, questions, and theory 

Chapter One 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is concerned with the influence of social institutions on the development of 
cooperative inter-firm relations in the UK and Dutch agri-food sector. In this 
introductory chapter the context of the study is discussed and the research questions, 
which have guided the research process, are made explicit. In addition, the industry this 
study is focused upon is briefly introduced. Finally, an outline of the research design is 
provided and an overview of the general structure of this thesis is presented. 
1.1 Inter-firm cooperation 
In the past decade, inter-firm cooperation has received much attention in management 
and organization literature (Ebers (ed.) 1997; Grandori 1998; Gulati 1998; Koza and 
Lewin 1998). The rapidly growing body of literature on this subject reflects the view of 
both practitioners and scholars that firms can gain competitive strength through 
collaborative arrangements with either buyers or suppliers (vertical cooperation), 
competitors (horizontal cooperation), or with companies from other industries (diagonal 
cooperation). 
Why do firms that operate in competitive business environments choose to engage in 
some form of cooperation? Motives include strategic considerations such as linking 
products and skills, (re-)defining the rules of the game in the industry, and getting access 
to markets, knowledge, information, investment capital, production capacity, labor 
force, and brainpower. From an efficiency viewpoint, considerations such as lowering 
transaction costs, achieving economies of scale, and improving lead times could be the 
driving forces. In addition, firms may be encouraged to bundle their powers because of 
strategic developments in the business environment, such as the increasing international 
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scope of markets, rapid technological changes on an international scale, demands of 
buyers for new products while product life cycles are shortening, and high economic 
uncertainties (Child and Faulkner 1998: 4; Alter and Hage 1993: 42). In addition, there 
is a growing need among firms to promote common interests with respect to interest 
groups (Van den Bosch 1996) and with respect to governmental policy makers on 
national, federal, or European levels (Greenwood, Grote and Ronit 1992). 
The existing body of literature on inter-firm cooperation covers a great variety of forms, 
issues, perspectives, and approaches (see Chapter 2). To date, however, relatively little 
attention has been paid to the influence of factors in the institutional environment of 
firms on the development of cooperative relations. Nevertheless, there is a growing 
consensus among management scholars that the institutional environment is an 
important shaping factor with respect to inter-organizational structures (Whitley 1992b: 
29-31; Williamson 1993: 113). In other words, social institutions, such as for instance 
the state or the legal system, can make it either more or less attractive and/or legitimate 
for firms to engage in cooperative relations (Lane and Bachmann 1996; Barney and 
Hesterly 1996: 140). The few but increasing number of cross-national comparative 
studies on this subject have shown that both the degree and character of inter-firm 
cooperation can vary considerably across different countries (Best 1990; Orru, Biggart 
and Hamilton 1991; Nishida and Redding 1992; Sako 1992; Lane 1996). Evidence from 
these studies supports the idea that social institutions have a considerable influence on 
the way firms build and shape their business-to-business relations. Social institutions are 
regarded here as nationally specific complexes of cognitive, normative, and regulative 
structures and activities that have acquired stability over time and which give meaning 
to social behavior (see Chapter 2). As will be explained in Chapter 3, the key social 
institutions that are particularly relevant to the development of cooperative inter-firm 
relations include the state, the financial system, mechanisms to ensure trust, and cultural 
conventions about individualistic behavior (Whitley 1994: 167; Rademakers and Van 
Valkengoed 1999). The central idea is that social institutions channel and constrain the 
perceptions and actions of managers and, accordingly, the way managers shape or re-
shape inter-firm relations. However, as will be di.scussed below, systematic research on 
this subject is still in an early stage of development (Lane 1995: 13; Kristensen 1996: 
32; Ebers 1997: 8). 
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1.2 Inter-firm cooperation and social institutions 
As was pointed out above, a limited number of studies is devoted to the sociil 
constitution of inter-firm relations. To date, however, these studies have been focused 
on a limited set of characteristics of inter-firm cooperation. In addition, forms of verticil 
inter-firm cooperation receive relatively much attention while horizontal relations terd 
to be disregarded. For instance, in her comparative study of the German and British 
mining machinery and kitchen utensils industries, Lane (1996) focused on contractuil 
relations between buyers and suppliers. The characteristics of vertical cooperation n 
these countries were found to be nationally specific rather than converging towards ore 
universal form. In a similar fashion, Sorge (1997), linked the divergent levels of verticil 
integration among German and British firms in the electronics industry with societal-
based transaction costs. Other scholars limited their investigations to country specifc 
distinct mechanisms that ensure trust in relationships between buyer and supplier finis 
in Hungary (Whitley, Henderson, Czaban and Lenyel 1996) and Germany and Greit 
Britain (Lane and Bachmann 1996). Apart from Europe, research on the connection 
between inter-firm relations and social institutions has been carried out in East- and 
Southeast Asian settings as well. Orru, Hamilton and Suzuki (1989) provided tentatixe 
explanations for the distinct characteristics of both horizontal and vertical inter-firm 
relations in Japan by placing them against a historical-institutional backdrop. In 
addition, Nishida and Redding (1992) indicated connections between nationally distinct 
institutions and remarkable differences in the relevance of long-term relations and trust 
among firms in the textile industries of Hong Kong and Japan. Moreover, in a study of 
buyer-supplier relations in the traditional medicine industry of Indonesia, Rademakeis 
(1998) linked a typical Javanese form of paternalism with distinct ways of inter-firm 
coordination. 
The social construction of inter-firm relations has also received attention in accounts of 
the effects of a range of social institutions on characteristics of industrial organization 
(Dore 1973; Biggart and Hamilton, 1988; Groenewegen 1989; Lane 1989, 1992, 199?; 
Best 1990; Clegg 1990; Whitley 1990, 1991, 1992a, 1992b (ed.), 1994, 1996, 1999; 
Campbell, Hollingsworth and Lindberg (eds.) 1991; Hollingsworth, Schmitter and 
Streeck (eds.) 1994; Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997 (eds.); Groenewegen and Van Dijc's 
1994 (eds.); Boons 1995; Whitley and Kristensen 1996 (eds.); Sorge 1991). In these 
studies, nationally specific patterns of economic organization in various European, East 
Asian and US industries have been linked with the prevalent nature of social institutions 
6 CHAPTER ONE 
on a national level. As a consequence of the broad scope of these studies, however, the 
attention for the development of cooperative inter-firm relations has remained limited. 
1.3 Problem definition 
As indicated above, studies of the social constitution of inter-firm cooperation generally 
have been fragmented and partial in nature. Most studies address a limited number of 
attributes of inter-firm relations while forms of horizontal cooperation are largely 
neglected. Moreover, the influence of social institutions on the development of inter-
firm relations is generally analyzed from a national perspective. In this way, the 
influence of social institutions that may be industry-specific in nature tends to be 
overlooked1. In light of the current state of development of the literature, the present 
study is aimed to articulate the influence of social institutions on the development of 
both vertical and horizontal cooperative inter-firm relations2. 
Apart from the intended contribution to the literature on inter-firm cooperation, the 
proposed aim of this study is relevant to management as well. Firms are likely to gain 
advantage from a better understanding of the influence of social institutions that may 
either hinder or facilitate the development of cooperative arrangements. To put it in 
strategic management terms: inter-firm cooperation is likely to advance the competitive 
strength of firms, only if there is a sufficient 'fit' with institutional constraints that are 
nationally and/or industry-specific (cf. Sorge 1991: 182; Smitka 1991; Orru et al. 
1991:361-363; Schmitz 1997). Knowledge that supports management in dealing with 
such issues is considered particularly useful for firms with cross-border operations 
involving inter-firm cooperation, as the nature of social institutions may differ between 
countries. Moreover, this matter has become more relevant to management because of 
the shifts that firms are witnessing in their institutional environment as a result of the 
increasing globalization of industries, markets, regulations, and flows of capital. 
It is not unlikely that the nature and infiuenee of social institutions, such as for instance the state, 
differs with respect to particular industrial sectors, both within and between countries (cf. Herrigcl 
1996; Whitley 1999). Consider, for instance, the role of the state in the defense and aerospace 
industries, agribusiness, and shipbuilding in countries such as the United States, France and Germany. 
2 
Because the research is limited to relations between firms within an industry, no attention is paid to 
'diagonal' cooperative relations, i.e., horizontal links between firms from different industrial sectors. 
This type of inter-firm collaboration is based on (he advantages of combining knowledge and 
capabilities from two different industries in the development of new products or markets. Examples 
are forms of collaboration between firms from the micro processor and software industries (e.g.: Intel 
and Microsoft), and the links between firms from the automotive and petrochemical industries (see, for 
instance. Child and Faulkner 1998). 
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With regard to the aim of this study, the central question is stated as follows: 
What is the influence of key social institutions on the development 
of cooperative inter-firm relations? 
This question can be unraveled into three secondary questions. 
The theoretical questions are: 
1. What are the key attributes of vertical and horizontal inter-firm cooperation? 
2. Which social institutions are likely to influence the development of cooperative 
inter-firm relations in different societies? 
The empirical question is: 
3. What is the nature of key social institutions that either hinder or facilitate the 
development of cooperative inter-firm relations? 
The answers to questions 1 and 2 will be drawn from the literature and form the building 
blocks for the construction of an analytic framework. This framework will guide the 
field study and the subsequent analysis involved in this research, which are intended to 
provide the empirical foundations for the answers to question 3. Finally, the answers to 
this question will form the basis for answering the central research question. 
1.4 Research design 
The fundamental line of reasoning underlying this study is that social institutions 
channel and constrain the perceptions of managers who (re)shape the inter-firm relations 
of their company. In this way, the nature of key social institutions makes particular 
organizational solutions more likely than others. This, in turn, leads to the emergence of 
distinct patterns of inter-firm cooperation, either on national or industry level. As is 
displayed in the embryonic framework (see Figure 1.1), this is considered to be an 
ongoing socially structured process in which managers (re)shape the characteristics of 
inter-firm relations (cf. Sorge 1996: 67, 77). 
It is important to emphasize here that 'embeddedness' (Granovetter 1985), i.e., 
reciprocal interdependence is implied in this framework, as opposed to one-way 
causalities between single social institutions and characteristics of inter-firm 
cooperation. In the framework, which will be developed further in Chapter 3, inter-firm 
relations form the central unit of analysis. The level of analysis is the industry, where 
patterns of inter-firm cooperation are explained by linking them with the nature of social 
CHAPTER ONE 
institutions (see Chapter 6). The social institutions considered particularly relevant in 
this respect will be drawn from the body of literature and will be labeled here as 'key 
social institutions.' 
Figure 1.1 Embryonic framework 
Key social institutions in the 
business environment 
X 
Ongoing process of 
structural development 
Existing inter-
firm relations 
(Re)shaping of 
inter-firm relations 
by management 
Resulting degree 
and nature of inter-
firm cooperation 
Source: see text 
Given the aim of this study, a cross-national comparison of cases is considered most 
appropriate. The cases need to contain detailed descriptions of the patterns of inter-firm 
cooperation and the nature of social institutions on an industry level within two different 
countries. In this way, the nature of social institutions, which are at least in part 
responsible for variations in patterns of inter-firm cooperation, may be identified1 (cf. 
Whitley 1990; Nishidaand Redding 1992). 
The countries involved in this study are the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (UK). 
The two countries are located closely to each other, but nevertheless constitute quite 
contrasting institutional settings (Lane 1992; Van Iterson and Olie 1992). 
In contrast to previous research on inter-firm relations, which is usually focused on the 
manufacture and service sectors such as the automotive, electronics, furniture, 
pharmaceuticals, and airline industry, the empirical setting of this study is the agri-food 
sector. In view of the serious challenge of feeding a world population which is expected 
to reach 6 billion in 1999 and is likely to approach 9 billion in 2050 (DESA 1998), it is 
The comparison of cases is addressed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
INTRODUCTION 9 
considered relevant to pay attention to management issues in this sector. In order to 
enhance the focus of this research within the broad agri-food sector, the attention is 
aimed at the potato industry. 
Considering the increasing liberalization of international trade in food products, it is 
important to point out that the potato industries of the UK and the Netherlands are not 
the subject of any EU market regulation4. The industry is known to be highly 
competitive and involves several multinational companies such as ConAgra, McCain, 
Pepsico, and Unilever. Nevertheless, the potato industries in both countries are 
constituted of a huge number of small and medium-sized companies with a clear 
domestic signature. Moreover, the potato industry has a number of interesting features 
with respect to the aim of this study. First, contrary to many other industries within the 
agri-food sector, the potato industry has a clear structure. The supply chain, 'from seed 
to plate,' is relatively short and the different production/distribution stages can easily be 
distinguished from each other. This property is helpful to keep a clear view of the 
empirical field during data collection and analysis. Second, this industry is known to 
comprise active trade associations and industry boards/associations/councils, which 
usually are quite accessible sources of secondary information. Third, many countries in 
Europe, Asia, the Americas, and the Middle East have a potato industry within their 
borders. This wide international presence provides a broad set of possible countries to 
choose from for future cross-national research, which may be relevant for replication 
purposes. Finally, the potato industry can be considered new to the area studies on inter-
firm organization. Hence, this research enlarges the diversity of the empirical 
knowledge base in this field. 
1.5 Overview of the thesis 
This thesis consists of seven chapters. The structure of the thesis is outlined in Figure 
1.2 (see next page). Following this introduction, Chapter 2 provides a closer 
examination of the concepts of inter-firm cooperation and social institutions. In 
addition, in this chapter the study will be positioned with respect to the many different 
research traditions involved in the area of inter-firm organization. Then, in Chapter 3, an 
analytic framework is constructed for the rigorous cross-national comparison of patterns 
of inter-firm cooperation. Based on this framework, propositions are formulated about 
4 
Regarding the resistance of a majority of EU member states against any market regime for the potato 
industry, it is not very likely that this situation will change. 
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the influence of key social institutions on the development of cooperative relations 
between firms. Next, in Chapter 4, the methodological aspects of the empirical part of 
this study are discussed. Attention is paid to the comparison of cases as a way to 
conduct cross-national comparative research. In addition, details will be given of the 
field study conducted among firms in the Dutch and UK potato industries. In Chapter 5 
the results of the field study are presented. Following a brief introduction of players and 
peculiarities of the UK and Dutch potato industries, attention is paid to historical 
developments in both industries. Furthermore, the characteristics of inter-firm 
cooperation are systematically described for each industry. The resulting insights make 
up the input for a comprehensive comparison of the patterns of inter-firm cooperation in 
the UK and the Netherlands. This is done in Chapter 6. The outcomes of this 
comparison are then analyzed and interpreted with the help of insights from previous 
research on inter-firm relations in their institutional context. Next, the results of the 
analysis compared with the propositions formulated in Chapter 3. Finally, in Chapter 7, 
the outcomes are used to provide answers to the central research question and the 
practical and theoretical implications of the research findings are discussed. 
INTRODUCTION 
Figure 1.2 Overview of the thesis: chapters, links, and loops 
Parti 
Purpose, 
questions 
and theory 
Part II 
Field study 
Part III 
Analysis and 
conclusions 
CHAPTER I 
Problem definition; 
Research design 
CHAPTER 2 
Discussion of key concepts; 
Literature review; 
Positioning of the study 
CHAPTER 3 
Construction of the 
analytical framework; 
Formulation of propositions 
CHAPTER 5 
Presentation of results 
from the field study 
CHAPTER 6 
Comparison, analysis and 
discussion of the findings; 
Feedback to the propositions 
CHAPTER 7 
Answers to the research 
question; Implications; 
Research agenda 
CHAPTER 4 
Research methods, 
protocols and tools 
Source: see text 

Chapter Two 
INTER-FIRM COOPERATION: 
PERSPECTIVES, FORMS, and PARADIGMS 
This chapter is concerned with a review of the concepts of inter-firm cooperation and 
social institutions. A working definition of inter-firm cooperation is formulated, 
opposite perspectives on this type of governance are addressed and the relevance of 
cooperation for competitive advantage is discussed. In addition, attention is paid to 
inter-firm cooperation as a distinct form of governance versus markets and hierarchies. 
Next, a review is made of distinct forms of inter-firm cooperation that have been 
identified in past research on a variety of industries in different countries. Moreover, 
the major paradigms in research on inter-firm cooperation are addressed to position 
the present study vis-a-vis the dominant lines of thinking in this field. Finally, closer 
attention is paid to the different perceptions on institutions in the management and 
organization literature. This is done to explain what is understood by 'social 
institutions' in the present thesis and to further refine the positioning of this research 
with respect to the existing literature in this field. 
2.1 Inter-firm cooperation 
2.1.1 A working definition of inter-firm cooperation 
What is inter-firm cooperation? According to Richardson (1972: 886) the essence of 
cooperative inter-firm relations is the fact that the parties involved in an exchange 
relation accept some degree of obligation with respect to their future conduct1. Although 
See also Sako (1992: 11) who developed the concept of 'obligational contractual relations' (OCR) that 
reflects cooperative inter-firm relations as opposed to 'arm's length contractual relations' (ACR). 
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'mutual obligations' certainly form an important aspect of inter-firm cooperation, it is 
considered here as too narrow a conceptual basis for a general (working) definition. 
However, notwithstanding the considerable attention that forms of inter-organizational 
cooperation have received during the past decade, definitions of inter-firm cooperation 
with a broader conceptual basis have remained scarce. Rather, most scholarly 
publications on this subject have been narrowed down to particular forms of inter-firm 
cooperation such as 'alliances,' 'networks' or 'supplier relations.' As a result, some 
variation exists as to how inter-firm cooperation has been perceived by different authors. 
This can be illustrated by taking a brief (and inevitably eclectic) look at some edited 
volumes on inter-firm cooperation that have been published quite recently (i.e., in the 
late 1990s). 
In their book on cooperative strategy, Child and Faulkner (1998: 1) defined inter-firm 
cooperation simply in terms of the opposite of competition as a way of realizing 
objectives. Another view can be found in a volume edited by Huxham (1996: 7) which 
is devoted to cooperation within and between organizations. He points out that inter-
firm cooperation is characterized by aspects such as 'work that is done in association 
with others' and 'mutual benefit.' In addition, in the same volume, Cropper (1996: 82) 
defines inter-firm cooperation as a mix of autonomy, integrity, and distinct identity in a 
positive inter-organizational relationship. In an edited volume about inter-organizational 
networks, however, Ebers (1997: 4) stresses different features of inter-firm cooperation. 
In his view, 'recurring exchange relationships' and 'joint decisions over the use of 
resources' are the key elements of inter-firm cooperation. 
What is more interesting here is that the different views of inter-firm cooperation 
emphasize different aspects of the same phenomenon. These aspects can be classified 
according to the dimensions 'process' and 'structure' (see Table 2.1). The structural 
aspects and the processes that are typical of inter-firm cooperation are considered 
complementary to each other. 
The combination of features displayed in Table 2.1 is considered sufficient to formulate 
a working definition of inter-firm cooperation, which, in turn, makes explicit how this 
phenomenon is perceived in this study. Inter-firm cooperation is considered as: 
A relationship between autonomous firms that is based on mutual 
obligations and objectives for a positive-sum game, and which involves 
recurrent transactions as well as joint control over activities and/or 
resources. 
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Table 2.1 Dimensions of inter-firm cooperation: processes and structures 
Process 
Structure 
• Realizing objectives in a positive-sum game 
• Recurrent exchange of goods/resources 
• Joint activities 
• Mutual obligations 
• Two or more organizations involved 
• Joint control over activities and resources 
• The organizations involved remain autonomous 
Source: see text 
Firms, in this definition, are autonomous units of economic organization in the sense 
that they make their own strategic choices (Whitley 1987)2. Possible forms of joint 
control include, for instance, mutual shareholdings or projects that are carried out by a 
jointly managed workforce. Moreover, joint control over resources may involve some 
degree of financial risk sharing, but can also be limited to the sharing of production 
capacity, information, knowledge, and/or ideas. The mutual obligations give the parties 
involved some degree of assurance with respect to each other's future behavior. In 
addition, the positive-sum game implies that the objectives of the firms involved in the 
relationship are not in conflict with each other. This is not to say, however, that firms 
involved in a cooperative relationship always try to achieve the same aims. For instance, 
as a result of the cooperation between the automobile manufacturers Rover and Honda, 
Rover aimed for the learning of new design and engineering skills while Honda aimed 
for access to a supplier network and knowledge about the European market (Faulkner 
1995). Another example is the cooperative relationship of Philips and Matsushita in the 
electronics industry. In 1952, on invitation of Matsushita, a joint venture for joint 
production purposes was established in which Philips brought in its leading technology. 
In the 41 years the joint venture remained in existence, Matsushita took advantage of the 
access to Philips' knowledge and capabilities, developed rapidly and transformed into 
one of Philips' most important competitors in the global electronics market1. Obviously, 
the aims and results of this cooperative arrangement were different for both firms. 
2 
See also Chapter 3. 
' Kerres in: Van der Zaal (1997: 14). 
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2.1.2 Conflicting perspectives on inter-firm cooperation 
In the literature, inter-firm cooperation is looked at from both positive and negative 
points of view. Authors with a negative perspective on this phenomenon stress harmful 
practices such as collusion, conspiracy, and cartels that impede fair competition and 
industry development. The Scottish philosopher and economist Adam Smith (1776) can 
be regarded as an early proponent of this view, asserting that: 'People of the same trade 
seldom meet together,...but (if this happens) the conversation ends in a conspiracy 
against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.' 
In more recent literature, inter-firm cooperation has been recognized as a possible 
barrier to fundamental changes within industries and firms (Whitley 1994; Lane 1996) 
and to organizational innovation (De Man 1996: 188). Moreover, cooperative inter-firm 
relations are seen to involve the risk of declining results owing to clique formation, 
overall fragmentation (Granovetter 1973), inertia (Lane and Bachmann 1996: 391), and 
conflicts (Huxham 1996: 4). 
In contrast, proponents of the positive view on inter-firm cooperation stress the 
advantages of partnerships, coalitions, and alliances. In general, cooperation is seen to 
enhance the competitive power of (groups of) firms and to facilitate industry 
development. In tune with this, Best (1990: 19) asserted that most of the negative 
aspects of inter-firm cooperation result from poor management. On the contrary, 
properly managed forms of inter-firm cooperation are seen to contribute to a stronger 
competitive position of the firms involved (Porter 1990; Sako 1994: 35; Child and 
Faulkner 1998: 2; Van den Bosch, De Man and Elfring 1997: 56), industry development 
and cohesion (Best 1990; Schmitz 1996), innovation of products, processes, and 
organizations (Hakansson 1998; Finn 1996). Inter-firm cooperation is also considered 
useful to obtain a better view and increased responsiveness with regard to developments 
in the business environment (McEvily and Zaheer 1997b; Liitz 1997: 230). Without 
disregarding the possible negative aspects of inter-firm cooperation, it is the positive 
perspective that dominates this study. In other words, inter-firm cooperation is viewed 
as a potential source of competitive advantage and industry development. In line with 
this, the next sub-section will discuss the relevance of inter-firm cooperation as a 
possible way to gain competitive advantage. 
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2.1.3 Inter-firm cooperation and competitive advantage 
In the last half of the 1990s attention to inter-firm cooperation in management and 
organization literature has surged dramatically. This is reflected in the rapidly increasing 
number of books on inter-firm cooperation and of special issues and articles regarding 
this subject, which are published in international journals such as Organization Studies 
(1998), Organization Science (1998), Academy of Management Journal (1995), and 
Strategic Management Journal (1998) . The general conclusion that can be drawn from 
this rapidly expanding body of literature is that new and higher demands from customers 
combined with increased competitive pressures are urging firms to engage in 
cooperative arrangements5. Below, the key demands and pressures will be discussed 
more in detail. 
Innovation and responsiveness 
Many industries are being confronted with consumers' concerns about product safety 
and environmentally sound ways of production. In addition, consumers increasingly 
demand variety, convenience, and customization. As is usually the case in competitive 
mass markets, there is a continuous pressure from customers for industries to meet 
higher standards and develop new products, while only the 'early mover'6 producers can 
take advantage of premium prices. Due to the inherent shortening of product life cycles, 
the innovation of products and processes has become a more crucial competitive factor 
than (nevertheless important) cost cutting and productivity (Hage and Alter 1997: 101). 
The pressures for rapid innovation push firms to increase their research and 
development efforts. Moreover, firms are urged to improve their adaptive capabilities in 
ways such as monitoring the environment for technological and product change, and the 
(timely) development and implementation of competitive responses. Clearly, innovation 
and responsiveness can require high investments but are essential to the survival of 
firms operating in present-day competitive environments. Indeed, firms which are not 
able to respond rapidly enough to new developments in their markets run the risk of 
loosing considerable market share and finding themselves up for sale. However, firms 
are not always able to meet the present-day demands for continuous innovation and high 
responsiveness on their own. For instance, small firms are likely to face the 
4
 Sec also Ring (1998). 
See Rademakers and McKnight (1998) for a case sludy about this subject on the Dutch potato 
industry. 
Early movers: firms that are first with the introduction of a new or better product/service. 
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disadvantages of limited resources for research, development, and monitoring, while 
large multinationals in particular cope with the problem of creativity and 
responsiveness. Hence, inter-firm cooperation is broadly seen as a way to facilitate 
innovation and market responsiveness for both large and small firms. Cooperative 
arrangements between firms are seen to contribute to the spread of costs, the shortening 
of product development cycles, and the development of a higher commitment of the 
(supply chain) parties involved (Lane 1996; Schmitz 1996). Moreover, cooperation 
enables firms to specialize, to 'learn by transacting', and to exploit opportunities to the 
mutual benefit of the parties involved (Sako 1998). In addition, cooperation is seen as 
one of the most effective and efficient ways to organize for innovation7. For instance, as 
will be shown in Chapter 5, joint pre-competitive projects imply a more efficient use of 
research resources as it prevents firms from re-inventing the same wheel. Moreover, in 
markets where creativity and high responsiveness to trends is a key to attracting and 
retaining customers (such as the entertainment, fashion, and software industries), large 
firms, in particular, seem to take advantage of cooperative arrangements with highly 
specialized and innovative small firms (see for instance Huygens 1999). 
Transactional efficiency 
' Inter-firm cooperation is also considered as a possible way for firms to enhance their 
transactional efficiency. For instance, based on her findings from a cross-national 
comparison of Japanese and British printed circuit board industries, Sako (1998: 90) 
points out that cooperative inter-firm relations are likely to enhance business 
performance through the reduction of transaction costs due to the reduced need for 
(costly) formal safeguards. Moreover, learning-effects that are likely to emerge in more 
durable cooperative relations enable suppliers to become familiar (and adjusted) to the 
specific needs of their customers, which makes the transactions between them more 
smooth and reliable. Indeed, there is a reduced need for negotiations concerning the 
exchanges involved or other efforts necessary to realize a reliable supply, which is likely 
•to enhance speed of delivery (Humphrey and Schmitz 1998). 
Strategic advantages 
Inter-firm cooperation can be attractive from a strategic viewpoint as well. For instance, 
small and medium-sized firms can take advantage of joint action in the development of 
Jordc and Teece (1992) in: Gultcrman (1997: 373). 
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export markets (see e.g., Chapter 5). Moreover, firms that have the ability to rely on 
cooperative arrangements do not have to acquire equipment and capabilities for an 
entire production process. This implies that cooperation enables focused investments 
and specialization as firms can leave some stages of the production process to other 
entrepreneurs (Schmitz 1996). Such arrangements also make it possible for firms to 
follow a 'bootstrap strategy' (Levy and Kuo 1991), i.e., breaking down investments into 
smaller riskable steps. This possibility of limiting risk through cooperation is regarded 
as a facilitating factor to overall industry development. 
Another strategic aspect of inter-firm cooperation concerns the enhancement of the 
flexibility of the firm (cf. Volberda 1998). Through cooperative arrangements firms can 
remain more flexible with respect to variations in market demands than vertically 
integrated firms. At the same time, cooperative arrangements can be used by firms to 
secure their supplies and to take early advantage of improvements of products or 
production processes by different supply partners (Smitka 1991). 
Cooperation can also be a basis for firms to improve each other's performance by 
linking complementary capabilities, skills, knowledge, and information (Richardson 
1972; Child and Faulkner 1998). In this light, the relevance of cross-border inter-firm 
cooperation, as a result of the increasingly internationalizing markets and industries, can 
be viewed in terms of access to capabilities, knowledge, and skills as well. Cooperation 
with local firms is likely to enhance the ability of companies that invest in new activities 
abroad to adapt effectively to different circumstances in different countries (cf. Child 
1998). 
Finally, firms can increase their market power by bundling their input and/or output. 
Such forms of horizontal inter-firm cooperation are, for instance, exemplified by 
marketing co-operatives that help their members to build countervailing power and 
avoid being played against each other in markets characterized by an abundance of 1 
suppliers and relatively few buyers (Van Dijk 1997; Veerman 1998). 
Put briefly, inter-firm cooperation is a highly relevant strategic issue to firms that seek 
to enhance or retain their competitive strength. Cooperative arrangements enable firms 
to compete better in rapidly evolving domestic and world markets by gaining from 
enhanced innovativeness, higher market responsiveness, lower costs, raised quality 
levels, mutually complementary capabilities and improved strategic positions. 
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2.2 Cooperative arrangements, markets, and hierarchies 
There have been many debates about how forms of inter-firm cooperation can be 
distinguished from other forms of governance. Three distinct lines of thinking will be 
addressed here: first, the market-hierarchy perspective; second, the contrasting view that 
inter-firm cooperation is an entirely distinct form of governance; and third, the 
'intermediate' view that markets, hierarchies, and inter-firm cooperation should be 
conceptualized as ideal types of economic organization. 
2.2.1 Markets, hybrids, and hierarchies 
A dominant line of thinking about the distinction between different forms of governance 
stems from proponents of the market-hierarchy dichotomy with leading scholars such as 
Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975; 1985). In this dichotomy, forms of inter-firm 
organization are conceptualized as a 'hybrid' and 'temporal mode of governance' 
(Williamson 1985). The hybrid is considered neither a market nor a hierarchy, but 
something in between. A visual representation of this conceptualization is displayed in 
Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1 The market-hierarchy dichotomy 
Markets 
Long-term contracts \ 
Strategic alliances Hybrids 
Networks / 
Hierarchies 
Source: see text 
The notions 'governance structure,' 'governance mode' or 'form of governance' are ways to describe 
forms of economic organization, i.e., ways to coordinate and control exchange relations. 
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As is shown, markets (comprised of impersonal arm's length relations between firms) 
and hierarchies (i.e., integrated formal organizations comprised of authoritative 
relations) are put at the extremes of a continuum. The 'hybrid' forms of governance are 
placed in between. The reasoning is that markets, via hybrid forms of governance, may 
evolve into hierarchies and vice versa (Miles and Snow 1992: 148). Non-incremental 
shifts are considered possible as well, i.e., the immediate transformation from market to 
hierarchy (or the other way around) as a result of strategic 'make or buy' decisions based 
on efficiency considerations (Williamson 1991: 82). 
Nevertheless, despite the theoretical usefulness of this market-hierarchy dichotomy, 
problems arise in empirical applications of this framework. It appears difficult to define 
where the borders of a firm end and where the 'gray zone' begins that separates it from 
pure markets. Moreover, due to the restricted meaning of formal definitions of markets 
and hierarchies, almost every organization in empirical reality can be considered as a 
hybrid governance structure (Hennart 1993; Hamilton and Feenstra 1995; Grandori 
1997). 
2.2.2 The third governance mechanism 
A very different line of thinking in the literature on inter-firm cooperation rejects the 
principles of the market-hierarchy dichotomy. Instead, the prevailing view is that inter-
organizational arrangements are entirely distinct governance mechanisms. Therefore, 
they cannot be placed at the extremes on a continuum of markets and hierarchies. 
According to this view, many different types of inter-organizational arrangements have 
been identified as a 'third form of governance' and labeled accordingly and include, for 
instance, networks, clans, democratic poliarchies, and constitutional ordering (Grandori 
1997: 30). On the one hand, this view can be considered useful to the discovery of 
alternative, authentic, and/or innovative governance structures that otherwise may 
remain unnoticed. On the other, such an approach may lead to the emergence of a broad 
set of isolated concepts and a fragmented body of knowledge. The argument is that, 
without the application of a more general alternative framework, the resulting lack of a 
'common language' makes it very difficult to combine/compare the outcomes of 
research on different governance forms. 
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2.2.3 Ideal and real types of governance 
Apart from the conflicting views of how governance mechanisms should be 
conceptualized, a 'middleground' approach has been proposed by Ebers and Grandori 
(Grandori 1997: 44; Grandori 1998; Ebers 1998: 30; Ebers and Grandori 1998: 270). 
Rather than denying the existence of markets, hierarchies, and networks as distinct 
forms of governance, they view them as ideal types*. These ideal types, in turn, enable 
the identification of real type10 forms of governance (cf. Van den Bosch and Van Wijk 
1998). For the purpose of this 'Weberian' approach", constitutive characteristics of 
governance structures have been identified including 'lower level ties' (i.e., the content 
of inter-firm relations), property rights, and coordination mechanisms. These 
characteristics are used to define the ideal-types of markets, hierarchies, and networks. 
In addition, they form the basis of a framework for the analysis and/or comparison of 
different forms of governance, be it market-like, hierarchy-like, or network-like entities. 
Table 2.2 shows an adjusted version of this framework12. 
The framework of ideal types is considered useful to order the broad range of 'real type' 
governance structures that can be found in different countries. To underscore the 
existence of the remarkably wide variety of 'real type' fonns of governance that can be 
found in free market economies, the framework in Table 2.2. will be used for a brief 
review of 15 distinct market-, hierarchy-, and network-like organizational forms. Given 
the wide scope and rapid development of research in this field, it must be noted that the 
review is certainly not considered inclusive. 
In a quite similar fashion. Thompson, Frances and Levacic (1991) have used the concepts of markets, 
hierarchies and networks as 'models' that can be used as a kind of sifting device for empirical analysis. 
Spicthoff (1953: 459) defines 'real types' as: 'reflecting the sum total of actually existing uniformities, 
everything that is essential in relations to a given phenomenon' (accentuation by the author). 
This approach has been inspired by Max Webers' view of empirical research, expressed in Volume I 
of his 'Economy and Society' (1978:18, edited and translated version): It is necessary to know what a 
'king,' an 'official,' an entrepreneur,' a 'procurer,' or a 'magician' does, that is, what kind of typical 
action, which justifies classifying an individual in one of these categories, is important and relevant 
for an analysis, before it is possible to undertake the analysis itself.' 
There is some variation in the way Ebers and Grandori treat the relevance of 'lower level tics' with 
respect to 'property rights' and 'coordination mechanisms.' In addition, many details arc used for the 
characterization of the three ideal types of markets, hierarchies and networks. The inherent complexity 
of these ideal types hinders their application in empirical analysis. Hence, in the matrix developed here 
the ideal types are re-interpreted and presented in a more condensed way. 
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Market-like forms of governance 
A real-type form of market-like governance is the (arm's length) spot market. This | 
governance mechanism stands for impersonal ad-hoc exchange relations where the price 
is a major criterion for the transaction of standardized commodities between 
independent buyers and sellers (Whitley 1992b: 12; Biggart and Hamilton 1992: 473). 
Examples are the trade of industrial products such as memory chips, and bulk goods 
such as crude oil, ore, soybeans, and oranges. 
Table 2.2 Markets, hierarchies, and networks as ideal types 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Resource flows 
Information flows 
Mutual expectations 
Property rights 
Coordination 
Mechanisms 
Market 
Infrequent 
exchange of 
goods, services, 
and/or money 
Limited 
Transactional: 
price, quality, 
quantity 
Formal, limited to 
the contractual 
terms of exchange 
Full control 
Over own 
resources by the 
actors involved 
Price 
IDEAL TYPES 
Network 
Recurrent 
exchange 
of goods, services, 
and/or money 
Moderate-
extensive wider 
spectrum than 
transactional 
information 
Both formal and 
informal 
expectations 
Joint control 
in various degrees 
over resources 
owned by the 
actors 
Negotiation 
(dynamic) 
Conventions 
(static) 
Hierarchy 
No exchange, 
but pooling of 
resources 
Extensive 
wide spectrum 
Formal, 
specified 
expectations 
Joint control 
over resources, 
based on 
specifications. 
Authority 
Adapted from Ebers (1997: 20-23) and Grandori (1997: 22-37) 
Another form of governance close to the ideal-typical market is sub-contracting, which 
can be considered as a 'market based organizational form' (Jarillo 1993: 13). Examples 
of sub-contracting are reflected in the way major American car manufacturers govern 
their supplies. These corporations tightly coordinate a constellation of suppliers and 
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assemblers of parts without directly owning or authoritatively controlling them. The 
inter-firm relations are coordinated on the basis of price and customized specifications 
and involve high degrees of information exchange and recurrent transactions. As 
Mudambi and Helper (1998: 776) pointed out, the mutual expectations in such forms of 
governance are largely characterized by a formal structure of commitment (i.e., highly 
specified contracts), while the relations involved can be considered close but 
adversarial. 
Hierarchy-like forms of governance 
Different real-type hierarchies can be identified as well. First, the functional 
organization exists in different varieties ranging from simple hierarchies to 
divisionalized corporations (see, e.g., Chandler 1962). Such organizations are divided 
into different units that are grouped by function (e.g. Gasunie), market (e.g. KLM), 
product (e.g. Philips), project (e.g. NASA), or geographic area (Mintzberg 1992: 162; 
Volberda 1998). The vertical flows of information between the different units are 
extensive, while the coordination of the activities happens through authority relations. 
Most activities of these organizations are fully owned. However, it is very difficult to 
determine the exact boundaries of these functional organizations (Van den Bosch and 
Van der Zaal 1994) as many of them also incorporate activities that are co-owned with 
other firms and involve joint control over resources and extensive information flows. 
Quite different hierarchy-like forms of governance are the intra-firm networks such as 
the 'federated enterprise' and the South-Korean 'chaebol.' The federated enterprise is 
seen as a novel organizational concept and is, for instance, experimented with by IBM. 
This huge multinational corporation has turned away from the principles of a tightly 
integrated hierarchical organization as it transformed itself into a federation of fourteen 
mutually independent intra-corporate companies (Child and Faulkner 1998: 5). The 
fundamental difference with regard to more conventional divisionalized enterprises is 
the ability of the intra-corporate companies to cooperate with each other and the lesser 
importance of coordination via hierarchical channels. However, an in-depth study of the 
Dutch Rabobank revealed that the relative importance of authority as a coordination 
mechanism in intra-corporate networks is likely to increase with the degree of 
diversification among the units involved (Van Wijk and Van den Bosch 1999). 
The chaebol is a distinct form of governance of South-Korean breed. The 'chaebol' are 
very large and highly self-sufficient organizations that encompass a broad range of 
different industries, ranging from shipbuilding to the processing of dairy products and 
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are comprised of a large number of vertically integrated companies (Zeile 1996: 256). 
They often have a trading firm at the center and are involved in insurance services but 
are not permitted to own banks. The high degree of vertical integration of the companies 
comprising a 'chaebol' is mostly maintained by family ownership. Moreover, among the 
members of the boards of directors strong ties exist that are based on family, region of 
birth and high-school alumnae (Kim 1996: 235) indicating that mutual expectations are 
certainly not always based on formal and specified rules. In tune with this, paternalist 
authority relations (rather than authority based on formal rules and procedures) are 
important coordination mechanisms (Janelli 1993). The high degree of self-sufficiency 
of the 'chaebol' is, among others, based on the easy exchange of technology, 
information, and personnel among the companies involved. 
Network-like forms of governance 
A vast range of different 'real types' of inter-organizational governance can be found 
within and across different countries. The cooperative, to begin with, is a 'horizontal' 
form of inter-firm organization that is particularly well developed in the Dutch agri-food 
industry (Veerman 1998: 71). The (marketing) cooperative is comprised of a group of 
autonomous firms that pool some of their resources and market their output via a jointly 
owned organization. Although the members jointly own the cooperative and have joint 
control via a board of members, they have no individual ownership of any part of the 
organization. Membership in the cooperative is based on formal and highly specified 
contracts that, among others, regulate supply obligations and the consequences of 
discontinuing membership. 
The joint venture is a formal, either vertical or horizontal form of governance wherein 
two or more autonomous firms have joint control over a common enterprise on the basis 
of joint ownership (see, e.g., Kogut 1988). Reasons that firms engage in this way of 
pooling resources range from gaining access to new markets to the joint development or 
production of new products or technologies. Hence, information flows tend to be 
extensive. 
Reasons of firms to engage into a strategic alliance can be much the same as for a joint 
venture. However, in contrast to a joint venture a strategic alliance does not involve a 
jointly owned enterprise. Rather, alliances are established to pool resources or 
capabilities in order to achieve a common goal such as the joint development, 
manufacturing or marketing of a new product. For instance, small entrepreneurial firms 
may engage into alliances with large multinationals to obtain, for instance, access to 
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extensive production and distribution systems. The large firms, in turn, may take 
advantage of the creative capabilities of the small firms they are working with and, 
possibly, buy out the owners in a later instance (see, e.g., Huygens 1999). This form of 
inter-firm cooperation is much in line with the 'value-added partnership' (Johnston and 
Lawrence 1988) consisting of cooperative supply chain relations between fully 
autonomous firms; considered a substitute for vertical integration. 
A consortium is a formal and often horizontal form of governance, which is also 
intentionally temporal in nature. Firms in a consortium jointly control and contribute a 
range of resources, competencies, and equipment necessary to realize large-scale 
projects (Grandori 1997: 42) such as the construction of airports, railroad tracks or 
barrages. The coordination of the activities usually happens by negotiation, while the 
firms involved share the risks that come with the joint project. 
The outsourcing-based strategic center to manage a web of partners can be considered a 
distinct network-like form of governance with hierarchy-like treats (Lorenzoni and 
Baden-Fuller 1995: 148; Lomi and Grandi 1998). Examples of such networks are 
multinationals such as Apple, Nike, Sun, McDonald's and Benetton. This form of 
governance differs from arm's length subcontracting practices as the 'core firms' in such 
networks are involved in developing the competencies of the partners, borrowing and 
lending new ideas, and encouraging intra-network competition in a positive manner. The 
principles of the 'strategic center' are exemplified by Benetton in the fashion industry 
and involve among other things, thousands of shops and hundreds of subcontractors in 
production. In this inter-organizational arrangement a core firm orchestrates, in a quasi-
hierarchical way, extensive flows of resources and information of a wide range of 
similar, small, and highly specialized autonomous family firms. Formal contracts play a 
complementary role in this network and expectations based on informal types of trust 
are considered much more important (Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller 1995: 155). 
A typically Japanese network-like form of governance, which is in some respects quite 
similar to the 'strategic center' described above, is the keiretsu. The 'keiretsu' consists 
of hierarchical, multi-tier production ties among (formally) autonomous companies and 
is often with a large industrial firm in the center that covers a range of different 
industries (Orru 1996: 208). Examples of firms that center such vertical networks are 
Mitsubishi, Kawasaki, and Toyota. The flows of resources between the firms are 
coordinated on the basis of mutual obligations and involve high degrees of risk sharing 
and information exchange. Moreover, the major firms that are part of the 'keiretsu' are 
often linked with each other through cross-shareholdings. 
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The kigyo shudan is another distinct Japanese form of governance. These network-like 
structures are horizontally organized and resemble large inter-market groups of 
autonomous firms (which, in turn, can be part of a 'keiretsu') allowing for extensive 
flows of information and resources among its members. The firms making up a 'kigyo 
shudan' can be tied to each other in various degrees and multiple ways, including ties 
via president's clubs, mutual shareholdings, and mutual obligations (Orru 1996: 202). 
A 'real type' governance structure, mainly comprised of small firms, is the 'industrial 
district.' Such a 'district' is comprised of a spatial clustering of resources and 
capabilities of (mainly) small firms. In the past, but also in more recent times, industrial 
districts have emerged (and ceased) across a range of countries including the 
'Marshallian districts' in England", the Baden-Wiirttemberg region in Germany 
(Herrigel 1993), the various districts in Northern Italy (Best 1990; Piore and Sabel 
1994), the Sinos valley in Brazil, and the cluster of manufacturers near Sialkot in 
Pakistan (Humpfrey and Schmitz 1998). All these 'districts' do (or did) compete 
successfully in international markets. In fact, the regional clusters of small firms attain 
competitive properties of big firms such as market power and economies of scale, while 
remaining highly flexible and without being reduced to subcontractors for products 
designed by large firms (cf. Best 1990: 225). Obviously, cooperation between the small 
and autonomous firms within these districts involves extensive flows of information, 
goods, services, as well as joint control over resources owned by the partners. Moreover, 
both formal and informal expectations underpin the exchanges between the small 
(family) firms, while in some countries either voluntary or quasi-governmental business 
associations are involved in the coordination of the relations (Best 1990; Schmitz 1996). 
Networks of Chinese family businesses, also labeled as bamboo networks (Weidenbaum 
and Hughes 1996) are the dominant inter-organizational structures in many East- and 
Southeast Asian nation states. These networks are generally ad-hoc and loose in nature 
and comprised of autonomous family-owned firms. Joint control over resources is 
limited. The flows of resources and information between these firms are largely 
coordinated through a combination of negotiations and conventions between the owners, 
who are linked to each other through informal, personal relations (Redding 1990). 
Finally, the association-based network is comprised of a constellation of firms that are 
member of the same trade- or industry association. According to Child and Faulkner 
(1998: 9) this is one of the most loose network forms, jointly controlled by the 
13
 Marshall (1920) in: Best (1990: 233). 
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members, and representing a communication system that enables firms to keep informed 
about the latest developments in their industry. Such networks largely function on the 
basis of both formal and informal conventions between the members. However, in some 
countries the business associations constitute an important part of industrial districts 
(discussed above), either or not based on compulsory membership and the authority to 
impose regulations. In tune with this, and as will be shown in Chapters 3 and 5 of this 
thesis, networks centered by trade- and industry associations can be tighter and more 
active than suggested by Child and Faulkner. 
2.2.4 Summary 
In this section three major ways to conceptualize of inter-firm cooperation have been 
addressed: the market-hierarchy dichotomy, the third governance mechanism and ideal 
types of governance. In addition, a range of distinct 'real type' governance structures 
have been discussed, showing that 'real-type' network structures tend to combine ideal-
type network characteristics with features of markets and hierarchies. Moreover, the 
range of distinct forms of governance discussed here indicates the vast heterogeneity 
that exists in present-day forms of inter- and intra-firm organizational arrangements 
within and across different industries in different countries. The provision of a 
comprehensive overview of the literature on 'real-type' governance structures, however, 
is beyond the scope of this study. Such an endeavor would require a journey through 
time, from the 19th century till present, and through the scattered literature anchored in 
a range of different disciplines and sub-disciplines that in some way or another touch 
upon this multi-sided issue. Nevertheless, as will be shown in the next section, scholars 
have made initial attempts to identify patterns and structures in the broad field of 
academic literature on inter-firm cooperation. 
2.3 Paradigms and approaches 
2.3.1 Diversity and unity in research on inter-firm cooperation 
The literature on inter-firm cooperation involves a broad range of different schools of 
thought, (sub-)disciplines, and methodologies (cf. Grandori and Soda (1995); Grandori 
1998; Koza and Lewin 1998: 255; Gulati 1998: 294). Biggiero (1998: 12), for instance, 
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identified 10 different major theories'4, ranging from sociological and neo-classical 
approaches to strategy studies. Moreover, Oliver and Ebers (1998) have made a detailed 
account of this fragmented body of literature. Based on an analysis of 158 articles on 
inter-organizational relations in major management and organization journals, they 
identified, among others, 17 distinct theories, 5 contrasting methods, and 6 different 
levels of analysis' . Despite this diversity, they argued that not more than 2 distinct 
research paradigms'6 both differentiate and unite the broad field of inter-organizational 
studies. These paradigms have been labeled as 'the social network paradigm' and the 
'governance paradigm' and include two major variants each (See Figure 2.2). 
Figure 2.2 Paradigms and approaches in inter-organizational studies 
Major paradigms 
in inter-organizational studies 
Source: see text 
The theories identified include resource dependence theory, network theory, approaches to strategic 
alliances, neo-institutionalism, population ecology, evolution theory, transaction cost theory, the 
structurc-conduct-performance approach, agency theory, and game theory (Biggiero 1998: 10). 
The theories identified by Oliver and Ebers differ somewhat from Biggiero's work and include 
resource dependence theory, network theory, political power theory, exchange theory, institutional 
theory, contingency theory, strategic approaches, decision making theory, transaction cost theory, 
industrial organization theory, agency theory, population ecology theory, bargaining theory, evolu-
tionary theory, structuralion theory, labor law theory, and industrial marketing theory (sec Oliver and 
Ebers 1998: 574-575 for a brief description of the principles of these theories). The different 
methodologies include empirical, quantitative, cross sectional, longitudinal, and qualitative methods. 
The levels of analysis identified are the individual, groups of individuals, the organization, groups of 
organizations, regional/industries, and societies. 
The notion of 'paradigm' (Kuhn 1962) has been defined in multiple ways (Mastcrman 1974: 61-65) 
and has been used accordingly by many scholars. In their article Oliver and Ebers seem to use the 
concept paradigm in the sense of a 'disciplinary matrix' (Kuhn 1974: 271) or 'puzzle-solving device' 
(Masterman 1974: 68). They identified four major 'paradigms' of which two pairs show relations and 
areas of overlap. A more strict application of the notion 'paradigm.' with incommensurability of 
theories as a major property, leaves us in this case with two paradigms in two variants each. 
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Below, both paradigms and their variants will be discussed more in detail to determine 
the position of the present research with regard to major schools of thought in the 
literature on inter-firm cooperation. 
2.3.2 The social network paradigm 
The social network paradigm includes two major variants: the 'structuralist' and the 
'power and control' approaches. First, research of the 'structuralist' variant is focused 
on the impact of network structures and positions on the behavior and performance of 
the organizations involved (Ebers and Oliver 1998: 568). Examples of key concepts 
used by structuralists are, for instance, 'structural holes' and 'bridging ties.' A structural 
hole is a relationship of non-redundancy between two organizations, meaning that they 
do not share the same contacts in a network (Burt 1992: 65)17. Bridging ties are provided 
by actors that link together two organizations that otherwise would be disconnected. In 
other words, a bridging tie constitutes the only link between otherwise disconnected 
nodes in a network (Granovetter 1973). 
Second, research of the 'power and control' variant is also focused on the structural 
attributes of networks, but combines this with properties of individual firms. Key 
concepts in this respect are 'resource dependence,' and 'centrality.' Resource 
dependence refers to the environmental dependencies (i.e., gaining, managing, and 
controlling external resources) of firms, which are believed to have an impact on their 
power in inter-organizational systems (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) . The concept of 
centrality is concerned with the power (i.e., control and dependence) implications of the 
position that organizations occupy in a network and is, among others, measured by 
counting the number of adjacent links, direct and indirect links, and mediating positions 
(Freeman 1979; Brass and Burkhardt 1992)19. 
The idea is that organizations can build hoth more efficient (less contacts to maintain) and effective 
networks (more diverse) if they optimize the number of structural holes in their network (Burt 1992: 
67). 
See also Van der Zaal (1997: 72-75) for a detailed account of this concept. 
For example, a firm that is in the center of in a star-shaped network of organizations has a high 
degree of 'centrality.' With respect to the other organizations, such a firm has a strong 
mediating position and also the most direct and shortest links in the network. Hence, this firm is 
considered to have the most powerful position in the network. 
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2.3.3 The governance paradigm 
The governance paradigm is comprised of two major variants as well. The first variant is 
based on institutional economics and strategy approaches that involve 'how to' 
questions about such issues as organizing networks (Miles and Snow 1992), managing 
alliances (Doz 1996), enhancing efficiency (Williamson 1991), and gaining competitive 
positions (Porter and Fuller 1986). Key notions in these approaches include transaction 
costs, ownership, contracts, economic institutions (Williamson 1985; North 1990), 
games (Nalebuff and Brandenburger 1996), resources and capabilities (Richardson 
1972; Lorange and Roos 1992: 6; Hakansson and Johanson 1993: 36), and performance 
(Gulati and Lawrence 1997). 
The second variant, (neo-)institutional theory (or: economic sociology), is focused on 
the influence of the institutional environment on the development of inter-organizational 
relations. Issues tackled on the basis of this approach include the development of 
distinct forms of inter-firm organization in different geographical areas or industries 
(Nishida and Redding 1992; Whitley 1999; Lane 1996; Herrigel 1996), the institutional 
embeddedness of business networks in East- and Southeast Asia (Hamilton 1996; Orru 
et al. 1997), and the identification of distinct coordination mechanisms within specific 
industries and national settings (Campbell et al. 1991; Hollingsworth et al. 1994; 
Rademakers 1998)20. Overarching concepts in this line of research are 'business 
systems' (Whitley 1992a - 1999), 'industry recipes' (Spender 1989), 'industrial orders' 
or 'social systems of production' (Hollingsworth et al. 1994; Lane 1996), and 'social 
institutions' (Whitley 1992b: 19-27)2'. 
On the basis of the above discussion it is not difficult to position the present research 
within the existing literature. As was discussed in Chapter 1, the present thesis is 
concerned with the influence of key social institutions on the development of 
cooperative inter-firm relations. Regarding its focus on the influence of the institutional 
environment, the present study can be placed in the governance paradigm, and more in 
particular in the institutional theory variant. 
See also Chapter 1. 
The meaning of these concepts will be discussed in the next section and in Chapter 3. 
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2.4 Social institutions 
Obviously, 'institutions' are a central concept in research within the 'institutional theory' 
variant of the governance paradigm. This raises the question: What is understood by 
'institutions' in the management and organization literatures? Moreover, what is the 
perspective adopted in the present study? 
2.4.1 Institutions defined 
On the basis of a broad review of the early and more contemporary 'institutionalist' 
literature, Scott (1995: 33) has formulated a helpful 'omnibus' definition of institutions. 
His definition states that: 
'Institutions consist of cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and 
activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior. Institutions 
operate at multiple levels in society and are transported by various carriers -
cultures, structures, and routines- and they operate at multiple levels of 
jurisdiction.' 
Put briefly and in more popular terms, institutions can be regarded as 'rules of the game' 
that reduce uncertainties by structuring interactions between people (North 1990: 3). In 
line with this, institutionalization is the process of structuring and stabilizing interactions 
between social actors (Van Doom and Lammers 1959). In addition, institutions emerge as 
a result of successful solutions to practical problems of interaction that have been 
reproduced and gained a 'taken for granted' and routine quality over time (Garfinkel 1967; 
North 1990; Clegg 1990; Lane 1996). 
2.4.2 Diverse perspectives on institutions and economic organization 
As indicated in the definition by Scott (1995), there are different categories and carriers of 
institutions. Table 2.3 displays an overview of possible types of institutions that reflect 
different carrier-category combinations. 
Institutionalists have in common that they attempt to explain the process by which 
institutions shape organizational structure and action (Lane 1995: 10). However, regarding 
the broad range of possible types of institutions (see Table 2.3) it is not very surprising that 
in the literature different aspects of institutions have been emphasized by different 
scholars. Scott (1995: 57-59) has showed this in a very convincing way. At least 8 
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different major schools can be distinguished, reflecting a broad range of different 
institutional perspectives (regulative, normative, cognitive), levels of analysis (ranging 
from world systems to organizational sub-systems), and concepts (e.g., populations, 
industries, etc.)22. For instance, research by the mainly American scholars of the 'new 
institutionalists' school has been largely focused on the cognitive aspects of institutions in 
non-profit organizations (see, e.g., DiMaggio and Powell 1991). In contrast, the largely 
European centered 'societal effects' school has emphasized the influence of institutions 
with regard to the constitution of social groups and their competition for resources 
(Whitley 1999: 12). Clearly, there are different institutional approaches that deal with 
different objects and types of explanation. As a consequence, the range of studies that 
attempt to show how social institutions influence economic activities is considered too 
broad and too diffuse to characterize a single form of 'institutionalism' (Scott 1995: 34; 
Whitley 1999: 15). 
Table 2.3 Categories and carriers of institutions 
CARRIERS 
Cultures 
Social 
structures 
Routines 
Regulative 
Rules and laws 
Governance- and 
power systems 
Protocols and standard 
procedures 
CATEGORIES 
Normative 
Values and expectations 
Regimes and 
authority systems 
Conformity and 
performance of duty 
Cognitive 
Categories and 
typifications 
Structural isomorphism 
and identities 
Performance programs 
and scripts 
Adapted from Scott (1995: 52-55) 
2.4.3 Social institutions 
The evident heterogeneity of institutional approaches evokes the following question: 
Which institutional approach is dominant in the present study? The approach that 
undeipins the analysis in this thesis is consonant with the recent literature on institutions 
and economic organization. This literature draws attention to the influence of a range of 
These schools include economic history, historical institutionalism in political science, neo-institu-
tionalism in economics, traditional institulional sociology, nco-institutional sociology, population 
ecology, evolutionary theory in economics and ethno-methodology. 
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complementary institutions that constitute distinct types of economic organization (Lane 
1995: 13; HoUingsworth and Boyer 1997: 4; Whitley 1999: 16). Dominant approaches in 
this field include, for instance, the National Business Systems; Social Systems of 
Production and Industrial Order approaches1'. The dominant view underlying research in 
this area is that economic actors are embedded in complex social systems which place 
institutional constraints on the way forms of economic organization develop. 
As is reflected by the research questions stated in Chapter 1, a distinction is made in this 
thesis between institutions on a societal level (such as the state, legal rules, and cultural 
conventions) and institutionalized organizational arrangements (i.e., forms of inter-firm 
cooperation) on an industry level. To facilitate analytical discrimination, institutions on 
the industry level will be referred to as 'forms of economic organization,' while 
institutions on the societal level will be labeled 'social institutions.' With regard to this 
distinction, the perspective adopted here differs from others that do not discriminate 
between forms of economic organization and social institutions. For instance, in the 
view of HoUingsworth and his associates (Lindberg, Campbell and Holingsworth 1991: 
3; HoUingsworth, Schmitter and Streeck 1994: 5-7), the state is an institutional form of 
governance mechanism, as are markets, hierarchies, networks, and associations. 
Apart from the separation between social institutions and forms of economic 
organization, the perspective adopted here is characterized by a focus on dominant 
social institutions that channel and constrain the control and access of firms with regard 
to property rights and key resources such as raw materials, skills, capital, and legitimacy 
(Whitley 1992b; Lane 1995). This includes regulative, normative, and cognitive types of 
institutions (see Table 2.1). These dominant social institutions are seen to have 
remained primarily within the boundaries of nation states, which grew in significance as 
many countries industrialized in the 19th and 20th centuries. As a result, social 
institutions are often created as a 'by product' of the industrialization process, developed 
in association with the state (Whitley, forthcoming). 
Finally, in line with many other institutional approaches, the basic assumption 
underlying the present research is that different arrangements of social institutions 
structure perceptions of managers in contrasting ways. So what seems to be rational for 
firms in one context may be quite the contrary in another institutional environment 
(Clegg 1990; Whitley, forthcoming). Hence, certain kinds of managerial action are 
Sec Chapter 3 for more details about these approaches. 
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encouraged while others are discouraged, which leads to the development of convergent 
and fairly stable forms of governance within distinct national contexts. 
In summary, social institutions are seen as nationally distinct patterns of action and 
complexes of both formally fixed rules and of informally generated cultural 
understandings which have acquired stability over time (Lane 1996; Whitley 1999). 
These patterns of action and complexes of rules assume a 'taken for granted' quality, 
preventing managers from perceiving organizational alternatives. As a result, 
institutions are largely self-sustaining and support the reproduction of stable 
organizational structures (cf. Zucker 1991; Sorge 1996). The influence of social 
institutions over forms of economic organization stems from the fact that they channel 
and constrain the actions of management, because they provide shared cognitions about 
what is legitimate and rational. Hence, social institutions influence the goals that are 
adopted by management and the manner in which they are pursued. 
2.5 Summary 
In this chapter the central concepts of 'inter-firm cooperation' and 'social institutions' 
have been explored, discussed, and defined. Inter-firm cooperation is considered as a 
(vertical and/or horizontal) relationship between two or more autonomous firms that is 
based on mutual obligations and objectives for a positive-sum game, involving recurrent 
transactions and some degree of joint control over activities and/or resources. Moreover, 
inter-firm cooperation is viewed as an important managerial issue because properly 
managed cooperative arrangements enable firms to enhance their innovativeness, 
responsiveness, and transactional efficiency, as well as strategic capabilities and 
positions. 
On the basis of a review of 'real-types' of inter-firm cooperation, it has been indicated 
that cooperative forms of economic organization tend to combine characteristics of 
ideal-type networks, markets, and hierarchies. In addition, it has been highlighted that a 
wide range of distinct market-like, hierarchy-like, and network-like organizational 
arrangements can be found across different industries in different countries. 
To date, research concerning forms of inter-firm cooperation has been highly 
fragmented due to the use of different theories, methods, and levels of analysis. 
Nevertheless, on the basis of the work of Ebers and Oliver (1998) it has been argued that 
36 CHAPTER TWO 
just two major paradigms, including a total of four distinct approaches, have been 
identified which both divide and unite the broad field of inter-organizational studies. 
These include the governance and social network paradigms, with the 'structuralist,' 
'power and control,' 'institutional theory,' and 'institutional economics and strategy' 
approaches as variants. With regard to its focus, the present study can be located within 
the governance paradigm and more in particular within the institutional theory variant. 
An even more precise positioning has been achieved by addressing the perspective on 
social institutions in the current research. 
In consonance with recent, mainly European-centered schools of thought among 
institutional theorists, social institutions are considered nationally distinct cognitive, 
normative, and regulative structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to 
social behavior. The nationally distinct societal environment comprised of these social 
institutions is regarded to channel and constrain the perceptions and actions of 
management and, in this way, affect the development of organizational structures. 
Chapter Three 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK 
In this chapter the analytic framework is constructed. The framework is intended to offer a 
set of concepts that help to answer the following two questions. First, what are the key 
attributes of vertical and horizontal inter-firm cooperation? Second, which social 
institutions are likely to have an impact on the formation of cooperative inter-firm 
relations? To find an appropriate theoretical foundation for the framework, four major 
cross-national comparative approaches for the analysis of forms of economic 
organization are reviewed. On the basis of this review the 'business systems approach' is 
identified as the most appropriate conceptual basis for the analytic framework. The part 
of the business systems approach concerned with inter-firm relations is discussed in detail 
and also further developed by combining it with concepts from the literature on 
organizational networks. Finally, on the basis of the resulting analytic framework for this 
study, propositions are formulated about the influence of social institutions on the 
development of cooperative inter-firm relations. 
3.1 Cross-national comparative research approaches 
As was explained in the introductory chapter, a cross-national comparative analysis will 
be made of both cooperative inter-firm relations and a range of social institutions. This 
calls for the construction of an analytic framework that provides concepts and focus for 
the empirical analysis involved. The literature in the area of economic sociology offers 
several approaches that may provide a useful basis for the construction of such a 
framework. 
Since the early 1980s a number of approaches have seen the light, which have gained 
the interest of a wide community of scholars from different countries. These are in 
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particular the 'societal,' 'business systems,' 'comparative capitalism,' and 'societal 
logic' approaches. In the next sections the key features of these approaches, including 
the issues focused upon, the conceptual frameworks offered and the methods used will 
be discussed and compared with each other in light of the aim of the current research. In 
this way, the most appropriate of the broad but distinct approaches can be determined as 
the basis for the construction of the analytic framework. 
3.1.1 The societal approach 
The societal approach is associated with the work of a group of French scholars known 
as the Aix-group (Maurice, Sellier and Silvestre 1984; 1986), which in a later instance 
engaged in collaborative research with German and British colleagues (Sorge and 
Warner, 1986). The approach is based on comparisons of closely matched pairs of 
firms in different societies involving a relatively small set of in-depth cases. As such, 
contrasts and commonalties have been uncovered with respect to the work structures in 
German and French firms. These findings gave rise to the development of embryonic 
theories about the connection between a range of nationally distinct social institutions 
and the structure of work relations. In the societal approach a loose framework of three 
key dimensions guides the comparison of matched cases. The dimensions include the 
educational system, organizational relations, and the industrial domain. Furthermore, the 
cases involve two different approaches. First, synchronic descriptions of pre-selected 
industry characteristics are made in order to arrive at a general overview of the situation 
under investigation. Second, diachronic descriptions, involving a period of several 
years, are made to estimate the tightness of the relations found in the synchronic 
analysis. 
Arndt Sorge (1991) developed the societal approach further in the direction of strategic 
management issues. As a result, the focus of the approach has shifted towards the link 
between societal effects and competitive advantage. In this amended version of the 
societal approach, retrospective comparisons are made of strategic developments in the 
fields of technology, organization, and human resources among same industries in 
different countries'. Similar to the analysis of the Aix-group, the cross-national 
The cases of the Aix-group were controlled for si/.e, product, production technology and dependency. 
The analysis of Sorge (1991) concerned the German, French and British firms in (he CNC machine 
lools industry. 
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comparisons are guided by a set of central concepts3 that help to relate institutional 
arrangements with business strategies and organizational forms. The amended societal 
approach differs from its predecessor with respect to the use of a larger number of cases 
instead of matching a limited number of them. The shift away from pair matching 
enabled the discovery of different product types, strategies, and levels of integration in 
same industries located in different countries. 
3.1.2 The business systems approach 
In the early nineties the business systems approach was introduced and developed 
further by the British scholar Richard Whitley and his associates (1990, 1991, 1992a, 
1992b (ed.), 1992c, 1994, 1996, 1999). The central motive for the development of this 
approach was to find explanations for the existence (and persistence) of nationally 
distinct forms of economic organization in different capitalist societies. This issue was 
raised in the context of the emergence of the newly industrializing economies in East 
Asia and the ongoing economic integration of the European Union. The business 
systems approach has been used in studies showing that not only in Asian economies 
such as Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea, but also in European countries including 
Great Britain, Germany, Denmark and Finland, distinct forms of economic organization 
have emerged under the influence of nationally distinct social institutions. 
The business systems approach offers a framework4 for systematic cross-national 
comparisons of firms and markets in their nationally distinct institutional context. The 
key element in this framework is the firm, which is considered the basic unit of 
economic action in a society. It is important to note here that within the business 
systems approach, the concept of the firm refers to 'dominant units of strategic decision-
making and coordinated planning' (Whitley 1996: 42; cf. Whitley 1987) and not to 
financial-legal entities as is the case of narrow definitions of Anglo-Saxon origin. The 
reason is that firms can be different entities in different societies: the Chinese family 
business, the South-Korean 'chaebol,' the Japanese 'keiretsu,' and the US American 
'divisionalized corporation' to name a few. 
Including competitive advantage, organizational boundaries, and human resources patterns (Sorge 
1991: 165). 
The business systems concept constitutes a framework of concepts rather than a 'grand theory.' The 
framework is meant to provide a 'common language' to facilitate both communication and comparison 
of research findings about forms of economic organization. 
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The business systems approach offers a set of broad characteristics that help to 
conceptualize the organization of industry. These include 'the nature of the firm' 
(concerning characteristics of management and ownership), 'market organization' 
(concerning characteristics of inter-firm relations), and 'authoritative coordination and 
control systems' (concerning characteristics of authority relations). Apart from these 
characteristics a set of key social institutions has been identified. These are suggested to 
channel and constrain the way firms and their business-to-business relations are 
developed. The key social institutions include, among others, cultural conventions 
concerning individualistic and collectivistic behavior, state involvement in the industry, 
the nature of the financial system, and mechanisms to ensure trust5. In connection with 
each other, the organizational characteristics and key social institutions constitute the 
business systems framework that can be used for systematic cross-national comparative 
analysis of industries in their national context. 
The business systems framework has been used by (mainly European) scholars for 
cross-national comparative research on forms of economic organization. Rather than 
regarding the business systems approach as a conceptual 'straightjacket,' it has been 
used as a basis for the development of new conceptual frameworks that suited the 
treatment of a variety of research issues about economic organization. For instance, Peer 
Hull Kristensen and his associates (1996: 113) formed an international team that used 
concepts of the business systems approach to compare Danish and Finnish business 
systems. The comparison was aimed to identify typical firms6 in both countries. The 
results of this comparison were analyzed in terms of social institutions, ranging from the 
state via elites to financial memberships and unions. In a similar fashion, Christel Lane 
(1989, 1995, and 1996) has used the business systems approach as a source of concepts, 
rather than a set of guidelines in her research on the features of 'industrial orders' in 
There is some variation in the range, emphasis and labeling of the key social institutions that are 
presented in the books and articles on this subject by Whitley (1990 -1999). This is considered 
inherent to the ongoing development that the business systems approach has witnessed over the past 
decade (compare, for instance, the frameworks in the 1992 book on pages 26 and 25, and the one in 
the 1999 book on page 79). The key social institutions used in the analytic framework of this study 
reflect this development in the business systems literature. Therefore, they are not literally labeled 
according one of the different frameworks presented by Whitley, but rather combine the different 
labels under a general denominator (sec also Rademakers 1998; Rademakers and Van Valkcngoed 
1999). 
Typical firms are considered as 'real types' as opposed to Weberian 'ideal types.' Kristensen et al. 
(1996) refer here to the work of Spiethoff (1953: 459), who defined the real type as: 'Reflecting the 
sum of actually existing uniformities, everything that is essential in relations to a given phenomenon' 
(see also Section 2.2.3). 
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different European societies. Her cross-national comparisons of economic 
transformations in the British, German, and French industries were guided by a 
framework combining different theories and approaches, in which neo-institutionalist 
perspectives dominate. On the basis of this framework, different structures and 
development trajectories of economic organization were identified and connected with 
nationally distinct social institutions including the state, the financial system, unions, 
and mechanisms to ensure trust in the business society of the countries involved. 
3.1.3 The comparative capitalism approach7 
In the first half of the 1990s, J.Roger Hollingsworth and his American and European 
associates developed a cross-national comparative approach concerning governance 
regimes across different industries both within and across different nation states. The 
roots of this approach can be traced back to a series of historical analyses of 
transforming governance regimes in a variety of industries in the USA (Campbell, 
Hollingsworth and Lindberg 1991). A comparative empirical assessment of the 
transformations of these industries yielded the view of governance structures (i.e., 
market-hierarchy arrangements) that had changed under the influence of power and 
control, culture, pressures for economic efficiency and technology development, and in 
particular state policies (Campbell and Lindberg 1991: 333). The upshot of this research 
served as a basis for the 'comparative capitalism' approach. An enhanced analytic 
framework was developed to accommodate cross-national comparative analyses of 
governance regimes on industry level (Hollingsworth, Schmitter and Streeck (eds.) 
1994; Hollingsworth and Boyer (eds.) 1997). The industry/sector was taken as the key 
unit for comparative analysis, while governance regimes were defined as 'the totality of 
institutional arrangements that regulate transactions inside and across different 
economic systems.' The conceptual framework guiding the analysis comprised a 
typology of governance structures, including markets, hierarchies, networks, 
associations, and state agencies (Campbell et al. 1991: 14, 31; Hollingsworth et al. 
1994: 9-10, 273-278). On the basis of this framework, governance regimes in different 
industries were investigated in a variety of countries in the US, Japan, and Europe. The 
results of these case studies have gained the insight that 'Differences in governance 
within sectors are often recognizable as national differences in that they follow a 
similar logic across sectors' (Hollingsworth and Streeck 1994: 272). The findings gave 
Also known as the 'social systems of production' approach (see Hollingsworth and Boyer 1999). 
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rise to a further development of the 'comparative capitalism' approach by adding 
societal effects to the framework in line with the work of Maurice et al. (see Section 
3.1.1). The societal effects identified on the basis of the case studies consisted of three 
broad types of nationally distinct social institutions. These included 'identical rules of 
behavior' created and enforced on a national level (such as laws); 'identical factual 
conditions' on a national level (such as capital markets), vocational training systems and 
national craft trade unions; and 'identical cultural and political resources' that determine 
the extent of trust on which actors can draw. The role of the state in the industry is not 
considered as a nationally distinct social institution, but as an integral part of the 
governance regime of an industry/sector. Clearly, the 'comparative capitalism' approach 
does acknowledge the influence of social institutions on the development and 
transformation of forms of economic organization. However, in recent versions of the 
accompanying conceptual framework, the (possible) connections between particular 
institutions and particular forms of governance have remained largely unspecified. 
3.1.4 The societal logic approach 
The 'societal logic' approach originates from the USA and has been developed on the 
basis of studies of Asian enterprises by Marco Orrii, Gary Hamilton, and Nicole 
Woolsey-Biggart (1988; 1991; 1996; 1997). Their work is based on a loose framework 
for the analysis of enterprise structures and the organizing principles of the environment 
in which they are embedded. The focus of this approach is on historically developed 
authority relations among individuals and institutions in a society. Research in this 
fashion has led to the identification of distinct state-business relationships, principal 
corporate actors, and both intra-firm and market strategies in Japan, South-Korea, and 
Taiwan. In contrast to the other comparative approaches discussed above, explicit 
attention is given to the issue of isomorphism8 (Orrii, et al. 1991: 364). The 'societal 
logic' approach is characterized by both rich and detailed, and also 'grounded' rather 
than systematic descriptions of organizational patterns concerning ownership, intra-
group networks, inter-group networks, subcontract relations, investment patterns, and 
growth patterns. Regarding the focus of this approach, an important data source is the 
available documentation concerned with the historical formation and the organizational 
Isomorphism refers to the results of homogenization processes of formal organizations within a 
particular environment. Dimaggio and Powell (1983) have identified three major forms of institutional 
isomorphism: Coercive - based on political influence and legitimacy issues; mimetic - based on 
standard responses to uncertainty; and normative - associated with professionalization processes. 
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patterns of the enterprise groups under investigation. Finally, in this approach the 
number of enterprise groups is considered an important explaining variable in itself. 
Hence, no predetermined sets of firms (e.g. top-five) are analyzed, but rather the 
naturally occurring patterns within the economy. 
3.1.5 Comparing the comparative approaches 
As shown by Table 3.1, the four major comparative approaches differ from each other in 
some important respects. Marked differences concern the focus (transformation processes 
vs. structural properties of economic organization), the nature of the framework used 
(loose vs. more structured), and the methods used (matched pairs of firms vs. naturally 
occurring patterns; framework-guided vs. 'grounded'). Both within and between the 
different approaches, the level of analysis of the forms of economic organization varies 
between enterprise, industry and country level. In addition, all approaches discussed here 
pay attention to the nature and historical roots of social institutions from a national 
perspective. 
Regarding their features, which of the major approaches can be considered most suitable 
as a basis for the analytic framework of this research? With regard to the research aim, 
the major criterion is the appropriateness for detailed, systematic, and rigorous cross-
national comparisons of patterns of inter-firm cooperation in their institutional 
environment. The 'societal' approach offered by Sorge, Maurice, and their associates 
offers a loose analytic framework is focused on human resources and other intra-firm 
characteristics, rather than on aspects of inter-firm organization. Obviously, this focus is 
not in accordance with the requests for the current research. The 'societal logic' 
approach of Hamilton, Biggart, and Orru is considered little suitable as a basis for the 
analytic framework as well. Although attention is paid to different forms of inter-firm 
organization, the approach is 'grounded' in nature and does not offer a systematic 
framework of concepts for cross-national analysis. 
At a first glance, the 'comparative capitalism' approach seems well suited as a basis for 
the analytic framework for the present study. The approach is focused on different forms 
of inter-organizational arrangements across similar industries in different countries. The 
findings are linked with the influence of social institutions (in particular the state) on a 
national level. In this sense, the 'comparative capitalism' approach reflects remarkable 
similarities with the 'business systems' approach, certainly with regard to the types of 
social institutions that are taken into account. However, the 'comparative capitalism' ap-
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Table 3.1 Cross-national comparative research approaches compared (source: see text) 
Approach 
Societal 
Business 
systems 
Compar-
ative 
Capitalism 
Societal 
logic 
Key 
Authors 
Maurice et al. 
(1986); Sorge 
and Warner 
(1986) 
Sorge 
(1991, 1997) 
Whitley 
(1990-1999) 
Kristensen et 
al. (1996) 
Lane 
(1989-1996) 
Campbell, 
Hollingsworth 
and Lindbcrg 
(1991); 
Hollingsworth 
Schmitter and 
Streeck 
(1994) 
Orru, 
Hamilton, 
and Biggart 
(1988-1997) 
Major focus 
Comparison of 
work structures 
within firms in 
different countries 
Comparison of the 
societal advantages 
of technologies, 
organization & 
human resources of 
firms in national 
industries 
Comparison of 
nationally distinct 
patterns of both 
inter- and intra-firm 
organization 
Comparison of 
nationally distinct 
types of economic 
organization 
Comparison of 
structures and 
transformation 
processes in 
national industries 
Comparison of 
governance regimes 
in US, Japanese, 
and European 
industries 
Comparison of 
nationally distinct 
forms of enterprise 
organization in East 
Asia 
Framework and key 
methods 
Loose framework, use of 
matched (in-depth) cases, 
and both diachronic and 
synchronic analysis 
Loose framework of key 
concepts. Guidance by 
propositions/hypotheses. 
Both diachronic and 
synchronic analysis 
Business systems frame-
work (key characteristics 
of economic organization 
and key social institutions). 
Historical analysis of 
social institutions, 
synchronic analysis of 
inter- and intra-firm 
characteristics 
Business system frame-
work, real-type concept. 
Historical analysis of 
social institutions, 
synchronic analysis of 
inter- & intra-firm 
characteristics 
Loose multi-theory 
framework in line with the 
business systems approach. 
Historical analysis of 
social institutions, 
diachronic analysis of 
industrial orders 
Broad conceptual frame-
work of governance struc-
tures and institutions. 
Historical analysis of 
transformation processes 
across different industries; 
cross-national comparison 
of governance structures 
on industry level 
Loose framework, 
'grounded' approach of data 
collection and analysis. 
Historical analysis of the 
development of enterprises, 
their inter-firm relationships 
and social institutions 
Key institutional 
influences 
System of industrial 
relations, system of 
vocational education 
System of industrial 
relations, system of 
vocational education 
Social institutions 
including state 
involvement in the 
industry, the financial 
system, mechanisms 
to ensure trust, 
individualism vs. 
collectivism 
Social institutions 
including the state, 
elites, financial 
membership, and 
unions 
The state, the 
financial system, 
unions, and 
mechanisms to ensure 
trust 
State policy, capital 
markets, laws on 
property rights, 
vocational education 
systems, unions, and 
cultural / political 
resources 
State agencies. 
financial systems, 
cultural conventions 
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proach pays not much systematic attention to the influence and nature of social 
institutions. By contrast, the business systems approach offers a framework that, among 
other things, systematically links characteristics of inter-firm organization with a set of 
key social institutions. In addition, due to its systematic nature, the business systems 
approach offers a 'common language' that facilitates communication between students 
of forms of economic organization in different national contexts. Regarding these 
merits, the business systems approach is considered the appropriate basis for the 
construction of the analytic framework of this study. 
3.2 The market organization framework 
The market organization framework is the part (or sub-system) of the business systems 
approach concerned with aspects of inter-firm organization. It forms the basis on which 
the analytic framework for this study is built. For this purpose, the market organization 
framework will be addressed in greater detail. A number of its shortcomings will be 
discussed with regard to observations in the literature and the requests that come with 
the aim of this research. The shortcomings identified will be either moderated or 
eliminated, resulting in an adapted framework that will be used to guide and structure 
the present study. 
3.2.1 Market organization characteristics 
The market organization framework is comprised of four characteristics: 1) the extent of 
long-term cooperative relations between firms within and between sectors; 2) the 
significance of intermediaries in the coordination of market transactions; 3) the stability, 
integration, and scope of business groups; and 4) the dependence of cooperative 
relations on personal ties and trust (Whitley 1992b: 9). Together, these characteristics 
help to identify inter-firm relation patterns on either the industry or national level. 
Figure 3.1 The essence of the market organization framework 
Market organization 
characteristics 
1 
» 
•t 
4 
— ^ r ^ ^ 
*~^ 
Sel of nationally 
distinct social 
institutions 
Source: see text 
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These patterns can be explained at least in part by linking each of the four market 
organization characteristics with the nature of social institutions. Figure 3.1 presents the 
essence of this part of the broader business systems approach. 
3.2.2 Critique and refinements 
Observations in the literature point out a number of shortcomings of the business 
systems approach, which, consequently, are relevant to the market organization 
framework as well. Remarks have been made about the vulnerability of the business 
systems approach to accusations of determinism (Lane 1995: 13; Wilkinson 1996: 433). 
For instance, by linking market organization characteristics to the nature of key social 
institutions, there is a risk of overlooking the possibility that organizations may be 
powerful enough to choose and support deviant behavior over a long period of time 
(Mayer and Whittington 1996: 93). Moreover, not all firms may be equally capable to 
adapt to or take advantage of the constitutive forces of social institutions (Kristensen et al. 
1996: 116). As a consequence, great caution is required if explanations are generated for 
empirical findings that result from the application of the market organization framework. 
A common critique of the business systems approach concerns its basically static nature 
(Loveridge 1998: 1050). In line with this, the market organization framework essentially 
facilitates the identification of organizational structures and practices at a particular 
point in time. However, in a less static fashion, the framework can be used for 
diachronic analysis as well to gain insights into the relative stability of forms of inter-
firm organization. Another shortcoming concerning the static nature of the market 
organization framework is that it largely disregards change. Hence, it is proposed here to 
make explicit the process dimension that, in fact, implicitly underlies the framework. In 
this way, attention is paid to structural developments in the past to arrive at explanations 
about present patterns of inter-firm organization. Moreover, the role of management in 
these restructuring processes becomes more visible. The adjustment suggested here is 
displayed in Figure 3.2. As can be seen, the formation of cooperative inter-firm relations 
is viewed as an ongoing process. Triggered by either operational or strategic motivations 
(see Chapter 1), existing inter-firm relations are developed further by management. This, 
in turn, results in new or adjusted patterns of inter-firm cooperation. 
A final observation concerns the appropriate level of analysis in business systems 
research. A debate on this issue resulted in the view that forms of economic 
organization may be analyzed either on industry or national level (Whitley 1992b: 269). 
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However, the nation state is considered the appropriate level of analysis for social 
institutions in most cases (ibid.). This certainly makes sense for institutions such as legal 
systems, which usually have been established by national governments and therefore 
have a national scope. 
Figure 3.2 The market organization framework with a process dimension 
Existing inter-
firm relations 
(Re)-shaping of 
inter-firm relations 
by management 
Resulting 
characteristics of 
inter-firm cooperation 
Source: see text 
However, within a country, key social institutions can be industry-specific in nature as 
well. For instance, the different forms and nature of state involvement in the agri-food 
industries of most capitalist societies imply the existence of social institutions that are 
both industry and nationally specific in nature (cf. Tracy 1989). Therefore, in case of 
cross-national comparative analysis of industries in their national contexts, it is 
considered useful to analyze the nature of (national) social institutions from an industry 
perspective. 
Apart from the observations found in the literature, the market organization framework 
has some shortcomings with respect to the requests that emanate from the aim of this 
study. First, the attention paid to the characteristics of business groups reflects the 
'genesis' of the framework, i.e., studies of East Asian economies (Whitley 1992b: 6). In 
these studies large inter-industrial clusters of either autonomous or integrated firms have 
been identified as important forms of economic organization in, for instance, South-
Korea (the 'chaebol') and Japan (the 'keiretsu' and 'kigyo shudan'). However, devoting 
attention to the characteristics of inter-industry business groups is considered not very 
relevant to the current study, given its focus on inter-firm cooperation within European 
industries. Moreover, a detailed analysis of forms of both horizontal and vertical inter-
firm relations is likely to lead to the identification of possible clusters of firms. 
Second, the characteristic concerning 'the relative importance of intermediaries in 
transaction coordination' is quite broadly defined and needs adjustment as well as 
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further articulation. Intermediaries are, for instance, Japanese trading firms that 
coordinate the inputs and outputs of a huge number of firms in a range of different 
markets. Trading firms of this kind are quite characteristic of East Asian economies, 
which make it less relevant to pay explicit attention to such phenomena in an analytic 
framework for studying inter-firm relations within European industries. In the market 
organization framework trade/industry associations9 (i.e., business associations) are also 
mentioned as possible intermediaries (Whitley 1992b: 12; cf. Lane 1996) but not much 
elaborated upon. It is argued here that business associations can be looked at as forms of 
(multi-)horizontal inter-firm cooperation (Bowman 1989: 47, 261; Whitley, Henderson, 
Czaban and Lengyel 1996: 411; Schmitz 1997: 9) rather than organizations which are 
intended to coordinate transactions between autonomous firms. The consequence of this 
perspective is that further articulation is required of the attributes that indicate the 
relative importance of business associations as forms of inter-firm cooperation (see 
Section 3.3). The market organization framework also takes into account banks as 
possible intermediaries. However, banks are an integral part of the financial system as 
well, and are regarded as a key social institution. Consequently, the way banks and firms 
interact is seen as a reflection of the nature of the financial system rather than an 
attribute of inter-firm cooperation within an industry. 
Finally, the characteristics of the market organization framework are broadly defined. 
Although these characteristics proved their usefulness in broad analysis on a national 
level, they provide insufficient focus for detailed analysis of inter-firm relations on an 
industry level. For instance, it is not entirely clear what the distinct attributes are of the 
'long-term cooperative relations' mentioned as one of the characteristics. Therefore, to 
enhance the intended rigor of this research, further refinement is needed in order to 
distinguish different forms and degrees of cooperation between individual firms. 
In sum, the market organization framework has been adjusted here in some respects. 
First, the process that underlies the development of inter-firm relations has been made 
explicit. Second, an industrial perspective has been taken for the analysis of the nature 
of key social institutions. Third, the 'Asian' market organization characteristic 
concerning the role of business groups was removed from the framework. The scope of 
the characteristics pertaining to the relevance of intermediary organizations has been 
As a matter of definition, trade associations link together competing firms, while industry associations 
link firms across the supply chain of an industry. 
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limited to trade associations as forms of horizontal inter-firm cooperation. Finally, more 
detailed specifications of key attributes of both vertical and horizontal cooperative inter-
firm relations has been called for. 
3.3 Attributes of inter-firm cooperation 
In the former section various types of inter-firm cooperation have been discussed. A 
distinction has been made between vertical and horizontal inter-firm relations. 
Moreover, in a more implicit fashion, a distinction has been made between bilateral 
(between two firms) and multilateral (business groups and trade associations) types of 
inter-firm cooperation. These dimensions can be combined with each other in a 2x2 
matrix (see Matrix 3.1) to arrive at four major categories of forms of inter-firm 
cooperation (cf. Schmitz 1997: 8). In this matrix, the categories of multilateral forms of 
inter-firm cooperation are further distinguished as direct relations and arrangements via 
business associations. 
Matrix 3.1 Forms of inter-firm cooperation 
Vertical 
Horizontal 
Bilateral 
1 
Buyer-supplier 
arrangements 
3 
Dyadic competitor 
arrangements 
Multilateral 
' I l 2 
Cross-supply chain arrangements, 
including industry associations 
4 
Multi-competitor arrangements, 
including trade associations 
Source: see text 
Given this categorization invokes the question: what are the key attributes of these 
different forms of inter-firm cooperation? This question will be answered in a three-step 
approach. First, key attributes of vertical cooperation between two or more individual 
firms (box 1 and part of box 2 in the matrix) will be defined. Similarly, attributes of 
direct horizontal cooperation (box 3 and part of box 4) will be discussed. Finally, 
attributes that indicate the relative importance of trade/industry associations as forms of 
multilateral inter-firm cooperation (part of box 2 and 4) will be addressed. 
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3.3.1 Vertical inter-firm cooperation 
The market organization characteristics of vertical inter-firm relations, i.e., 'the extent 
of long-term cooperative relations between firms' and 'the dependence of cooperative 
relations on personal ties and trust,' can be transformed into a more systematic 
distinction between ideal-typical spot-market and cooperative relations (cf. Sako 1992). 
These ideal types are seen here as the extremes of a continuum ranging from 'no 
cooperation' to 'full cooperation.' In addition, the ideal types can be unraveled into key 
attributes according to a categorization offered by Ebers and Grandori (1997: 270), 
which includes three major 'flows.' These include flows of 'information,' 'mutual 
expectations,' and 'resources and activity links'10. Albeit they not have been worked out 
as detailed as considered required for the present study, these three kinds of 'lower level 
ties' are considered very useful because they help to identify -on a micro-level- what goes 
on between firms (Ebers and Grandori 1997: 269). Therefore, in the remainder of this 
section, the three kinds of 'lower level ties' will be integrated into the analytic framework 
and also further refined. In this way, key attributes of the content of inter-firm relations 
will be identified. 
Flows of information concern the degree and nature of both knowledge and information 
exchange between firms, which guides the decisions and actions of management with 
respect to the form and content of the inter-firm relationships. In ideal-typical cooperative 
relations the exchange of information exceeds prices, qualities, and quantities. In 
addition, knowledge is shared to enable mutual learning. On the contrary, in spot-market 
relations standardized commodities are exchanged between anonymous parties (Whitley 
1992a: 73). This implies that there is no exchange of knowledge between the parties 
involved, while information exchange is limited to the necessary transactional data. 
Flows of mutual expectations refer to the basis of exchange relations that influence 
actor's perceptions of the opportunities and risks of cooperation. A distinction can be 
made between the dichotomous types of explicit and implicit contracts, i.e., relations 
These three kinds of Hows (or: 'lower level ties') among firms have been identified by Ebers (1997: 23-
33) and elaborated upon from a different perspective by Ebers and Grandori in the concluding review of 
articles in a book edited by Ebers (1997) on the formation of inter-organizational networks. In the 
introductory part of the book the 'flows' and also other concepts including 'distribution of property rights 
over resources' and 'main co-ordination mechanisms' are used as a framework to position different 
papers by different authors (pp. 23-33). In the concluding part the attention is turned to 'what goes on 
between organizations.' At this point, the three kinds of ties (or 'flows') are presented as key elements of 
inter-organizational networks (Ebers and Grandori 1997: 270-271). 
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based on formal contracts versus relations based on (informal) trust and mutual 
obligations (Smitka 1991; Sako 1992; Lane and Bachmann 1996). In practice, exchange 
relations are likely to involve some level of trust, as well as the use of written contracts. 
Moreover, transactions between firms can be based on written contracts with various 
degrees of specificity and standardization. The reliance on contracts with a high degree 
of specificity and standardization is considered here as an attribute of spot-market 
relations. With respect to the other side of the continuum, oral agreements imply the 
reliance on trust instead of written documents, which is an attribute of ideal-typical 
cooperative relations. 
Flows of resources and activity links refer to the degree of interdependence of the 
parties that are engaged in an exchange relation. The time horizons involved in such 
relations are considered an important indicator. Put in dichotomous terms, time horizons 
can range from long-term (multiple years) to short-term (restricted to a single 
transaction) horizons (Whitley et al. 1996: 410). Long-term horizons are an attribute of 
cooperative relations, while ideal-typical spot-market relations are focused on current 
options and outcomes. The frequency of transactions is not considered a distinguishing 
attribute, because a series of repeated transactions between firms does not necessarily 
involve a long-term horizon and a single transaction does not exclude cooperation 
(Rademakers 1998: 1022). Another aspect of interdependence in inter-firm relations is 
the degree of risk sharing between the parties involved (Dore 1983: 465). In spot-market 
relations risk sharing is absent, as the selection of a supplier or customer is limited to 
price-quality deliberations. In contrast, ideal-typical cooperative relations include risk 
sharing and may occur in such arrangements as joint research and development, joint 
production, cross-shareholdings, or joint investments (Orru, Hamilton and Suzuki 1989). 
Table 3.2 provides an overview of the key attributes of ideal-typical spot-market relations 
and cooperative relations that have been discussed here. 
Finally, additional indicators for either cooperative or spot-market relations are the degree 
of self-sufficiency through vertical integration on the one hand, and a focus on narrow 
specialist activities on the other (Whitley 1990: 68). Firms may choose to internalize their 
risks instead of exposing themselves to market relations. This is reflected by a high degree 
of self-sufficiency, which indicates that authoritative control by vertical integration is 
preferred to (external)" flexibility and cooperative inter-firm relations. On the contrary, a 
External flexibility refers lo ihe possibility of sharing or Iransferring risks with/to exehange partners. 
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focus on narrowly specialized activities may reflect a preference for spot-market relations 
that offer high flexibility but no authoritative control. However, a high level of firm 
specialization may also indicate that a higher priority is adhered to cooperative inter-firm 
relations. Such relations offer relatively less external flexibility than spot-market relations 
(De Man 1996) but provide the possibility of shared risks and control based on common 
goals (Smitka 1991). 
Table 3.2: Key attributes of cooperative and spot-market relations 
Cooperative relations 
1. Flows of information: 
-
2. Flows of mutual expectations: 
• Surpassing transactional information 
• Exchange of knowledge 
• Relations largely based on mutual trust 
3. Flows of resources and 
activity links: 
Long-term time horizon 
• Risk sharing 
Spot-market relations 
1. Flows of information 
,. 
2. Flows of mutual expectations: 
3. Flows of resources and 
activity links: 
• Limited to price, quantity, and quality 
• No exchange of knowledge 
• Relation based on formal contracts 
Short-term time horizon 
• No risk sharing 
?«"* 
i « 
1 
Source: see text 
3.3.2 Horizontal inter-firm cooperation 
There is a wide range of possible forms and degrees of (direct) cooperative relations 
between two or more competitors. For instance, horizontal cooperation may involve 
strategic partnerships to reshape the industry, to enter new markets or to learn from each 
other. Horizontal cooperation may also remain limited to loose relations between firms 
meant to keep each other informed. This wide variety of possible forms is difficult to 
capture in a limited set of attributes. Nevertheless, the three kinds of 'flows' that have 
been applied in the former section are adequate for the identification and description of 
forms of horizontal cooperation. 
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Flows of information, i.e., knowledge and information exchange in horizontal relations 
between autonomous firms can happen on either an ad-hoc or a more structural basis, 
while the intensity may vary as well. Information exchange between competitors may be 
highly non-obligatory and limited to non-commercial aspects of the industry, including for 
instance the exchange of views on general developments, governmental policies or the 
reputation of the industry in society.12 The same is true for the exchange of knowledge 
without competitive value. More intensive forms of knowledge and information are likely 
to occur in structured cooperative relations such as joint ventures, interlocking directorates 
(Wong 1996: 91), and 'learning relationships' or 'skill-substitution arrangements' (Child 
and Faulkner 1998: 102). 
With respect to flows of mutual expectations, horizontal cooperative relations can be based 
on various combinations of implicit agreements (trust) and explicit (formal) contracts. In 
other words, similar to vertical relations, the basis of horizontal relations can range from 
informal (high trust) to formal agreements (specified contracts). In this respect Child and 
Faulkner (1998: 56) have identified indicators for different degrees of trust in horizontal 
relations, which range from calculation (low trust, competitors are just prepared to work 
with each other) via mutual understanding (moderate levels of trust, the parties get to 
know each other) to bonding (parties concerned with one another's interests). 
Finally, the flows of resources and activity links in horizontal cooperative relations reflect 
the degree of interdependence between the firms involved (cf. Orru et al. 1989). A key 
element here is the degree of risk sharing between the partners, which can differ 
considerably. Risk sharing is low in arrangements where firms make use of (e.g., hires) the 
equipment of competitors, or where firms share transport capacity for efficiency reasons. 
Higher levels of risk sharing are present in mutual share holdings, which involves flows of 
financial resources that link (part of) the destiny of firms to each other. Finally, competing 
firms may engage in joint investments ranging from joint ventures to joint research and 
development, wherein all risks are shared among the participants. Table 3.3 provides a 
summary of the key attributes of horizontal cooperative relations. 
Note that this kind of information exchange is more likely to occur via trade/industry associations, 
which will be addressed in the next section. 
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Table 3.3 Key attributes of horizontal cooperative relations 
Flows between competing firms 
1. Flows of information: 
2. Flows of mutual expectations: 
3. Flows of resources and 
activity links: 
• Information exchange 
• Knowledge sharing 
• Implicit agreements 
• Explicit contracts 
• Joint investments 
• Mutual shareholdings 
• Equipment sharing 
Source: see text 
3.3.3 Business associations13 
As indicated in Matrix 3.1 (see Section 3.3), two different types of business associations 
are distinguished. The first type is the trade association, which has a voluntary 
membership base of competing firms. Industry associations are the second type and link 
together firms across various stages in the supply chain of a particular industry. Both 
types of business associations may have either voluntary or compulsory membership. 
The relative importance of business associations as forms of multilateral cooperation is 
captured by three key characteristics, including their membership base, their statutory 
powers, and the functions they perform for their members (cf. Lane 1996; Best 1990). 
The membership base of business associations can range from complete industry 
representation to fragmented membership. In addition, business associations may be 
able to function as quasi-governmental agencies with statutory powers to influence or 
direct the behavior of their members. Moreover, business associations can vary with 
respect to the range of functions offered. In Figure 3.3 these characteristics are placed on a 
continuum that helps to indicate the relative importance of business associations as forms 
of multilateral inter-firm cooperation within an industry. 
Contrary to the 'membership base' characteristic, which is quite straightforward in nature, 
the 'statutory powers' and the 'range of functions provided' characteristics need some 
closer attention. Based on past research, Hollingsworth, Schmitter and Streeck (1994: 7) 
This section has been presented to sub-theme 3 'Business Systems in their International Context' of the 
15th EGOS Colloquium, University of Warwick, 4-6 July 1999. 
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enumerated a broad range of possible roles and functions of business associations, 
including both aspects of statutory powers and ways of bundling strengths.'4 
Figure 3.3 The relative importance of business associations 
Membership base fragmented •* • complete representation 
Statutory powers weak •* • strong 
Functions provided limited range ^ ^ wide range 
LOW 4 P HIGH 
Relevance of business associations 
as forms of multilateral inter-firm cooperation 
Source: see text 
Firstly, with regard to statutory powers, business associations may have the power to 
formulate rules for their members that range from far-reaching to more limited strategic 
implications. In case of strong statutory powers, business associations act as semi-
governmental agencies that decide on the prices, production goals, and investment 
strategies of their members. However, if statutory powers are weak, the rule-setting 
abilities of associations may be limited to the promotion of standardization (quality, 
protocols) and the formulation of general codes of conduct that are based on voluntary 
compliance. Secondly, possible ways to bundle strengths/resources of multiple firms are 
reflected in a range of functions that can be provided by business associations, including 
the dissemination of information, technology transfer, channeling communication, 
influencing state agencies, initiating and coordinating joint research and development, 
and organizing vocational training. 
The diversity of roles and functions listed by Hollingsworth and his associates are likely 
to have either intended or unintended effects that can be subsumed to three broad 
The full list includes information services, organizing joint research and development, promoting 
standardization, transferring technology, organizing vocational training, channeling communication, 
influencing state agencies, formulating codes of conduct, negotiating with labor, and also deciding on 
prices, production goals, and investment strategies. 
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categories15. These include the reduction of risks (by sharing them via business 
associations), the reduction and sharing of uncertainties (by knowledge and information 
sharing and common rules), and the increase of industry cohesion (through forms of 
socialization via business associations) (cf. Lane 1996: 282). In the remainder of this 
section, these categories will be used to structure a further discussion of the roles and 
functions of business associations on the basis of the diverse body of relevant literature. 
The reduction of uncertainties 
Bowman (1989: 46) considers business associations as vehicles of systematic and 
formalized inter-firm communication. This communication involves the dissemination 
of knowledge16 and information by business associations, which can be carried out in a 
variety of ways and in different degrees of intensity. Associations may act as informational 
brokers (Liitz 1997: 234; McEvily and Zaheer 1997b) or, in Burt's (1992) terms: as a 
'bridging tie' in a network of firms. In addition, business associations can generate and 
channel information on market developments, and bring firms together to hear about 
advances in management and technology (Smitka 1991: 78). Moreover, they can function 
as the 'collective memory' or the 'pool of common knowledge' for their members. 
Examples are the publication of annual reports about the industry and the development of 
industry-specific databases. 
Business associations can play an important role in self-administration by groups of firms 
which reduces uncertainties for firms with respect to the government and the legal system. 
Self-administration involves the development and monitoring of common rules, routines 
or procedures, and may be based on statutory powers of the association (Van Waarden 
1992: 523; Lane 1996). Less constraining forms of self-administration are based on 
voluntary approval of the association members. Examples include the development of 
general agreements of trade as standards for inter-firm exchange of goods, the formulation 
of agreements against the application of environmentally harmful production methods or 
materials, the setting of quality standards, and the formulation of general codes of conduct. 
A distinct form of self-administration by business associations is the provision of 
arbitration services to solve conflicts between members (Van Waarden 1992: 523). 
The three categories may not be entirely mutually exclusive. However, they are considered helpful to 
achieve an adequate level of distinction between the range of different (possible) functions of business 
associations. 
The dissemination of knowledge is seen to include the function of technology transfer, which was 
mentioned before. 
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According to Nooteboom (1999: 4), the availability of a third party with sector-specific 
expertise that can be called for arbitration reduces the need of firms to use detailed 
exchange agreements. In addition, the idea of being judged by experts from within the 
industry instead of 'laymen' from courts generates confidence that the parties in conflict 
are treated fairly (i.e., in line with the mores of the industry). 
The reduction and sharing of risks 
Firms can reduce and/or share their business risks by pooling resources, knowledge, and 
operations (Child and Faulkner 1998). These joint actions can be facilitated, initiated, 
and/or coordinated by business associations. This is particularly true for activities that are 
considered not commercially sensitive, such as research aimed to solve shared problems, 
vocational training and generic promotion. These kinds of joint action are considered 
particularly relevant to industries that include many small firms. For example, the 
Brazilian shoe manufacture industry benefited greatly from trade fairs organized by trade 
associations, which proved to be critical to firms to conquer export markets (Schmitz 
1997: 8-10). Interestingly, as a result of their marketing success, firms grew larger and the 
need for joint marketing efforts decreased. However, at the same time the need for joint 
action shifted towards quality improvement, which resulted in more vertical cooperation 
via both direct firm-to-firm relations and business associations. 
Another aspect of the reduction of risks via business associations is the relative ease of 
firms to act in a concerted way in case of crises that harm the competitive basis of the 
entire industry. With regard to the empirical setting of this study, it can be noted that the 
agri-food industry is particularly sensitive to such crisis. Examples of crises that occurred 
in the second half of the 1990s are the concerns about genetically modified organisms in 
the EU, the outbreak of swine fever in the Netherlands, BSE in Britain, chicken viruses in 
Hong Kong, and dioxin-poisoned chicken in Belgium. Obviously, these food-related crises 
had very negative consequences for the firms involved and the consumers' trust in the 
agri-food industry as a whole. The initiation and coordination of joint action in case of 
such crises can -at least- be facilitated by business associations. In this respect, business 
associations may function as a center in firm-government networks for the coordination of 
coherent policies to solve industry-wide crisis and also as a provider of industry-specific 
issue management (Van den Bosch and Van Riel 1998). 
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Reinforcement of industry cohesion 
Functions of business associations that reinforce industry cohesion, in fact, reduce both 
uncertainties and risks of the firms involved. This is certainly true for the joint promotion 
of interests with respect to the government. The development of governmental policies 
that affect the industry on either a regional, national, pan-European, or global level are 
sources of risks and uncertainties. An example is the policy making process that preceded 
the ban on CFKs in refrigerators and aerosols. This process took multiple years and 
implied great uncertainties and risks for the investment policies for the firms involved; 
such a ban would lead to severe shifts in markets, key technologies, and the need for raw 
materials (Harrison 1997). Business associations promoting their members interests to 
governments can be seen as lobby organizations (Greenwood et al. 1992). To be able to 
perform such a function, business associations require a 'critical mass' of loyal members, 
resources, and information, which form the basis for their influence on governmental 
circles (Van Waarden 1992: 522). Apart from lobbying, business associations may also 
promote their member's interests by participating in policy formulation. In such a 
function, business associations can be seen as providers of industry-specific knowledge for 
the development of sustainable governmental policies (Lane 1992: 73). 
Business associations can also play a role in strengthening industry cohesion by providing 
a 'platform' where managers of competing firms meet each other on a regular basis (i.e., 
horizontal cohesion). If managed poorly, these meetings may result in clique formation, 
inertia, collusion, and decreased competitive strength (Best 1990)17. If managed properly, 
however, regular meetings are likely to enhance the efficiency and competitive strength of 
the industry. Examples are the development of a joint strategic approach vis-a-vis 
external competitors, or initiatives to raise efficiency, skills, and quality (Schmitz 1997: 
10). In such cases, business associations facilitate processes of socialization (Casson and 
Cox 1997: 180), the building of trust, reputations, and commitment (Smitka 1991: 151; 
Bachmann 1998: 15), goal alignment (Porter 1996)'8, and cooperative learning (McEvily 
and Zaheer 1997a). In a similar fashion, business associations can function as a meeting 
point for managers of firms that operate in different stages of the supply chain (i.e., 
vertical cohesion). The results of the above discussion are summarized in Table 3.4. 
See also Chapter 2. 
Or, in Porter's (1996) terms: building joint industry foresight, a joint way of perceiving the future of 
the industry. 
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Table 3.4 Categories and functions of business associations 
Categories 
Reduction of uncertainties 
Reduction and sharing of risks 
Reinforcement of 
industry cohesion 
Functions 
• Dissemination of information and/or knowledge 
• Development and monitoring of common rules, 
routines or procedures 
• Arbitration in case of conflicts 
• Initiation of joint activities 
• Initiation and coordination of actions in case of 
industry-wide crises 
• Promotion of interests (lobbying/participation) 
• Platform for managers of competing firms 
(horizontal cohesion) 
• Platform for managers of firms operating in 
different stages of the supply chain (vertical 
cohesion) 
Source: see text 
3.4 The nature and influence of key social institutions 
In tune with the business systems approach adopted here, the development of cooperative 
inter-firm relations is seen as being channeled and constrained in large measure by 
national social institutions. This observation raises two questions. First, which key social 
institutions are likely to influence the formation of cooperative inter-firm relations? 
Second, what is the suggested influence of these social institutions according to the 
literature? These questions will be addressed on the basis of a review of the relevant 
business systems literature that has been published between 1990 and 1999. 
3.4.1 Background and proximate social institutions 
Within the business systems approach two broad types of key social institutions are 
distinguished: 'background' and 'proximate' social institutions (Whitley 1992b: 19). First, 
background social institutions reflect the cultural and historical background of societies. 
This involves, among others, cultural conventions about authority, individualistic 
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behavior, and mechanisms to generate trust. Second, proximate social institutions have 
emerged during, or along with, the industrialization of countries. Prominent examples in 
this respect are the state and the financial system. Contrary to their 'background' 
counterparts, these social institutions are directly involved in economic activities as they 
partially or fully control the availability and access to resources, property rights, and 
political control (Whitley 1992b: 269). 
Evidence from empirical research underpin the observation that cohesive arrangements of 
these background and proximate social institutions are likely to constitute relatively stable 
and dominant patterns of inter-firm cooperation on either national or industry level 
(Nishida and Redding 1992; Whitley 1990; 1994; Lane 1996; Lane and Bachmann 1996; 
Rademakers 1998). However, in tune with this observation, different patterns of inter-firm 
organization may co-develop within national contexts characterized by a great variety of 
non-cohesive social institutions (Whitley 1992b: 177; Lane 1996: 297). This implies that 
variations in patterns of economic organization may exist both within and across countries. 
On the basis of a review of the business systems literature, Rademakers and Van 
Valkengoed (1999) have identified the key social institutions that are considered to 
influence the development of inter-firm relations. Relevant proximate social institutions 
in this respect are the legal system, the state, and the financial system. The relevant 
background social institutions include (informal) mechanisms to ensure trust and 
conventions about the legitimacy of individualistic vs. collectivistic behavior. Below, 
the suggested influence of these social institutions on the development of inter-firm 
relations is discussed in more detail. 
3.4.2 Mechanisms to generate trust" 
Social institutions that generate and guarantee trust between exchange partners in a society 
can vary in strength and can include both cultural conventions and legal systems. The 
nature and strength of these social institutions are considered crucial factors in the 
development of cooperative relations between firms (Lane and Bachmann 1996). The 
connection between mechanisms to generate trust and the development of cooperative 
inter-firm relations can be discussed further on the basis of three different types of trust, 
including process-based, characteristic-based, and institutionally-based trust (Zucker 1986: 
This paragraph has been presented at the IAMA Food and Agribusiness Conference "Building Trust in 
the Agro-Food System: Trade, Technology and Competitiveness", Florence, Italy, July 13-16 1999. 
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60). Different bases of trust may co-exist in a society, but one is likely to dominate the 
others. 
First, process-based trust is based on experiences that are built between exchange parties 
over time. People learn to know each other and built reputations, which leads to 
expectations that the behavior of the business partner will be more or less the same as in 
the past. This type of trust particularly develops in societies where a reliable law system or 
any other formal basis for trust is largely absent, as is the case with Chinese family 
business structures in East and Southeast Asia (Redding 1990; Rademakers 1999). 
Cooperative relations between firms as well as business associations may develop but are 
not very likely to evolve as a dominant pattern of inter-firm organization in such 
circumstances. 
The second type, characteristic-based trust, refers to groups wherein membership is based 
on kinship relations, religion, ethnicity, or corporate identity. Within these groups stable 
conventions of social behavior exist and are monitored through social control. Examples 
are kinship-based networks of Chinese family businesses and also networks of Japanese 
firms in which trust between employees is for an important part based on corporate (i.e., 
collective) identity. Characteristic-based trust is considered as basis of stable cooperative 
relations between firms. This is also considered true for the development of business 
associations. For instance, on the basis of ethnic characteristics, Chambers of Commerce 
for Chinese entrepreneurs have emerged in different parts of the world (Weidenbaum and 
Hughes 1996). 
The third type of trust is institutionally-based and is tied to formal social structures, such 
as legal systems, in a society. Backed by the possibility of law-based sanctions, firms are 
able to reduce their perceived uncertainties about exchange relations by making use of 
written contracts. However, as Lane (1996: 284) pointed out, different types of legal 
systems exist that offer different degrees of certainty with regard to the use of formal 
contracts. For instance, the German system of commercial law (influenced by Roman law) 
is much more formal and detailed than its British counterpart. In Britain, the 'case-law' 
system prevails, which involves an empirical approach that yields more unpredictable 
outcomes. In contrast to their British counterparts, firms operating in the context of the 
more stable German legal system can reduce their risks more easily by basing their 
exchange relations on standard contracts. Firms in the British context are more likely to 
draw up detailed custom contracts for their exchange relations. Contrary to the standard 
contract system in Germany, this may hinder the development of stable long-term relations 
because it is very difficult to foresee future developments that affect the relationship. 
62 CHAPTER THREE 
The nature of the case-law system may raise the need for a source of more certainty in 
exchange relations, such as generally accepted standard contracts. The development of 
standard contracts, such as general agreements of trade, can be an important right of 
existence for business associations in societies with a case-law system. The effectiveness 
of these standard contracts, however, depends on the ability of business associations to 
offer arbitration services. This ability, in turn, depends on the membership of the 
association and the statutory power of the association. 
3.4.3 Individualism vs. collectivism 
Cultural conventions in a society concerning the legitimacy of individualistic versus 
collectivistic behavior are seen as an important underlying factor in the formation and 
maintenance of inter-firm relations (cf. Nishida and Redding 1992). Such conventions 
reflect the relative ease of generating commitment between social actors on a non-personal 
or kinship basis. 
A high level of individualism, as opposed to collectivism, involves the reducibility of 
collective institutions to individual self-interest (Whitley 1992b: 22). The prevalence of 
this form of individualistic behavior in a society is likely to hinder the development of 
long-term cooperative relations as opposed to more pragmatic and 'contractual' relations 
within limited time frames. On the contrary, societies where social norms dominate that 
support pursuing common goals and curb opportunistic behavior in exchange relations, 
constitute a more favorable environment for the development of cooperative inter-firm 
relations. 
Business associations that are powerful enough to protect collective norms and values by 
influencing the behavior of individual actors are not very likely to develop in societies 
where the pursuit of individual self-interest is considered legitimate (cf. Bachmann 1998: 
14). However, in such circumstances types of business associations may develop that serve 
the immediate self-interests of their members. Associations of this type are likely to be 
focused on the provision of individual services rather than collective goods. The reverse 
situation may occur in societies where norms and values favor collectivistic behavior of 
individuals and firms. In such circumstances, business associations may be developed for 
the organization of joint action. Such associations are likely to have a broad membership 
base that makes them relatively stable and powerful forms of collective action. 
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3.4.4 State involvement in the industry 
The nature of state involvement in the industry is likely to affect in large measure the 
development of cooperative inter-firm relations (see, e.g., Hollingsworth et al. 1994; 
Whitley 1994; Lane 1995; Rademakers 1998a). Three distinct types of state involvement 
that reflect the relative commitment to coordinate industry development are 
distinguished here: 'developmental,' 'facilitating,' and iaissez faire.' First, a 
'developmental' state is actively involved in the coordination and control of industrial 
development. Government agencies are directly involved in strategies of firms through, 
for instance, controlling sources of credit. Examples of societies that represent the 
developmental state type are South-Korea (Zeile 1996: 269) and France (Groenewegen 
1989). Second, a 'facilitating' state is also involved in industry development though in a 
more indirect way. Most initiatives for industry development are left to the firms 
involved. However, the facilitating state influences the direction of the developments to 
some extent through general policies that are supported by subsidies, levies, research, 
infrastructure, and educational systems. The German state, for example, reflects many 
features of the 'facilitating' state type (Lane 1995: 43). Third, a state of the 'Iaissez 
faire' type leaves the development of industries to the forces of supply and demand in 
free markets. Firms are largely left to their own devices and, within the boundaries of 
the law, the (immediate) right of the strongest prevails. The role of the state in industry 
is limited to issuing and sanctioning laws to limit market externalities owing to market 
failure such as environmental pollution, the exhaustion of resources, the emergence of 
monopolists, and ruthless competition. Countries such as Great Britain and the United 
States are considered examples of state behavior close to the iaissez faire' type (Albert 
1993). 
The three contrasting types of state behavior with respect to industry differ considerably 
with respect to their influence on the development of cooperative inter-firm relations. In 
case of a 'developmental' state, the national government embodies an important source 
of business risks and opportunities. Hence, managers are likely to adhere a higher 
priority to securing good relations with state officials rather than developing cooperative 
relations with exchange partners (Whitley et al. 1996). In addition, not much space is 
left for self-administration via voluntary business associations, as this activity is more 
likely to be carried out by state agencies. Business associations may be involved as 
well, though in the sense of organizations with compulsory membership, which function 
as an extension of state agencies. Conversely, a 'facilitating' state is likely to foster the 
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development of inter-firm cooperation. Risks in the business environment are limited to 
some extent as the continuity and self-administration of industrial development is 
stimulated. This is also likely to have a positive influence on the development of 
business associations, which help to bundle the visions of managers on industry 
development and which can play an intermediary role between the industry and the 
government (cf. Van Waarden 1992: 551). Finally, in the case of a 'laissez faire' state, 
the industry environment of firms is largely unstructured. Such circumstances may 
stimulate firms to gain greater control over their environment by internalizing business 
risks via vertical integration and gaining market power via horizontal integration. This, 
in turn, will make the development of both long-term cooperative inter-firm relations 
and business associations less relevant. With respect to multi-lateral cooperation, 
however, the development of business associations in the more narrow sense of lobby 
organizations may be encouraged. These organizations provide firms with the needed 
critical leverage to promote their interests to the government, which is an important 
source of acts and regulations that can affect the profitability of the industry. 
3.4.5 The financial system 
The nature of the financial system in free market economies is considered to have strong 
implications for the development of cooperative inter-firm relations. Financial systems, 
as social institutions, can be broadly distinguished as 'capital-based' and 'credit-based' 
systems (Zysman 1983; Whitley 1990). 
The key feature of the credit-based financial system is that long-term bank loans are the 
dominant way for firms to fill their capital needs. In addition, as the profitability of 
banks in such systems largely depends on the performance of their clients, they have 
closer relations with their client firms, rather than relations at arm's length. Examples of 
this 'bank capitalism' are the financial systems of such countries as Japan, Switzerland, 
and Germany (Johnson 1982: 206; Albert, 1993: 106; Lane 1995). Long-term bank 
credit implies a high stability in the supply of financial resources. This, in turn, allows 
managers to work with long time horizons with respect to the investment policies of 
their firm. The enhanced stability of firm behavior is considered to facilitate the 
development of both bilateral and multilateral cooperative relations between firms (cf. 
Lane 1996). 
In contrast to its credit-based counterpart, capital-based financial systems are 
characterized by highly liquid capital markets as the major source of investment capital 
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for firms. In terms of capital provision, the role of banks is limited to the provision of 
short- and medium-term loans. As a result, firms in a capital-based financial system 
have to be more self-sufficient in financing their investments. Relations with banks are 
at arm's length, and firms are pressed to show short-term high returns on investments to 
anonymous capital suppliers to keep the firm's stock price on a safe level. Such 
circumstances are likely to encourage management to take a short-term attitude. This, in 
turn, implies swift changes in firms' policies that impede the development of 
cooperative inter-firm relations (Whitley 1992b). Similarly, business associations based 
on voluntary membership are not likely to become very relevant either. The instability of 
firm policies and the short-term view of management are considered to hinder joint 
efforts that contribute to the joint development of the industry. 
3.5 Analytic framework and propositions 
In the previous sections of this chapter, the key characteristics and attributes of inter-
firm cooperation and the relevant key social institutions that influence them have been 
identified, discussed, and linked to each other. The resulting building blocks of the 
analytic framework will now be integrated into a single analytic framework. This 
framework, in turn, will be used to formulate five propositions. 
3.5.1 The analytic framework 
The concepts of both cooperative inter-firm relations and key social institutions 
discussed in this chapter are integrated in the analytic framework, which is presented in 
Figure 3.4. 
The nature and influence of key social institutions have been addressed apart from each 
other, but it is stressed here that it is their combined influence that has to be taken into 
account if an analysis is made of forms of inter-firm organization. In addition, the 
suggested influence of key social institutions should not be considered as a 
straightjacket with regard to the analysis of patterns of inter-firm cooperation. As 
indicated earlier in this chapter, unanticipated solutions of firms for institutional 
pressures have to be taken into account as well. Moreover, due to the great complexity 
of the organizational phenomena investigated here, the findings of this study will be 
mainly tentative in nature. 
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Figure 3.4 Analytic framework 
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The application of the framework in cross-national comparative analysis implies a four-
step approach. First, empirical data is collected on the attributes of inter-firm cooperation 
on the industry level in different countries (the UK and the Netherlands). Then the nature 
of key social institutions with respect to the industry is determined. Next, for each country 
the elements in the framework are analyzed in connection with each other, resulting in an 
image of the patterns of inter-firm cooperation in their national contexts. Finally, the 
patterns found are compared and contrasted with each other to gain insights into the 
connection between the nature of key social institutions and either industry or country-
specific patterns of inter-firm cooperation. 
3.5.2 Propositions 
The analytic framework forms the basis for the formulation of propositions about the 
influence of key social institutions on the development of cooperative inter-firm 
relations. 
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As was pointed out earlier20, cohesive institutional arrangements are likely to channel 
and constrain the development of distinct and fairly stable patterns of inter-firm 
cooperation. On the contrary, if an industry is embedded in an environment with a 
variety of non-cohesive key social institutions, this is expected to result in fragmented 
and unstable patterns of inter-firm cooperation. Given this notion, two sets of key social 
institutions can be identified that are highly contrasting in nature. They represent the 
extremes of a continuum ranging from 'strongly facilitating' to 'strongly hindering' the 
development of cooperative inter-firm relations (see Figure 3.5). Obviously, there are 
many different 'intermediate' institutional arrangements possible that can be placed 
somewhere in between the extremes of this continuum21. 
Figure 3.5 Contrasting institutional arrangements 
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Source: see text 
20 See Section 3.4.1. 
For instance, a financial system within a particular national setting may appear not clearly 'capital 
based or credit-based' in nature but rather combine features of both types. Moreover, it is also possible 
that a particular institutional setting includes a combination of 'facilitating' and 'hindering' social 
institutions (see also the propositions in the remainder of this section). 
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On the basis of the continuum that reflects the expected degree of development of inter-
firm cooperation in connection with a set of 'facilitating' and 'hindering' key social 
institutions, five propositions can be formulated. The first two propositions reflect the 
extremes of the continuum. The three remaining propositions represent institutional 
arrangements and degrees of inter-firm cooperation that are located in between these 
extremes. 
Proposition J 
Firms are likely to develop cooperative rather than adverse inter-firm 
relations if they are embedded in an institutional environment that 
combines a facilitating state and a credit-based financial system, trust 
based on either collective identities or a formal law system, and cultural 
conventions that legitimate collectivistic behavior. 
The above proposition is mirrored in the following one: 
Proposition 2 
Firms are likely to develop adverse rather than cooperative relations if they 
are embedded in an institutional environment that combines 
'developmental' or 'laissez-faire' state behavior and a capital-based 
financial system with trust largely based on either past experiences or a 
case-law system and cultural conventions that legitimate individualistic 
behavior. 
In a less extreme fashion, propositions can be formulated taking into account less cohesive 
environments which, however, may still be supportive or detrimental to the development 
of cooperative inter-firm relations. 
Proposition 3 
Firms are likely to develop cooperative inter-firm relations if they are 
embedded in an institutional environment in which key social institutions 
that are facilitating in nature are more dominant than the hindering ones. 
Proposition 3 is mirrored in the following proposition: 
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Proposition 4 
Firms are likely to develop spot-market relations if they are embedded in 
an institutional environment in which key social institutions that are 
hindering in nature are more dominant than the facilitating ones. 
Finally, a proposition can be formulated which addresses the possibility that inter-firm 
relations are developed in an institutional environment without facilitating key social 
institutions dominating their hindering counterparts or vice versa. 
Proposition 5 
A disjointed pattern of cooperative and spot-market relations is likely to 
develop in industries that are embedded in an institutional environment in 
which there is no dominance of key social institutions that are either 
facilitating or hindering in nature. 
These five propositions make explicit the Leitmotiv for the field research as reported in 
Chapter 5. In tune with this, the results of discussion of the empirical findings (in 
Chapter 6) will be fed back to the propositions formulated here. 

Part II: Field study 

Chapter Four 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This chapter is about the methodological aspects of this study, i.e., where and how the 
research project was carried out to arrive at answers to the central research question. 
The criteria used to select firms and business associations for the case studies are 
addressed. Moreover, attention is paid to the data collection and analysis process 
involved in the comparison of cases between the UK and Dutch potato industries. The 
chapter concludes with a discussion of research quality issues including the reliability 
of the outcomes, as well as construct-, internal-, and external validity aspects. 
4.1 The research process 
A cross-national comparison of two 'national' cases (i.e., two industries in their national 
context) was conducted to gain insights in the influence of national social institutions on 
the development of inter-firm cooperation on the industry level. The cases were 
comprised of detailed descriptions of inter-firm relation characteristics (including the 
role of business associations) on the industry level and the nature of key social 
institutions in two different countries. The aim of the cross-national comparison was to 
reveal similarities and differences between the two cases in order to find empirical 
evidence to support the propositions on the influence of nationally distinct social 
institutions on patterns of inter-firm organization'. 
A two-sided comparative approach with four cases (two with fairly similar and two with different 
outcomes) would have been a more rigorous way to find evidence for the connection between forms of 
economic organization and nationally distinct institutional conditions (Licberson 1992: 109; Ragin 
1987: 49; Djelic 1998: 14). However, given the available time and resources for the research project, it 
was not possible to conduct research in more than two countries. 
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As addressed in Chapter 1, the potato industries of the UK and the Netherlands formed 
the setting of this empirical research. The data collection and analysis processes that 
made up the comparison of cases are outlined in Figure 4.1. The 'helix of research 
stages'2 displayed in this figure reflects the interplay between theory and the empirical 
world. Theory was used to make sense of empirical findings and the results, in turn, 
were used to sharpen and refine theory to arrive at theoretically structured insights 
regarding the social phenomena under investigation (cf. Ragin 1992: 225). 
Figure 4.1 Outline of the research process 
Empirical field 
Exploration of 
the Dutch 
potato industry 
Exploration of 
the UK potato 
industry 
Data collection 
about the UK & 
Dutch potato 
industries 
Feedback from 
the respondents 
1 
Start 
Theory 
V2/ 
Construction 
of an initial 
conceptual 
framework 
\ 4 / 
Revision of the 
framework, 
development 
of interview 
protocols 
V6/ 
Data 
processing 
procedures 
V 8/ 
Creation of 
the case 
database 
Final 
analysis 
09/1995 1996 1997 1998 09/1999 
Time 
Source: see text 
The research process comprised nine major stages and covered a time period that ran 
from September 1995 to September 1999. Research started in 1995 with an exploration 
of the Dutch potato industry (stage 1). An exploration was carried out to get acquainted 
with the industry on the basis of secondary sources including consultant reports, annual 
The use of the helix metaphor was inspired by a presentation by Peer Hull Kristensen at the EMOT 
Summer School in Helsinki, Finland, August 1997. 
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reports, industry-specific journals, and publications from research institutes, ministries, 
and banks3. In 1996, an in-depth case study was conducted on a merger between two 
potato trading firms. In this way, detailed knowledge was gained about the industry 
structure, products and markets, past and recent developments, key actors, interests, 
sensitivities, and other characteristics that helped to create a clear view of what was 
going on in the industry. Moreover, open interviews with directors/chairmen of firms 
and business associations were conducted to test the relevance of the initial concepts 
and frameworks that had been developed (stage 2). The pilot interviews were also useful 
for gaining access to organizations via the 'snowball sampling' principle (Babbie 1995: 
287). In addition, as the number of organizations involved in the research project 
increased, it became easier to convince managers from other organizations to 
participate. This was also true for the UK4 potato industry, which was explored in a 
similar fashion (stage 3). Open interviews were conducted with managers, secretaries, 
and/or chairpersons of business associations, the editor of a British periodical for the 
potato industry (Potato Review), professors, lecturers, and Ph.D. candidates of Wye 
College (University of London) and the University of Edinburgh, consultants, and two 
Dutch export managers. An overview of the organizations involved in the explorative 
stage of the research project is provided in Appendix I. The results of the explorations in 
both countries provided input for the revision of initial concepts and frameworks, and 
the development of interview protocols (stage 4). In addition, the explorations resulted 
in insight, which was necessary for the selection of firms, persons, and business 
associations to be involved in the data collection (stage 5), processing (stages 6, 7, and 
8), and analysis (stage 9) stages of the research. These stages will be discussed in greater 
detail below. 
4.2 Data collection and analysis 
4.2.1 The selection of firms and business associations 
Data was collected about the inter-firm relations of 12 Dutch and 17 UK-based potato 
firms. They were selected with the intention to include all leading firms (in terms of 
market share) and business associations in the comparative case study. In addition, a fair 
These organizations included, in particular, the (Dutch) Agricultural Economics Research Institute, the 
Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, and the Rabobank. 
4 
In fact, of all the firms approached in the Netherlands and the UK. only one English potato processor 
responded negatively to the request for participation in the research project. 
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balance in the representation of firms per stage of the potato supply chain' in each 
'national' case was sought (i.e., fairly equal numbers of potato processors and seed and 
ware potato merchants). Many firms appeared to be active in multiple stages of the 
supply chain. However, in general they had a clearly identifiable core business, which 
often turned out to be the activity they had performed since their establishment. 
Moreover, the selection of firms was made in such a way that large (more than 500 
employees), medium-sized (50-500 employees), and small firms (employing 50 people or 
less) were included. As a consequence of the application of these selection criteria, no 
distinction was made with regard to three different firm types that can be found in the 
UK and Dutch potato industries, i.e., private firms, co-operatives, and private firms 
owned by co-operatives. Such a distinction was not considered relevant for this study 
because the aim was trace naturally occurring patterns of inter-firm organization (Orru 
et al. 1991) between autonomous units of strategic decision making (Whitley 1987; 
1996). Moreover, both from the explorative stage of the research project and the 
available literature (see, e.g. Lamont 1992) it appeared that the behavior of co-
operatives and private firms in inter-firm relations is remarkably similar6. 
Certain organizations were excluded from the comparative case study. Individual potato 
growers were not included because of their sheer numbers and their geographical 
dispersion. It was considered more practical and efficient to collect adequate 
information about farm-to-firm relations via the suppliers and customers of potato 
growers in the potato industry. Supermarket chains, restaurants, wholesalers, and their 
business associations were seen as organizations of different industries and were 
therefore excluded from the selection. 
To sum up, the potato firms involved in this study were selected on criteria including 
market dominance, core business, and size. After applying these criteria to the Dutch 
potato industry, the final selection of Dutch-based enterprises included four firms with 
potato processing as their core business, four firms with a major stake in ware potato 
trade, and four seed potato merchants. The age of the firms ranged from more than 100 
years to less than 10 years. The four selected potato processors represented at least 80% 
of the Dutch potato processing capacity for par-fried potato products (estimation based 
on interviews and annual reports of the Dutch business association VAVI). The four 
ware potato merchants were estimated to account for about 60% of the market for ware 
A graphical representation of the potato supply chain, as well as a discussion of players, structures, 
idiosyncrasies and developments in the UK and Dutch potato can be found in Chapter 5, Section 5.1. 
This is also confirmed by the findings from the field study reported in Chapter 5. 
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potatoes (estimation based on pilot interviews and annual reports). In the early nineties, 
the four seed potato merchants represented about 90% of the Dutch and 60% of the 
world market for seed potatoes (estimation based on research findings from Lamont 
(1992) and Renia (1997), and pilot interviews). The selection does not include breeder 
firms. The reason for this is that all major breeding activities in the Netherlands 
appeared to be integrated by seed potato merchants. Hence, it was not possible to select 
autonomous ('stand alone') breeder firms with a substantial market share in the Dutch 
potato industry. Table 4.1. presents the Dutch firms that have been involved in this study, 
including information about their date of establishment, core business, market ranking, 
and size (in tenns of employees). In Appendix II an extensive overview can be found of 
the range of potato supply chain activities that each firm is involved in. 
Table 4.1 The Dutch potato firms involved in this study 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
Firm 
Agrico (NL) 
Aviko (NL) 
Eriva 
Farm Frites (NL) 
Hettema 
Koval 
McCain Foods (NL) 
Lamb-Weston/Meijer (NL) 
Nedato 
Schaap 
Van Rijn 
ZPC 
Est. 
1973 
1962 
1992 
1971 
1898 
1972 
1972 
1920 
1962 
1965 
1855 
1919 
Market 
Ranking* 
1-10 
1-10 
10-20 
1-10 
1-10 
1-10 
1-10 
1-10 
1-10 
1-10 
1-10 
1-10 
Core 
activity** 
s, w 
P 
w 
p 
b, s 
w 
P 
P 
w 
s, w 
s 
s 
No. of 
employees 
100-500 
100-500 
1-50 
100-500 
50-100 
1-50 
100-500 
500-1000 
50-100 
100-500 
100-500 
100-500 
Source: research database 
* Represents the interval of market shares (e.g. top-10). It provides an indieation of the market position 
of the firm with regard to its core business. 
** b = breeding; s = seed potato trade; w = ware potato trade and/or pre-packing, p = potato processing. 
The selection of potato firms in the UK included (in terms of their core business), five 
potato processors, five ware potato merchants, five seed potato merchants, and one 
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breeder. The five potato processors represented at least 80% of the UK potato 
processing capacity for par-fried potato products7. 
Table 4.2 The UK potato firms involved in this study 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
Firm 
Anglian Produce 
Aberdeen Seed Potato Org. 
Baxter Avey 
Bird's Eye Walls 
Branston Potatoes 
Esk Frozen Foods 
Fenmarc Produce 
Fisher Frozen Foods 
Gordon & Innes 
Horberry & Baker 
Idwal Fisher 
MBM Produce 
McCain GB 
PBI Cambridge 
R&P Baker 
Smillie Ltd 
Worth & Co 
Est. 
1967 
1978 
1984 
1946 
1968 
1972 
1968 
1948 
1947 
1944 
1976 
1990 
1967 
1928 
1988 
1959 
1948 
Market 
Ranking* 
1-10 
<20 
<20 
1-10 
1-10 
1-10 
1-10 
1-10 
1-10 
1-10 
1-10 
1-10 
1-10 
1-10 
<20 
<20 
1-10 
Core 
activity** 
w 
s 
s 
p 
w 
p 
w 
p 
s 
s 
p 
w, s 
p 
b 
s 
s 
w 
No. of 
employees 
50-100 
1-50 
1-50 
>1000 
1-50 
100-500 
100-500 
500-1000 
1-50 
1-50 
100-500 
500-1000 
500-1000 
100-500 
1-50 
1-50 
1-50 
Source: research database 
* Represents the interval of market shares (e.g. lop-10). It provides an indication of the market position 
of the firm with regard to its core business. 
** b = breeding; s = seed potato trade; w = ware potato trade and/or prc-packing, p = potato processing. 
The five ware potato merchants were estimated to account for about 70% of the market 
for ware potatoes (estimation based on interviews, annual reports, and firm profiles). 
The six seed potato merchants that were included in the selection were well known (but 
often small) UK firms of which the market share, however, could not be estimated. The 
breeder was the only large firm of this type that was based in the UK. The age of the UK 
organizations ranged from several decades to less than 10 years. 
Estimation based on interviews, journal articles and an unpublished Wye college working paper by N. 
Wilson et al. (draft 1996). 
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Table 4.2. lists the UK potato firms involved in this study, including information about 
their date of establishment, core business, market ranking, and size (in terms of 
employees). In Appendix II, an extensive overview can be found giving the range of 
activities performed by each firm in the potato supply chain. 
Data was also gathered on the relative importance of business associations. The business 
associations were selected on the basis of criteria similar to the ones used for the firms. 
The aim was to include a dominant trade association for every stage of the supply chain, 
as well as the major industry association(s) in the potato industries of both countries. 
Moreover, to facilitate cross-national comparison, trade associations representing firms 
in the same stages of the potato supply chain (e.g., associations for potato processors) 
were selected in both countries. In this way, the possibility was reduced of differences in 
functions performed by different types of trade associations. 
Table 4.3 The selection of Dutch business associations 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Name 
Commissie Aardappelen 
(CA) 
Nederlandse Federatie 
Pootaardappelen (NFP) 
Vereeniging ter Behartiging 
van den Nederlandschen 
Aardappelhandel (VBNA) 
Vereniging voor de Aardappel-
verwerkende Industrie (VAVI) 
Est. 
1956/96* 
1952/98* 
1938/98* 
1962 
Type 
Industry 
association 
Trade 
association 
Trade 
association 
Trade 
association 
Focus 
Entire Dutch 
potato industry 
Seed potato 
trade 
Ware potato 
trade 
Potato 
processing 
Source: research database 
* The second date indicates a fundamental change in the organization 
(a merger and/or major change in mandate). 
On the basis of the criteria, four business associations were selected that are entirely 
devoted to the Dutch potato industry, including one industry association and a total of 
three trade associations for potato processors, ware potato merchants, and seed potato 
merchants. Table 4.3 gives an overview and some details of the Dutch business 
associations that were selected. 
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In the UK, many business associations were found that were either fully or partially 
active, on a local or national level, in the potato industry. The selection of UK business 
associations resulted in a group comprised of one industry association and three major 
trade associations that matched the focus of their Dutch counterparts. Table 4.4 provides 
an overview of the UK business associations involved in this study. 
Table 4.4 The selection of UK business associations 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Name 
British Potato Council 
(BPC) 
National Association of Seed 
Potato Merchants (NASPM) 
Scottish Potato Trade Association 
(SPTA) 
Potato Processors 
Association (PPA) 
Est. 
1934/97* 
1940 
1970 
1968 (±) 
Type 
Industry 
association 
Trade 
association 
Trade 
association 
Trade 
association 
Focus 
Entire UK potato 
industry 
Seed potato 
trade 
Ware and seed 
potato trade 
Potato 
processing 
Source: research database 
* The second date indicates a fundamental change in the organization 
(i.e., a major change in mandate). 
In conclusion, the selection of firms and business associations involved in the field 
study included virtually all of the leading organizations in the potato industries of both 
countries. Moreover, firms and business associations that are involved in all of the 
major stages of the UK and Dutch potato supply chain have been included in the 
selection (seed potato trade, ware potato trade, and potato processing). Seed and ware 
potato growers, and 'customers' of the potato industry such as supermarkets and 
restaurant chains were excluded from the selection. 
4.2.2 Data collection: interview types and protocols 
Information about the degree and nature of inter-firm cooperation in the UK and Dutch 
potato industries has been obtained by collecting data about characteristics of individual 
firms and business associations and by aggregating the results at an industry level. The 
relevant data was gathered from multiple sources including annual reports, consultant 
reports, journal articles, and interviews. Half-structured interviews made up the major 
data source, while the secondary sources were used to either add or check information. 
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Between January 1997 and August 1998, a total of 31 half-structured interviews were 
conducted with key informants (see Appendix III and Appendix IV). These informants 
(respondents) were the managing directors of firms and chairpersons/secretaries of the 
business associations in the Netherlands and the UK. These particular respondents were 
considered (and turned out to be) the most knowledgeable with regard to the 
information required, i.e., the nature of business-to-business relations and functions 
performed by business associations. At two large UK firms and one business 
association, the product and/or marketing managers were interviewed instead of the 
managing directors/chairpersons. In general, the respondents showed great willingness 
to participate in the research project in return for the final results. The firms and 
business associations were approached via personal networks, snowball sampling or 
directly by a letter followed by multiple telephone calls and fax messages. The letters 
contained, among others, an explanation of the purpose of the research, why the 
organization had been selected and which organization financed the project. 
Depending on the respondents' willingness to provide detailed information, which 
varied to some degree, the interviews took between one to two hours. Because of time 
and financial constraints, a number of interviews were conducted by telephone. For 
these interviews the same protocol was applied as for the face-to-face interviews. Most 
telephone interviews took between 30 to 45 minutes. Although the telephone interviews 
were less in-depth in nature than the face-to-face ones, adequate data about firms and 
business associations were obtained which otherwise would not have been accessible. 
The telephone interviews were conducted with respondents at three Dutch and six UK 
potato firms, and two UK business associations. In addition, telephone interviews were 
used to complete the data about two Dutch firms that had been visited but had not yet 
provided all the information needed. Appendices III and IV provide details about the 
types of interview held at the organizations and the location of their head office. 
To facilitate the data collection process, protocols were developed (cf. Yin 1994: 64). 
These protocols included address lists, preliminary data about the focal firms (e.g., 
journal articles), schedules of field visits, persons to be interviewed, and interview 
protocols. The interviews were taped* and transcribed. The resulting data was combined 
with information from secondary sources (if available) and then processed into reports. 
Moreover, the resulting interview reports were sent to the respondents with a request for 
Two interviews were not taped as this was considered to lead to withholding of data by the respondent. 
In these instances notes were made. To minimize data loss and distortion the notes were processed into 
interview reports within 24 hours, including all data gathered (cf. Bourgois and Eiscnhardt 1988: 819). 
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their comments and to check whether the data was correct. The feedback of the 
respondents was largely comprised of suggestions for minor adjustments. In addition, 
some requests were made to delete passages that were considered to be sensitive 
information by the respondents. Because these corrections only concerned additional 
data categories, no changes were made that would have altered data about inter-firm 
relation characteristics. After the interviews, the reports were corrected on the basis of 
the comments and were added to the case study database. After completion, the 
magnitude of this database totaled about 600 typewritten A4-sized pages. 
The interviews at firms and business associations were conducted on the basis of an 
interview protocol. The protocols provided a general introduction for the respondents, 
both structured and open interview questions, and also explanations about the meaning 
of the concepts used. The telephone interviews were based on the same protocol (see 
Appendices V and VI). All respondents were provided with the interview questions in 
either a Dutch or English version. For the telephone interviews, the protocol was sent to 
the respondents in advance with the request to read it carefully beforehand. Most 
respondents followed the instructions in the accompanying letter and read the protocol 
before the interview took place. This helped to shorten the time needed for the actual 
interview and to identify issues that needed further clarification. 
The interview questions for the firms and business associations were developed on the 
basis of concepts from the analytic framework (see Chapter 3) and deduced from the 
research questions (see Chapter 1). The interview was set up according to a two-step 
approach. A short and structured question was asked about every topic and was 
followed by an in-depth discussion about the background of the answer that was given. 
In this way, an overview was kept with regard to the combination of the time available 
and the topics covered. Moreover, this two-step approach facilitated a systematic 
analysis of the huge amount of data that was obtained during the interviews. 
The questions for the interviews at the firms were designed to capture managerial 
perspectives on key attributes of inter-firm cooperation, levels of self-sufficiency, and 
the relative importance of business associations. All buyer and supplier relations of the 
selected firms were addressed. This meant that, in the case of vertically integrated firms 
which were not entirely self-sufficient, questions were asked about the inter-firm 
relations per activity of the firm in the potato supply chain. Depending on the amount of 
time available for the interview, additional questions were asked. Topics included 
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strategic developments, the role of the state, the sources of capital for investments, and 
structural changes in the industry. These issues had been treated in more detail in the 
pilot interviews during the explorative stage of the field research. 
The interview protocol (see Appendix V for the English version) is divided into 6 
sections that together covered the major information needs of this study. Section I of the 
interview protocol is aimed at capturing the range of potato supply chain activities of the 
focal firm and also to find out to which extent these activities were fully or partially 
owned. Next, in Section n, the focus is on the vertical (i.e., buyer and supplier) relations 
of the firm. To obtain data about the nature of these inter-firm relations, a four-point 
scale was used with the ideal types of 'spot-market' and 'cooperative' relations at the 
extremes. After an explanation of these concepts and the application of the four-point 
scale, the respondents were asked to characterize the vertical inter-firm relations of their 
organization9. In Section ILT, questions are asked about the basis of the vertical relations 
of the firm. Respondents were asked to indicate the importance of formal contracts and 
informal ties in their exchange relations, how easy (or difficult) it was to switch from 
one buyer or supplier to another, and the general duration of their vertical relations. 
Section IV treated the horizontal inter-firm relations by providing the respondents with a 
range of possible forms of horizontal business-to-business cooperation, which formed 
the starting point of an in-depth discussion about this subject. With regard to Sections II 
to IV, the respondents were asked to explain their choice for every interview question. 
This two-step approach yielded two different types of data. First, counting the scores 
from the scales that had been filled out by the respondents generated data that was semi-
quantitative in nature (Hutjes and Van Buuren 1992: 67). Second, qualitative data was 
gathered by asking questions about the respondents' motivations for their choices and by 
asking for examples. This provided information to interpret and analyze the patterns of 
inter-firm cooperation found on the basis of the structured questions. It also helped to 
detect possible misinterpretations of the concepts by the respondents. 
With the questions in Section V, data was obtained about the managerial perspectives 
on the relative importance of business associations. This was done by providing the 
respondents with a list of possible functions10, which were linked with a range of major 
The scale was deliberately comprised of an even number of steps. In this manner, the respondents 
could not avoid answering the question by choosing a 'neutral' characterization of their inter-firm 
relations (i.e., neither cooperative nor spot-market in nature). 
This list is discussed in detail in Section 3.3.3 of Chapter 3. 
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associations in their industry". The respondents were asked if they were members of one 
of the associations listed and if there were perhaps others that were not listed. Some 
respondents in the UK added one or two business associations to the list. These 
associations, however, appeared not to be significant to most other firms in the industry 
and were therefore excluded'2. Next, it was asked how relevant the functions were that 
the business associations performed for the member firm. The relevance of the functions 
was rated by the respondents on a three-point scale ranging from 'highly relevant' to 
'moderately relevant' to 'not relevant.' To counter 'memory failure' (Mintzberg, 
Raisinghani and Theoret 1976: 250) and to track down other possible biases, the same 
list of functions was presented to, and discussed with, the respondents from the business 
associations (see Appendix VI, Section III). The interview questions for the respondents 
of the business associations were preceded by an introduction of the research project 
(Section I). Moreover, the interview protocol for the business associations also included 
topics about the establishment of the organization (when, why, and by whom), the key 
functions performed in the past and at present, and expectations about the future role of 
the association (Section II). 
Finally, in Section VI of the interview protocol for the UK and Dutch potato firms, 
general questions are asked with respect to, amongst others, the date of establishment of 
the firm, the number of employees, and the ranking of the firm in terms of market share. 
4.2.3 Data analysis: histograms and template analysis 
The analysis of the empirical data, of which the results are presented in Chapter 5, 
reflected the two-step approach used in the interviews. As a first step, the results from 
the structured interview questions were aggregated by adding up the scores produced by 
the respondents. The resulting figures were transformed into histograms to provide a 
graphical image about the relevance of each item. Figure 4.2 provides an example of 
such a histogram, which was constructed as follows. All the scores from the 4-point 
scales about the nature of the vertical relations (i.e., customer and supplier relations) of 
the firms involved were added up. The raw data and the totals of scores that were used 
to arrive at the histogram in Figure 4.2 can be found in Appendix VII. Note that many 
The list of major business associations was put logelher on the basis of the results of the explorative 
research stage. 
Most business associations that were added by the respondents were organizations that operated cither 
on a limited geographical basis (membership limited to firms from Wales or Scotland or England) or 
across multiple industries. 
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firms were active in multiple stages of the potato supply chain and therefore had 
multiple buyer-supplier relationships. The histogram shows the resulting scores for each 
item of the 4-point scale. The items are represented as percentages of the total number 
of vertical relationships of all the firms involved. The histogram shows that the vertical 
relations of the selection of 17 UK potato firms were perceived to be predominantly 
spot-market in nature by the managers interviewed. 
Figure 4.2 Example of a histogram derived from the interview data 
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% of a total of 64 buyer-supplier 
relations of 17 UK potato firms 
Source: interview data 
The histograms derived from the interview data were added to the case study database. 
In addition, the histograms were used to generate a comparative overview of the 
characteristics of inter-firm cooperation that had been found in the UK and Dutch potato 
indjstry. 
The second step of the data analysis concerned a 'template analysis' (King 1998: 119) of 
the interview reports. On the basis of a topic list, the text of interview reports was 
seamed line by line to identify all relevant data about attributes of inter-firm 
cocperation and to allocate the information to relevant categories. Annual reports, 
conpany histories, and journal articles about the firms (if available) were treated in the 
same manner. The topic list, which was used as a data filter, mirrored the subjects 
ccnered by the interview questions. Apart from the pre-defined topics, the template also 
allcwed for the creation of new categories on the basis of unanticipated patterns that 
emerged from the data. This resulted in the creation of additional data categories 
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including, among others, the perceptions of respondents about codes of 'good behavior,' 
and the views of the role of banks and the state on firm and business association 
behavior. The resulting body of processed data, which was transformed into documents 
and added to the case study data base, presented a source of detailed information about 
attributes of inter-firm co-operation in the UK and Dutch potato industry. The contents 
of the documents were used for the interpretation of the aggregated data in the 
histograms (see Chapter 5). 
4.3 Reliability and validity issues 
In the research design of the present study a range of quality aspects has been taken into 
account including reliability, construct validity, internal validity, and external validity 
(cf. Hutjes and Van Buuren 1992: 51; Yin 1994: 33). Some of these aspects have been 
touched upon in the previous sections but will be discussed more systematically below. 
4.3.1 Reliability 
The reliability of the research results was enhanced by making explicit the procedures 
that had been followed for data collection. This was achieved by using protocols (see 
Section 4.2), recording the interviews on tape, and feeding back edited transcriptions of 
the tapes to the respondents. Moreover, a case study database was built, comprised of 
electronic data files of the reports of the pilot studies, the revised reports of the 
interviews at firms business associations, and documents with processed data. 
Secondary information was also included in the database, though generally not in an 
electronic form but in an archive. This type of information included several volumes of 
Dutch and British journals devoted to the potato industry, as well as annual reports of 
firms and business associations, company histories, journal and newspaper articles, and 
consultant reports. 
4.3.2 Construct validity 
Construct validity was supported through a set of measures. To test the relevance of 
initial concepts and frameworks, pilot interviews were held and a case study was 
conducted of a merger between two Dutch potato firms. This was done in an early stage 
of the research process. In addition, the protocol-guided two-step approach in the data 
collection stage worked as a two-edged sword with regard to construct validity. On the 
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one hand, highly structured interview questions (which were based on the analytic 
framework in Chapter 3) prevented deviations from the central research concepts. On 
the other hand, the in-depth discussions that followed these questions allowed obtaining 
deeper insights into the respondents' perceptions of the meaning of the concepts used. 
This lowered the risk of response bias during the interviews. Moreover, the semi-
structured nature of the discussions allowed for the discovery of unanticipated but useful 
information. 
Data triangulation was used as well to increase construct validity. Although the major 
source of evidence was formed by interview data, the available secondary data proved 
very useful in gaining additional information about the research issues. For instance, 
several journal articles were found in which details could be found about mergers, 
alliances, and visions of managers on cooperation. In addition, multiple sources of 
evidence were used during the data collection about business associations. The same 
questions about the functions performed by these organizations were asked in the 
interviews with both managers of potato firms and persons working for the business 
associations. In addition, the annual reports that were obtained from the business 
associations contained much useful information about the functions performed by these 
organizations. 
Finally, the principles of 'peer debriefing' and 'member check' (Wester 1987) were 
applied to avoid, as much as possible, the subjective influences of the researcher in the 
use of the research concepts. Peer debriefing took place via meetings with the two 
supervisors of the research projects, and via the presentation of preliminary findings at 
conferences in 1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999". Member check (i.e., the discussion of the 
findings with respondents) was done by sending transcripts to the respondents. 
Moreover, post-interview meetings took place with some of the respondents at 
occasional gatherings in both the UK (annual fair) and the Netherlands (seminar and 
annual business association meeting) in 1998. 
4.3.3 Internal validity 
For the discussion of the internal validity of the present research it is useful to make a 
distinction between deterministic and probabilistic propositions about causal 
relationships, as proposed by Lieberson (1992: 106). Deterministic propositions claim 
that a given factor, when present, will lead to a specified outcome. In contrast, 
See Appendix XI for an overview of the papers presented al these conferences. 
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probabilistic propositions claim that a given factor, when present, will increase the 
likelihood of a specified outcome. The propositions that guided this research (see 
Chapter 3, Section 3.5.2) were probabilistic in nature because deterministic claims 
would have required the consideration of all independent variables that influence inter-
firm cooperation. Given the complexity of the phenomena under investigation (i.e., 
social institutions and forms of economic organization), this requirement was 
considered extremely difficult to meet, if achievable at all. 
To arrive at insights into the relationship between social institutions and the 
development of inter-firm cooperation, the principle of 'pattern matching' was 
applied. The empirical data from the field study was subjected to an intensive search for 
patterns in the key attributes of inter-firm cooperation. This 'patterning' was based on 
qualifications given by the respondents with respect to the relative degree of 
development and/or relevance of these attributes. In addition, the nature of relevant 
social institutions was described and linked with the patterns that had been found. The 
resulting 'national' cases, comprised of patterns of inter-firm cooperation and the nature 
of key social institutions, with their similarities and differences, were compared and 
contrasted with each other. Finally, the results were compared with the propositions 
about the likely influence of social institutions on the development of inter-firm 
cooperation (see Chapter 6). 
To promote the internal validity of the research further, measures were taken to reduce 
'control effects' and 'biased viewpoint effects15 (Wester 1987) during the data collection 
and analysis stages of the research. Both disturbing effects were moderated via peer 
debriefing (the exposure of the results to peers) as well as by member check, i.e., 
feeding back the interview and (intermediate) research results to the respondents (see 
the previous section). 
4.3.4 External validity 
The external validity of the research outcomes, i.e., the domain to which the findings 
can be generalized, has been demarcated by the propositions that were formulated after 
the construction of the analytic framework (see Chapter 3). In accordance with the 
14
 Cook and Campbell (1979) in: Yin (1994: 106). 
Control effect: (he researcher evokes divergent behavior from the respondents; Biased viewpoint 
effect: misinterpretations caused by selective perceptions of the researcher. 
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principles of 'analytic generalization'16 (Yin 1994: 31), the propositions about the 
influence of social institutions on the development of inter-firm cooperation have been 
compared with the empirical findings of the field study. As a result, the research 
findings could be used to support theory development that go beyond generalizations 
about the industries that were investigated to produce empirical data. In other words, the 
findings about the social construction of cooperative inter-firm relations not only 
generated insights about the Dutch and UK potato industries but also were considered 
useful to general theory development about the social construction of forms of economic 
organization. 
4.4 Summary 
The research design of this study concerned a cross-national comparative analysis of 
similar industries in two different countries. The aim of this comparison was to obtain 
insights into the influence of national social institutions on the development of inter-
firm cooperation. The research process was comprised of 9 major stages that reflected a 
continuous interplay between theory and practice. The stages included (1) the 
exploration of the Dutch potato industry; (2) the construction of an initial conceptual 
framework; (3) the exploration of the UK potato industry; (4) the development of a 
revised conceptual framework and the development of interview protocols on the basis 
of this framework; (5) the data collection stage in which interviews were held at UK and 
Dutch potato firms and business associations; (6) the initial data processing stage; (7) 
the inclusion of feedback from the respondents in the data; (8) the final data processing 
stage and the creation of a research database; and (9) the final data analysis. The 
research project started in September 1995 and was finished four years later, in 1999. 
The exploration of the UK and Dutch potato industries started at the end of 1995 and 
lasted until mid-1996. This stage included desk research, pilot cases, and pilot 
interviews at firms, universities, and business associations. The major data collection 
stage started at the beginning of January 1997 and lasted until August 1998. Data about 
the inter-firm relations was collected at 12 Dutch and 17 UK firms in the potato 
industry. The selection of firms included virtually all leading firms across the UK and 
Dutch potato industries, representing total market shares of up to 80% per stage in the 
Thai is, generalization towards a more or less general theory, in contrast with statistical generalizations 
about relations between variables in a narrowly defined population. 
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potato supply chain. Farms and customers of the potato industry (such as supermarkets 
and restaurant chains) were excluded from the comparative case study. The selection of 
Dutch firms included four potato processors, four ware potato merchants, and four seed 
potato merchants. The selection of UK firms included five potato processors, five ware 
potato merchants, six seed potato merchants, and one breeder. Business associations 
were also included in the research. Four Dutch business associations were selected, 
including the national industry association and the trade associations for potato 
processors, ware potato merchants and seed potato merchants. The selection of UK 
business associations matched with their Dutch counterparts and included one industry 
association and three major trade associations. 
Data about the managerial perceptions of the way UK and Dutch potato organizations 
coordinate and control their inter-firm relations was obtained from semi-structured 
interviews with the managing directors of the selected firms and the chairmen and/or 
secretaries of the business associations. Additional data was gathered from secondary 
sources including annual reports, consultant reports, journal articles, and interviews. A 
large majority of the interviews was conducted in person and a minority of the 
interviews was done by telephone. The interviews were based on an interview protocol 
that included a list of open questions and pre-structured answer categories for the 
respondents. The questions for the interviews at the firms were designed to capture 
managerial perspectives on key attributes of inter-firm cooperation, levels of self-
sufficiency, and the relative importance of business associations. The interview 
protocols designed for the business associations included topics about the functions they 
performed in the past and present, the reason of their establishment and future 
developments. All except two interviews were taped, transcribed, and fed back to the 
respondents. Finally, the interview data that was obtained at each organization was 
written up in interview reports. 
The data analysis was carried out according to a two-step approach. Results from the 
pre-structured interview questions were processed into histograms. The results from the 
'template analysis' of the contents of the interview reports were added to the 
information reflected by the histograms. This analysis was conducted on the basis of a 
topic list that was used to allocate all the information from the interview reports to 
categories. These categories, in turn, formed a 'template' that reflected the key concepts 
from the analytic framework. 
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A range of methods and techniques for qualitative research was used to enhance the 
reliability and validity of the results. Reliability was enhanced through the use of fixed 
procedures for data collection, which included interview protocols, taping the 
interviews, and feeding back edited transcriptions to respondents. In addition, a case 
database was built including all electronically recorded documents pertaining to the 
study. Construct validity was ensured by conducting pilot interviews and making use of 
interview protocols that structured data collection, but also allowed for the discovery of 
unanticipated though useful information. The in-depth discussions with respondents 
during the interviews lowered the risk of 'response bias.' Data triangulation and the 
application of techniques such as 'peer debriefing' and 'member check' helped to 
enhance construct validity as well. The latter two techniques also promoted internal 
validity as they moderated the subjective influences of the researcher on the use of the 
research concepts. The internal validity of this study was enhanced by formulating 
propositions and by making use of 'pattern matching' to find relationships between 
social institutions and the development of inter-firm cooperation. Finally, the external 
validity of the research was enhanced by demarcating the 'domain of generalization' by 
propositions about the influence of social institutions on the development of inter-firm 
cooperation. Moreover, in line with the principles of 'analytic generalization', the 
propositions were compared with the empirical findings. 

Chapter Five 
INTER-FIRM COOPERATION IN THE 
UK AND DUTCH POTATO INDUSTRIES 
This chapter presents the results from the field study that was conducted in the UK and 
Dutch potato industries in the period 1997-1998. The major supply flows and key actors 
are introduced and attention is paid to important structural developments that took 
place in the second half of the 2(? century. Then, detailed and systematic descriptions 
are made of the vertical and horizontal inter-firm relations in the UK and Dutch potato 
industry. The research results are processed in overviews that provide a concise view of 
the bilateral forms of inter-firm cooperation and the relative importance of business 
associations in the potato industries of both countries. 
5.1 The UK and Dutch potato industries 
The Dutch and UK potato industries are quite similar to each other in many respects. As 
will be shown below, they involve similar types of firms and products. Other similarities 
concern structural developments such as increasing demands from customers and an 
ongoing concentration of firms. However, there are also significant structural 
differences between the potato industries in both countries that can be linked with 
important developments in the past. The similarities and differences between the UK 
and Dutch potato industries will be outlined in the sections below. 
5.1.1 The potato supply system 
Major products of the UK and Dutch potato industries include potato varieties, seed 
potatoes, ware (edible) potatoes, and potato products. The greatest challenge of firms in 
this industry is to secure a stable supply of high-quality products at low costs, which is 
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considered not very easy. The potato is a natural product and therefore very sensitive to 
environmental conditions that can change by the day.' 
The Dutch and UK potato industries are comprised of three major clusters, as displayed 
in Figure 5.1. The first cluster is concerned with the development, production, and trade 
of the basic (i.e., genetic) material needed for large-scale potato production. The cluster 
includes potato variety development (by breeders), seed potato growing (by farmers), 
and seed potato trade (by merchants). The breeders aim to develop new potato varieties 
with enhanced properties, which are then propagated by seed potato growers and 
marketed/exported by seed potato merchants.2 
Figure 5.1 Clusters in the potato industry 
Major customers: 
• multiple retailers 
• fast-food chains 
• catering industry 
Potato varieties & 
seed potatoes 
Source: see text 
Ware potatoes Potato products 
The seed potatoes from the first cluster are used to grow plants that produce ware 
potatoes with predictable properties . This is done by the second cluster, which involves 
For instance, the growth and quality of potatoes is subject to weather and disease, while the price of 
this perishable product can vary greatly under the influence of tensions between supply and demand. 
The development of a new, commercially applicable potato variety takes about 10 to 15 years. The 
development of a sufficiently large supply base of seed potatoes (which have to be as disease free as 
possible) takes about four years more. 
Ware potatoes can be grown on the basis of seeds (called 'true potato seed') as well. Apart from 
developing countries, however, this way of potato growing is not widely practiced. The problem is that 
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the growing, handling, and trade of edible potatoes by ware potato farmers and 
merchants. Ware potatoes are generally destined for either fresh consumption or further 
processing. In the case of fresh consumption, potatoes are collected by ware potato 
merchants/exporters who wash, grade, and pre-pack4 the potatoes for the retail market. 
If the potatoes are destined for further processing, the crop is collected, graded, and 
traded by merchants or directly sold by farmers to potato processors. 
Potato processing firms make up the last cluster, where potatoes are used as a raw 
material for the production of a wide range of products. This cluster can be subdivided 
into three distinct segments: starch production, crisp making, and the manufacturing of a 
broad range of potato products such as french fries and components for meals. With 
regard to the first segment, it must be noted that the EU starch market is subject to a 
quota system. In addition, the European market for potato starch is dominated by a large 
Dutch co-operative (AVEBE), while starch production is virtually absent in the UK. The 
second segment, i.e., the production of potato crisps, stands out as a single firm that 
dominates both the Dutch and UK markets5. Moreover, crisp making requires very 
particular (e.g., very round) potatoes and the transport costs of the final product are 
relatively high. As a consequence, this potato processing activity involves supply 
situations that are quite different from the other two. Regarding the distinct nature of 
these parts of the potato-processing cluster, they have not been involved in the field 
research. The third segment of the cluster in both countries is comprised of Dutch, UK, 
Canadian, and American firms that process raw potatoes into a wide range of either pre-
fixed, frozen, crisped, chilled, dried, or canned potato products. 
Finally, as shown in Figure 5.1, the major customers of firms in the UK and Dutch 
potato industries include retail organizations, fast-food restaurant chains, and 
wholesalers. 
every seed, in principle, represents a new potato variety with not entirely predictable properties. This is 
considered a problem for large-scale commercial applications which require stable and predictable 
properties (Renia 1997). 
Pre-packing potatoes for retailers is also carried out by specialized firms ('packers'). In the Netherlands 
this type of firm has become virtually extinct, while in the UK the situation develops in the same 
direction. In general, potato pre-packing has become an integrated activity of ware potato merchants. 
The global crisps market is dominated by the US-based corporation Pepsico, with market shares in the 
UK (Walkers) and the Netherlands (Smiths) well over 50% (interview notes FCI). 
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5.1.2 Key organizations, production locations, and export positions 
Most leading firms in the UK and Dutch potato industries are located in areas where 
also the bulk of the seed and ware potato crop is grown. In the UK, major areas are East 
Anglia, East Midlands, and Scotland (Poppe 1989: 13). In the Netherlands, the majority 
of potato firms are located in the 'polders' and in the northern and southwestern 
provinces. In both countries seed potato production is concentrated in the northern parts. 
The ware potato and potato processing clusters in the UK potato industry are dominated 
by relatively few but large firms which are highly integrated. The largest potato 
processor by far is McCain Foods GB (of Canadian origin). In ware potato trade and 
handling MBM Produce (part of Hillsdown Holdings pic.) and the marketing co-
operative Anglian Produce are the major players. The growth, trade, and handling of 
seed potatoes in the UK is dominated by relatively small Scottish6 firms such as Gordon 
& Innes and Caithness Potatoes, which operate both in domestic and export markets. 
Breeding activities have become relatively marginal in the UK, certainly if compared 
with the Netherlands and Germany. 
An outstanding characteristic of the Dutch potato industry is the presence of very large 
potato processors that mainly produce for export markets. Key players include Aviko 
(owned by two Dutch co-operatives), McCain Foods NL (Canadian), Farm Frites 
(Dutch), and Lamb-Weston/Meijer (an American-Dutch joint venture). Among the ware 
potato merchants, the major players include large, small, and medium-sized firms such 
as Nedato, Agrico, Koval, and Schaap. The seed potato trade and breeding activities in 
the Netherlands are dominated by Dutch co-operatives such as ZPC and Agrico, and 
private firms including Hettema7, Meijer, and Van Rijn. 
Both in the UK and the Netherlands, thousands of farms are involved in seed and ware 
potato growing. However, acreage of farms in the UK are generally much larger than in 
the Netherlands8. Nevertheless, the supply of potatoes in the Netherlands is considered 
less fragmented than in the UK because most of the Dutch potato trade is carried out by 
This dominance can be related to the favorable climate for growing seed potatoes in Scotland. The 
relatively low temperatures in this part of the UK reduce the spread of plant disease and aphids. This is 
important, as high-quality seed potatoes need to be free from viruses and other harmful organisms. 
In the second half of 1998, ZPC (a co-operative) and Hettema (a private firm) presented their plans to 
integrate their activities. In 1999 these plans were realized. 
According to Poppe (1984: 10), UK farms are among the largest in the EU. In general, their acreage is 
about four times larger than the acreage of their Dutch counterparts. 
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marketing co-operatives. Another contrast is that, in the UK, it is not unusual that 
growing potatoes is at least in part an integrated activity of merchants and processors. 
Both in the UK and Dutch potato industries, various business associations are active. In 
the UK, a multitude of business associations can be found. Both general and highly 
specialized trade associations exist, with membership based on combinations of product 
type, markets served, and/or the production location of firms (i.e., Wales, England, 
Scotland or Northern Ireland). Trade associations with a more nation-wide membership 
base include the SPTA (Scottish Potato Trade Association), NASPM (National 
Association of Seed Potato Merchants), and the PPA (Potato Processors Association). 
Both the SPTA and NASPM further the interests of seed and ware potato merchants, 
although the focus of the NASPM is on seed potato merchants. Most (but not all) 
members of the SPTA are Scottish firms involved in ware and/or seed potato trade. 
Many NASPM members are integrated firms that are involved in both seed and ware 
potato trade. Apart from trade associations, one industry association is active in the UK 
potato industry as well. This association, the BPC (British Potato Council), is involved 
in all stages of the potato supply chain. 
Dutch trade associations for potato firms include the NFP (Nederlandse Federatie 
Pootaardappelen), VBNA (Vereniging ter Behartiging van de Belangen van den 
Nederlandschen Aardappelhandel), and VAVI (Vereniging voor de Aardappel-
verwerkende Industrie). The VBNA represents the Dutch ware potato merchants, while 
the NFP is an association for seed potato merchants9. The VAVI is the Dutch association 
for potato processors. In contrast with the UK, these trade associations have no direct 
competitors because there are no other associations for potato firms active in the Dutch 
potato industry. The industry association of the Dutch potato industry is the CA 
(Commissie Aardappelen). This is not an autonomous organization such as the BPC, but 
a sub-division of the quasi-governmental Productschap voor de Akkerbouw (i.e., a 
general Industry Board-like organization for agriculture). 
Notwithstanding the fact that the Dutch and UK potato industries involve the production 
of similar products, they differ quite markedly from each other with respect to their 
export performance. Over the past decades, Dutch seed and ware potato merchants, as 
well as potato processors, have gained a very strong international presence. Most of the 
In 1998 these two organizations merged. However, this did not involve any substantial alteration in the 
functions performed for the members. 
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domestic production is exported to countries within the EU. However, the Middle East, 
former Soviet states, and countries in East- and Southeast Asia form important 
destinations as well. In addition, Dutch potato processors have expanded their 
production activities across Europe, the Americas, and the Middle East. In contrast, 
apart from some Scottish seed potato exporters, most UK potato firms are much more 
focused on their large geographically and relatively isolated domestic market. 
5.1.3 Structural developments 
In the second half of the 20lh century both the UK and Dutch potato industries have 
witnessed considerable structural changes. Major drivers were the large-scale 
mechanization of potato growing, the internationalization of markets, the emergence of 
potato processors as prominent players in the industry, the introduction of breeders' 
rights, changing consumer needs, and the growing power of a small number of large 
retailers and fast food restaurant chains. 
Large scale mechanization 
In the late 1960s, ware potato growing in the Netherlands became rigorously 
mechanized (Van den Bosch and Veerman 1980a: 45). Before that time, growing, and 
harvesting potatoes was mainly done manually. However, as labor became scarce, wages 
went up and the price for potatoes remained high for some years. As a result, investing 
in the mechanization of potato growing became an attractive option for many farmers. 
The mechanization efforts involved a vast increase of capital investments. Therefore, 
more and more farmers enlarged the scale of their operations to lower the fixed costs per 
hectare. Consequently, the domestic production of potatoes grew tremendously while 
the number of growers dropped with more than 1000 a year (Van den Bosch and 
Veerman 1980b: 928). The increased yield of potatoes, combined with a maturing 
domestic market forced Dutch potato firms to find new markets in order to survive. As 
will be addressed more in detail below, new major sales opportunities were created 
through the development of export markets and by taking advantage of the growing 
demand for processed potatoes. 
During the same time period, the situation in the UK was quite different from the 
Netherlands. In terms of acreage, UK farms traditionally were much larger than their 
Dutch counterparts. Moreover, to UK fanners the growing of grain was (and still is) 
much more important than potato production. Rather, potatoes were considered as a 
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'break crop' (Poppe 1984: 11). Another contrast with the Dutch situation is the 
remarkable stability over several decades, of the acreage used by UK farmers to grow 
potatoes. This stability was due to the tight regulation of the area used for potato 
production in the UK. Under these conditions, there was no need for a rigorous 
mechanization of potato growing. In addition, searching for new markets became no 
serious issue as the market regulation in the UK largely matched home production with 
home demand. 
Internationalization 
The development of both the UK and Dutch potato industries has been affected by the 
internationalization of their markets as well. Dutch firms took advantage of the early 
internationalization of the European market for agricultural products that came with the 
creation of the Common Agricultural Policy in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In the 
period 1963-1973 that followed, Dutch potato exports (measured in tons) grew by 200% 
(Van den Bosch and Veerman 1980a: 46). 
The firms in the UK potato industry experienced internationalization as well, but this 
happened both much later and more rigorously. From 1933 until 1996, the UK potato 
market was regulated on the basis of an area quota system. When the country became a 
member of the European Economic Community (EEC) in the early 1970s, however, this 
system came more and more under pressure. For instance, firms from EEC member 
countries (in particular the Dutch) took advantage of the opportunity to export potatoes 
to the UK. In response, the UK government initially restricted these imports from the 
Continent. However, on the basis of a judgement of the Luxembourg Court in 1979 the 
restriction of potato imports (and other main crops) by the UK had to be lifted (PMB 
1987). Despite of this, it took until 1997 before the regulation of the potato market in 
the UK ended. From that year onwards, the UK potato industry became fully exposed to 
the forces of the free market system. The first to take advantage of this new situation 
were the large supermarket organizations and potato processors in the UK, who gained 
more opportunities to specify and control the quality of their potato supplies. 
The rise of potato processors 
The structure of both the Dutch and UK potato industries has changed quite 
considerably under the influence of potato processors. In both countries, the first potato 
processing firms emerged in the 1960s. Taking advantage of growing consumer 
preferences for more convenience, the potato processors developed into prominent 
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players in the decades that followed. In the Netherlands, most potato processing firms 
were established by farmers and merchants who tried to find new markets for the 
increasing domestic supply of ware potatoes. From the late 1960s onwards, the potato 
processing capacity in the Netherlands has been growing at a remarkable speed while 
the supply of ware and seed potatoes remained sufficient to cover the increasing need. 
However, in the 1990s the growth slowed down and a considerable shakeout among 
firms took place. Nevertheless, the Dutch potato industry had become more and more 
adjusted to the needs of a handful of very large potato processors, which together 
accounted for the majority of potato purchases in the Netherlands. In the second half of 
the 1990s the Netherlands had even become a net importer of ware potatoes as a result 
of the raw material needs of potato processors, which, in turn, exported about 90% of 
their output. 
In the UK, potato processors have become important players as well, although to a lesser 
extent if compared to the Netherlands. In contrast, pre-packed fresh potatoes have 
remained the major outlet for ware potatoes grown in the UK10. Most of the output of 
potato processors located in the UK is produced for the domestic market rather than for 
export. 
Breeders' rights 
The ratification of the regulation for breeders' rights by both members and non-
members of EEC countries in 1966 meant another important development for the potato 
industries in the UK and the Netherlands. These rights, which are comparable to patents, 
imply that potato varieties only can be used (i.e., propagated) under agreement with the 
breeder". The strategic implication was that breeders gained control over the 
propagation of new, so-called monopolized potato varieties (Van den Bosch and 
Veerman 1979). Newly developed varieties can have properties that enable users to gain 
competitive advantage (e.g., because of higher yield, better taste, etc.). For this reason, 
access to these excellent but monopolized varieties has become an important strategic 
issue for potato firms. In the UK and the Netherlands, this has pushed many firms to 
For instance, the domestic potato crop for human consumption amounted to app. 5169.000 tons in the 
season June 1994-May 1995. 3524 tons were destined for fresh consumption, while the remaining 
1717.000 tons were used for potato processing purposes (figures drawn from an unpublished report by 
N.Wilson, Wye College, app. 1996). 
In 1995 the registration of plant variety rights was unified under new EU-legislation (Renia 1997). 
Before that time, new varieties had to be registered separately in every country. 
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either integrate vertically into breeding activities or to engage in some form of 
cooperation with breeders. 
The rise of large customers 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, large supermarket chains and fast-food restaurant 
chains gained a dominant market position with respect to their suppliers, including 
potato firms in the UK and the Netherlands. Food retailers broadened their product 
range in response to consumer demands for more variety and higher quality at a 
reasonable price. As a consequence, they increased the scale of their operations to 
remain profitable. In tune with this, many takeovers and mergers among food retailers 
took place. This resulted into a high level of concentration of retailers, i.e., a small 
number of large firms began to dominate the market12. The large supermarkets and the 
large fast-food chains (such as McDonalds) put intense pressure on firms in the potato 
industry to supply larger quantities of high-quality products in more varieties at lower 
prices. Moreover, firms were pressed to develop food safety systems that enabled buyers 
to track down the origin of their purchase as well as the production methods used. As a 
result, the level of mutual dependence between firms in this industry grew considerably 
(Rademakers 1999). This led to an increase of vertical integration through takeovers, 
mergers, and collaborative arrangements between potato firms (Rademakers 1998b). 
Moreover, in tune with the concentration among their major customers, both the UK and 
Dutch potato industries witnessed a dramatic decline in the number of firms across all 
stages of the supply chain while the total output remained stable or went up 
(Rademakers and McKnight 1998; Dadson 1998). By the end of the 1990s the 
concentration in the potato industries of both countries had become quite high. 
Currently, not more than a handful of firms dominate one or more clusters of the supply 
chain." 
5.2 Inter-firm relations in the UK potato industry 
The sections below provide a detailed description of the nature of inter-firm relations in 
the UK potato industry. The description is structured along the lines of the analytic 
framework outlined in Chapter 3. The attributes of vertical inter-firm cooperation are 
12 
E.g., Tesco and Sainsbury's in the UK, and Royal Ahold and De Boer Unigro in the Netherlands. 
13 
The number of farmers declined considerably as well, but several thousand farmers remained involved 
in the industry though none became dominant. 
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treated first, followed by a discussion of the horizontal relations in the industry. Finally, 
attention is paid to the relative importance of business associations as forms of inter-
firm cooperation in the UK potato industry. 
5.2.1 Customer and supplier relations in the UK 
Most customer and supplier relations in the UK potato industry are spot-market in 
nature. Figure 5.2 shows a graphical representation of how UK potato firm managers 
perceive the nature of the vertical relations of their organization. As can be seen, more 
than two-thirds of the total number (64) of the customer and supplier relations of the 17 
firms involved were considered to be mainly or entirely spot-market in nature. In the 
remainder of this section, the attributes of these relations will be addressed in detail to 
gain a fuller understanding of the way vertical inter-firm relations in the UK potato 
industry are coordinated and controlled. 
Figure 5.2 The nature of customer and supplier relations in the UK potato industry 
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Flows of information 
Most of the information exchange between UK potato firms is directly concerned with 
(and limited to) transactions. In accordance with this, a manager remarked that 'In this 
industry, vertical relations are dominated by negotiations about price, quality, and 
quantity.' Consequently, inter-firm relations involving flows of information surpassing 
See Appendix VII for the data and the criteria used to arrive at this graph. The data is based on the 
answers of the UK managers to the questions in Section II of the interview protocol (sec Appendix V). 
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the transactional level are not very common. If present, such forms of information 
exchange in the UK potato industry appear to be largely limited to seed and ware potato 
merchants, who share experiences with growers. Other exceptions were found among 
UK-based firms involved in breeding. Some appeared to have informal relations with 
large retailers, potato processors, and merchants. In these relations, the breeders 
generally receive information about needs and requirements for new potato varieties, 
while potential (direct or indirect) customers remain informed about the development of 
commercially attractive varieties. 
Exchange of knowledge between UK potato firms appears quite rarely. Some of the 
largest firms in the industry (processors, merchants, and retailers) educate and counsel 
ware potato growers about crop treatment to increase yields, quality, and/or 
environmental soundness. However, the flows of knowledge involved are one-way and 
tend to be directly linked to (or part of) supply contracts. 
Flows of mutual expectations 
As is shown in Figure 5.3, supplier relations'5 in the UK potato industry tend to be based 
on a combination of formal contracts and informal ties. Unlike the supplier relations, 
most relations with customers were found to be based on formal contracts. Furthermore, 
transactions entirely based on trust and mutual obligations (i.e., implicit contracts) were 
considered relevant neither for customer nor for supplier relations. 
The basis of supplier relations appears to vary quite strongly with the size of the potato 
firms in the UK. The largest firms tend to make use of highly specified contracts. A 
manager of a large firm explained that 'We use precise contracts specifying what to 
produce, how to do it and when to deliver.' In contrast, the medium-sized and smaller 
firms generally use fairly standardized contracts to formalize the oral agreements 
preceding most transactions. Most explanations of the smaller-firm managers stressed, 
as one of them put it, that 'We do not specify everything.' Their contracts are limited to 
the specification of information needed for a transaction (e.g., price, tonnage, variety, 
and time of delivery). In addition, some firms make use of general conditions of sale 
that have been developed by their business associations. 
Supplier relations: ihe exchange relations of firms with their suppliers of potato varieties, seed 
potatoes, and/or ware potatoes. 
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Figure 5.3 The basis of customer and supplier relations of leading UK potato firms 
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The dominance of highly specified contracts in the exchange relations with customers11 
must be seen in light of the detailed specifications issued by - in particular - the large 
customers, including fast food restaurant chains and retail organizations. Firms such as 
McDonalds are almost notorious for the amount and tightness of the specifications for 
their supplies. Moreover, the large retailers in the UK require that their supplies of fresh 
produce are grown according to formal plans (schemes) that involve 'integrated crop 
management' (ICM). As a result, contracts with these major customers of potato firms 
are often embedded in 'schemes' such as the Assured Produce Scheme and Nature's 
Choice. The schemes aim for safe, environmentally sound and controllable food 
production and are comprised of protocols about, for instance, the use of pesticides. In 
addition, these schemes compel farmers to produce evidence about the way they have 
grown their crop (often referred to as 'traceability'). 
The findings about the relative dominance of combinations of formal and informal 
contracts and the irrelevance of entirely informal ones can be clarified as follows. 
The aggregated results of the answers of UK managers lo question 1 in Section III of the interview 
protocol (see Appendix V). 
Customer relations: the exchange relations of firms with their customers that include buyers of potato 
varieties, seed potatoes, ware potatoes and/or potato products. 
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Without exception, the respondents regarded the reputation of their firms as an 
important basis for trust in exchange relations with suppliers and customers. On the 
contrary, mutual obligations were considered not relevant at all because the relations 
involved were principally impersonal and also adverse in nature. Put differently, 
relations between the firms tend to be loose and are generally viewed in terms of win-
lose rather than win-win opportunities. In general, the supplier and customer relations of 
UK-based firms are based on either highly specified or standard contracts, in a lesser 
extent on a firm's reputation, and hardly ever on mutual obligations. 
Flows of resources and activity links 
Vertical inter-firm relations in the UK potato industry generally have a short-term time 
horizon. This finding is based on the responses of management to questions about the 
usual time span of their exchange relations in general (see Chapter 4). The relations 
appeared to be largely limited to discrete transactions/contracts for one (harvest) season. 
Figure 5.4 The time span and stability of vertical relations in the UK potato industry 
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The aggregated results of the answers of UK managers to question 3 in Section III of the interview 
protocol (see Appendix V). 
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However, as shown in Figure 5.4, most relations are long-term in nature in the sense that 
they are comprised of short-term contracts that are repeated over multiple years. The 
preference for the use of repeated short-term contracts was explained by the respondents 
with statements such as: 'It is not necessary to keep shopping and changing ... basically, 
if a supplier does not give the service you want, you just go to another one.' However, 
potato firm managers appeared to consider it not very easy and even difficult to change 
from buyer or supplier (see Figure 5.5). 
Figure 5.5 The ease for UK potato firms to switch to another customer or supplier 
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It was also pointed out that, because of the ongoing concentration of firms in the UK 
potato industry, both buyers and suppliers have become larger but also scarcer. This 
effect has been enhanced by the large retail organizations, which aim to work with a 
limited group of preferred suppliers. Moreover, because firms increasingly tend to use 
particular potato varieties and have high quality requirements, lock-in situations occur in 
which it is difficult to switch to another buyer or supplier. A manager explained: 'It is 
not easy to find potatoes of a particular variety with the quality you are used to on the 
short term ... you don't know up front what the quality is like with other companies.' 
Similar remarks from other respondents indicated that firms in the UK potato industry 
The aggregated results of the answers of UK managers to question 2 in Section III of the interview 
protocol (sec Appendix V). 
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prefer to work with a stable set of buyers and suppliers to reduce uncertainties about 
quality issues. Most firms realize this aim by working with recurrent short-term 
contracts. In this way, the parties involved are always free to switch partners without 
having problems after the fulfillment of the contract. The contracts are simply repeated 
as long as it is commercially attractive and therefore remain loose in nature.20 
Vertical integration and self-sufficiency 
The level of vertical integration of UK potato firms varies considerably. The few major 
players, as well as some smaller firms that together dominate the potato supply flows in 
the UK, display high levels of integration. They have built up positions in virtually all 
stages of the domestic potato supply chain for either fresh or processed potatoes. 
However, also a substantial number of 'niche players' are active in either seed potato 
trade or potato processing. 
Figure 5.6 presents an overview of the activities across the UK potato supply chain and 
the involvement of firms in these various activities through ownership. It appears that 17 
firms are involved in 41 activities in total, either on the basis of partial (joint venture) or 
full ownership. Not shown in the figure is that the firms involved in just one activity are 
small and medium-sized potato processors (4) and small seed potato merchants (3). The 
remaining 10 firms are involved in two or more activities. It can be seen that in the 
downstream end of the supply chain (i.e., potato processing and ware potato trade) 
ownership virtually overlaps the core activity of the firm. The opposite is the case with 
activities in the rest of the (upstream part) of the supply chain, including ware potato 
production, seed potato trade, and production and breeding. Among a total of 37 fully or 
partially owned activities, there are just 7 that are considered as a core business of the 
firms involved. It indicates that firms in the downstream end of the potato supply chain 
are integrated backwards to secure their control over supplies. This is in particular 
highlighted by the involvement of ten firms in breeding activities, while it is the core 
activity of just one firm. Apparently, firms that focus on other stages of the supply chain 
but have a stake in breeding activities find it important to have direct control (via 
ownership) over the development of new potato varieties. 
An example of the spot-market nature of these repeated short-term contracts was exemplified in a BBC 
TV news item in May 1998. In this news item, the power of large supermarkets over their suppliers 
was questioned. A case was presented of a potato grower who said he got ruined when he was set aside 
hy one of his major customers. The grower had supplied this retailer for years and had made 
substantial investments to meet the demands of that firm. 
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Figure 5.6 Vertical integration and core activities of UK potato firms 
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Most UK potato firms have achieved vertical integration through takeovers and joint 
ventures. The general philosophy behind the integration efforts is that competitive 
advantages can be achieved by 'Having control over every aspect of the business.' 
Moreover, the activities controlled by the integrated firms tend to be aimed at self-
sufficiency, rather than trade with other firms. Hence, it seems that firms in the UK 
potato industry prefer to have full or at least partial control over the supplies for their 
The aggregated results of the answers of the UK managers to the questions in Section I of the 
interview protocol (see Appendix V and also Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2). 
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core activity. In line with this observation, the firms that dominate the UK potato 
industry are highly integrated firms with high degrees of self-sufficiency. 
Overview 
Table 5.1 provides an overview of the findings concerning the relevance of the attributes 
of inter-firm cooperation for firms in the UK potato industry. Flows of information 
between buyers and suppliers are generally limited to discrete transactions, while 
knowledge exchange appears to be not a common practice for UK firms. The basis of 
vertical inter-firm relations is generally centered on either highly specified or standard 
contracts, in a lesser extent on a firm's reputation, and hardly ever on mutual 
obligations. In addition, most vertical inter-firm relations are based on recurrent short-
term contracts and tend to have sort time horizons. Risk sharing between buyers and 
suppliers virtually does not occur. Moreover, the industry is dominated by firms that are 
both vertically integrated and highly self-sufficient. In short, the pattern of the attributes 
of vertical inter-firm cooperation in the UK potato industry reflects a strong dominance 
of spot-market relations. 
Table 5.1 Attributes of vertical inter-firm cooperation in the UK potato industry 
Key attributes of cooperative customer-supplier relations 
Flows of Information 
Flows of mutual expectations 
Flows of resources and 
activity links 
Integration of activities 
• Surpassing transactional 
information 
• Exchange of knowledge 
• Relations largely based on 
mutual trust 
• Long-term time horizon 
• Risk sharing 
• Degree of vertical integration 
• Degree of self-sufficiency 
Relevance 
+ 
+ 
Source: see text 
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5.2.2 Horizontal inter-firm relations in the UK 
In the UK potato industry competing firms also cooperate with each other, though only 
to a very limited extent (see Figure 5.7). Horizontal cooperation is largely limited to 
information exchange (12 out of 17 firms). For instance, potato processors in the UK 
talk to each other and exchange general and technical information that is considered not 
commercially sensitive. In addition, respondents of seed potato merchants pointed out 
that 'It is a small world and of course we talk to each other ... for instance about 
experiences with new potato varieties.' Other topics that are discussed among 
competing firms include governmental regulations, the circumstances under which the 
potato crop grows and is harvested, and developments in overseas markets. Much of this 
information exchange appeared to be facilitated by business associations (see next 
section). 
Figure 5.7 The perceptions of managers of 17 UK potato firms about the relevance of 
horizontal cooperation 
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Some of the large and medium-sized UK potato merchants work together with 
competitors in joint ventures that are concerned with breeding activities (5 out of 17 
firms). The joint ventures are formal organizations, based on explicit agreements 
between the parties involved. With regard to breeding activities in general, it was 
remarked that it is common practice (i.e., an implicit agreement) for breeders to 
exchange information and seedlings and to share test fields for experiments with the 
22 
The aggregated results of the answers of the UK managers to question 1 in Section IV of the interview 
protocol (see Appendix V). 
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growing of new potato varieties. However, breeding is not a very dominant activity in 
the UK potato industry. The focus of most firms is on other parts of the supply chain. 
Marketing co-operatives, as forms of horizontal cooperation between growers of seed-
and ware potatoes, are quite rare in this industry. Rather, the bulk of the UK potato crop 
is marketed by individual farmers or via private traders. Most co-operatives are very 
small, located in Scotland and involved in seed potato trade. The only co-operative with 
a substantial presence in the UK potato industry is involved in ware potato trade and 
located in England. 
Other attributes of horizontal inter-firm cooperation appear to be not relevant or 
extremely rare in the UK potato industry. The relative weak development of horizontal 
cooperation between firms was explained by several respondents stressing that 'Firms in 
the UK like to do their own thing.' Table 5.2 summarizes the findings concerning the 
attributes of horizontal inter-firm cooperation in the UK potato industry. 
Table 5.2 Attributes of horizontal inter-firm cooperation in the UK potato industry 
Key attributes of horizontal co-operation 
Flows of Information < 
Flows of mutual expectations « 
Flows of resources and < 
activity links < 
Information exchange 
« Knowledge sharing 
Implicit agreements 
> Explicit agreements 
> Joint investments 
« Mutual shareholdings 
Equipment sharing 
Relevance 
+ 
— 
— 
+/— 
+/— 
Source: see text 
5.2.3 The relative importance of business associations in the UK 
The discussion of the relative importance of business associations in the UK potato 
industry will be done on the basis of the possible functions that have been identified in 
Chapter 3. The sequence followed here is determined by the degree of relevance of the 
functions to trade associations. 
Promotion of interests 
UK trade associations particularly distinguish themselves as lobby organizations. As one 
secretary put it: 'We lobby for self-interest as hard and often as we can.' Both the 
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associations and their members see this lobby function as one of the most important 
reasons for the existence of these organizations. The trade associations promote their 
members' interests either via direct contacts with state officials23 or via their 
representation in the quasi-governmental industry association BPC. Most trade 
associations also promote the interests of their members with respect to regulations 
developed on the EU level. This is done either on the basis of direct contacts with EU 
officials or via seats in European peak associations. 
Dissemination of knowledge and information 
The dissemination of information, and in a lesser extent knowledge, is regarded as an 
important task for both trade- and industry associations in the UK. The provision of 
access to information about new and changing governmental policies and regulations on 
local, national, and European levels is considered most relevant. The chairmen and/or 
secretaries of the business associations generally have good access to governmental 
circles, which is necessary to keep informed. The business associations also collect 
information about both technical (e.g. new lifting techniques) and market developments 
(e.g. weekly prices and other general market information). The dissemination of this 
information is accomplished in multiple ways, including conferences and seminars, 
study tours, newsletters, minutes of meetings, and direct mail services. Most of the 
information is quite general, but nevertheless considered quite useful. Some information 
services of the business associations are commercial in nature and imply some degree of 
competition with other organizations. For instance, an important role in the 
dissemination of knowledge and information in the UK potato industry is played by a 
well-established and independent magazine, Potato Review. The activities of the firm 
behind this magazine, to a certain degree, overlap with the information services of broad 
and nation-wide operating business associations such as the BPC. 
Facilitation of horizontal cohesion 
At first glance, the facilitation of horizontal cohesion through regular face-to-face 
communication between directors and/or managers of firms seems to be quite strongly 
developed in the UK. However, the membership base of the trade associations is far 
from inclusive as well as quite fragmented. As a result, firms operating in similar 
Occasionally, the SPTA is consulted by (Scottish) governmental agencies when new standards are set 
and inspection schemes are developed for seed potatoes. 
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markets may be members of different trade associations or have no membership at all. 
This, in turn, severely limits the impact of the 'platform function' provided by the trade 
associations. This is different for the industry association, which has a compulsory 
membership base. However, the BPC is not seen as an organization that is very deeply 
involved in the facilitation of horizontal cohesion. The organization constitutes a 
meeting place for representatives of industry branches, rather than for members. 
The trade associations in the UK tend not to be a center of regular meetings between 
their members. In addition, most trade associations work with either elected or ad-hoc 
sub-committees of members to tackle practical problems. The people involved in these 
committees are not always the directors of (units of) member firms, but generally are the 
senior managers. The industry associations as well as the trade associations stimulate the 
development of horizontal cohesion among their members in some extent through the 
organization of seminars and annual gatherings. 
Facilitation of vertical cohesion 
The facilitation of vertical cohesion in the industry is not considered a very relevant 
function of trade associations in the UK potato industry. Nevertheless, some 
respondents noted that the associations play a role in this respect. This is due to the 
presence of some highly vertically integrated firms that are members of various 
associations. Hence, meetings organized by trade associations often involve firms that 
operate in multiple stages of the potato supply chain. However, vertical cohesion, in the 
sense of having a joint strategic view about the development of the industry, is not 
deliberately facilitated. Rather, the largest firms in the industry, in particular large 
multiple retailers, determine the direction in which the industry develops. 
Most potato firm managers were uncertain about the role of the industry association 
BPC in the development of vertical cohesion. Nevertheless, one of the (quite recent) 
priorities of this organization is to enhance the cohesion in the UK potato industry. 
Development of common rules 
Trade associations in the UK are involved in the development of common rules, though 
only in the narrow sense of general conditions of trade. These conditions of trade are 
copyrighted and to be used by members only. The development of other possible 
common rules or codes of behavior by trade associations was not considered very 
relevant. In general, respondents remarked that the development of common rules 
should be a task of the government, rather than business associations. 
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The industry association is involved in the development of general rules for firms in the 
industry, though also to a limited extent. The industry association has statutory powers, 
but, to date, these have been used only to set up a levy system to finance their 
operations. The trade associations in the UK potato industry never have had any 
statutory powers. 
Arbitration 
In connection with the general conditions of trade, some of the trade associations in the 
UK potato industry provide arbitration services to their members. It was noted that 
arbitration is only possible in conflicts between members of the association who make 
use of these general conditions. The industry association is not involved in any form of 
arbitration. 
The coordination of industry-wide crisis 
Some of the possible activities of business associations appeared very weakly developed 
in the UK potato industry. With regard to actions of business associations in cases of 
industry-wide crisis, the respondents noted that not many crisis-like situations have 
occurred in the UK potato industry. The general view is that, if a crisis would occur, the 
initiation and coordination of actions would be a task for the government. The role of 
associations is expected to remain limited to a consultative role and to keeping firms 
informed in such events. 
The initiation and coordination of joint activities 
For trade associations, the initiation and coordination of joint activities, to be carried out 
or financed by their members on a voluntary basis, is not considered very relevant in the 
UK. The respondents regarded initiatives of associations for joint research not 
impossible, but pointed out that such actions are quite exceptional in the industry. The 
general view among UK potato firms is that joint promotion and research is something 
that should be initiated (and paid for) either by the government or the levy-financed 
industry association BPC. Financed by levies paid by the members and contributions of 
the government, the BPC had an annual research budget of about £2 million to 
commission and monitor projects in 1997. 
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An overview of the roles and functions of business associations in the UK potato 
industry is shown in Tables 5.3 and 5.4. The histograms that have were used as a point 
of departure for the above analysis can be found in Appendix IX. 
Table 5.3 The functions of trade associations in the UK potato industry 
Relevance 
Strong 
Moderate 
Weak 
Functions 
• Promotion of interests (lobbying) 
• Dissemination of knowledge and information 
• Facilitation of horizontal cohesion 
• Facilitation of vertical cohesion 
• Development of common rules 
• Arbitration 
• Coordination in cases of industry-wide crises 
• Initiation and coordination of joint activities 
Source: see text 
Table 5.4 Functions of the UK industry association 
Relevance 
Strong 
Moderate 
Weak 
Not relevant 
Functions 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Dissemination of knowledge and information 
Initiation and coordination of joint activities 
Development of common rules 
Promotion of interests 
Facilitation of horizontal cohesion 
Facilitation of vertical cohesion 
Coordination in cases of industry-wide crises 
Arbitration 
Soiree: see text 
In conclusion, the membership base of trade associations in the UK potato industry is 
qui:e fragmented. Membership is voluntary and the trade associations are far from 
inc.usive. Moreover, these organizations have no statutory powers, while the range of 
funJtions performed is not very wide. Lobbying and the dissemination of information 
are seen as the most important activities, while the remaining possible functions are 
considered either moderately or weakly relevant. The industry association of the UK 
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potato industry has a compulsory membership base. The organization is linked to the 
government and has statutory powers that, among others, enables them to impose levies 
and allocate licenses. The range of functions considered strongly relevant for the 
industry association is, in fact, broader than that of the trade associations. Based on 
these findings, Table 5.5 presents a summary overview of the indicators for the relative 
importance of business associations in the UK potato industry. 
Table 5.5 The relative importance of business associations in the UK potato industry 
Membership base 
Statutory powers 
Range of functions 
Trade associations 
Fragmented (voluntary) 
Not relevant 
Not very broad 
Industry association 
Inclusive (compulsory) 
Present 
Fairly broad 
Source: see text 
5.3 Inter-firm relations in the Dutch potato industry 
The following sections describe the attributes of vertical and horizontal inter-firm 
cooperation that have been found in the Dutch potato industry. In accordance with the 
description of the situation in the UK potato industry, attention is paid to the flows of 
information, mutual expectations, and resources and activity links in both vertical and 
horizontal inter-firm relations. Moreover, the degree of vertical integration and self-
sufficiency of the Dutch potato firms is addressed. The last section discusses the 
functions performed by the business associations in the Dutch potato industry. 
5.3.1 Customer and supplier relations in the Dutch potato industry 
Most vertical relations of Dutch potato firms are cooperative in nature. Figure 5.8 shows 
the aggregated results of the perceptions of the managers of 12 Dutch potato firms with 
respect to the nature of their total of 78 customer and supplier relations24. The figure 
shows a clear dominance of vertical inter-firm cooperation over spot-market relations. 
Spot-market relations exist, but to a limited extent and mainly concern the trade in non-
Customer-supplier relations: i.e., the relations of the firms involved with their customers and suppliers. 
See Appendix VIII for the data and the criteria used to arrive at this graph. 
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monopolized potato varieties such as 'Bintje.' The motivations and remarks that have 
been made about the nature of the inter-firm relations of Dutch potato firms will be 
addressed below. 
Figure 5.8 The nature of customer and supplier relations in the Dutch potato industry 
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Flows of information 
The vertical relations of Dutch potato firms generally involve the exchange of 
knowledge and information that goes far beyond transactional aspects. In particular, the 
large Dutch seed potato merchants, who are also deeply involved in breeding activities, 
share knowledge and information with their suppliers and customers. They work with a 
very stable and loyal supplier base that exists of (semi-professional) breeders26 and seed 
potato growers. The exchange of knowledge and information in these ongoing relations 
is concerned with such issues as the development of new potato properties and the 
improvement of crop treatment techniques. These quite intensive contacts support the 
aim of the merchants to secure a stable supply of high-quality seed potatoes, which is 
seen as an important competitive strength. The seed potato merchants generally have 
well-developed relations with their customers as well, including large potato processors, 
ware potato merchants, growers, and sometimes also retailers. Through these relations, 
25 
26 
See Appendix VIII for the data and the criteria used to develop this graph. The data comes from the 
answers of Dutch managers to the questions in Section II of the interview protocol (see Appendix V). 
These breeders are not commercial firms but individuals who, as a hobby, try to breed new potato 
varieties. They are also called 'hobby breeders.' Apart from high-tech breeding activities in the 
laboratories of professional breeders, the hobby breeders play an important role in the highly uncertain 
and time-consuming process of new potato variety development. 
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the merchants keep abreast of a range of customer demands concerning properties of 
potato varieties, expected needs for particular potatoes in the future (e.g., x tons of 
variety y in year z), and other aspects that are relevant to future transactions, rather than 
present ones. For instance, a seed potato merchant/breeder explained that 'We listen to 
the ware potato merchants we do business with, who inform us about the needs of 
retailers for particular varieties.' 
The vertical relations of ware potato merchants usually involve flows of information and 
knowledge to regularly evaluate the business contacts and enhance product quality. 
Moreover, contacts tend to become more intensive as a result of the increased demands 
from customers for 'teeltregistratie' i.e., to register the way the potatoes are grown 
(which is much in line with customers' requests for traceability in the UK). Some of the 
ware potato merchants also exchange ideas with retailers to develop new products and 
services. This has, for instance, led to the introduction of new potato products/varieties 
in supermarkets, as well as just-in-time distribution systems. 
The potato processors in the Netherlands generally have quite intensive contacts with 
their suppliers who are either individual growers or ware potato merchants. The 
exchange of knowledge and information is largely aimed at improving the quality of 
supplies and logistic processes, both in the short and long term. A manager of a large 
potato processor explained that 'This happens in the context of a process of mutual 
learning, which keeps us together.' In this respect it was pointed out that the quality of 
the ware potato supply has a tremendous impact on the costs of potato processing, 
which, in turn, need to be as low as possible to remain competitive. The intensity of 
knowledge and information exchange with major buyers located in different countries27 
appeared to vary from customer to customer. 
Flows of mutual expectations 
The customer and supplier relations of Dutch potato firms are largely based on 
combinations of oral agreements and formal contracts. As is shown in Figure 5.9, this is 
true for virtually all supplier relations and most of the customer relations. A very minor 
part of the transactions with customers is based on highly specific contracts. 
An important proportion of the transactions between Dutch potato firms takes place on 
the basis of oral agreements, often made by telephone, which are later confirmed by a 
As was pointed out in Section 5.1.3, about 90% of the total output of the Dutch potato processors is 
destined for export markets. 
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formal contract. These contracts are standardized and often added to general conditions 
of trade, which tend to vary from firm to firm. It was explained that the contracts are 
often nothing more than a sheet of paper that specifies straightforward transactional 
aspects such as the amount, quality, variety, and time of delivery. The details about the 
deliveries are put to paper in order to avoid misunderstandings and to have something to 
refer to in case of disagreements. In particular, the seed potato merchants consider it 
important to work with formal contracts in order to keep control over the propagation of 
their potato varieties (which are protected by breeder's rights). 
Figure 5.9 The basis of customer and supplier relations of leading Dutch potato firms 
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However, formal contracts are considered secondary to mutual trust, which appeared to 
be an important basis for the relations between buyers and suppliers. As a manager put 
it, 'The contracts are mainly used for bookkeeping purposes.' Moreover, the general 
conditions of sale tend to have a ritual function, which was illustrated by a respondent 
who noted: 'Just recently I had a look at the general conditions of sale that we had 
attached to our contracts for years ...I discovered some serious flaws that never had 
been noticed because nobody really had read the conditions.' The respondents 
explained that most of their transactions are embedded in long-term relations. In these 
The aggregated results of the answers of Dutch managers to question 1 in Section III of the interview 
protocol (see Appendix V). 
120 CHAPTER FIVE 
long-term relations, reputations have been built up that form a basis of mutual trust. 
With respect to the relevance of social control, remarks were made that the Dutch potato 
industry is a small world in which most people know each other. If a firm would do 
something unacceptable, the whole industry would soon know this. It was stressed that 
the resulting bad reputation could severely complicate the business activities of the firm 
involved. Finally, most directors of (in particular the larger) potato firms know each 
other personally. The threshold to contact each other directly is low. In accordance to 
this, informal relations between directors generally form an integrated part of the inter-
firm relations in the Dutch potato industry. 
Flows of resources and activity links 
The inter-firm relations of Dutch potato firms generally involve long-term time 
horizons. As is shown in Figure 5.10, virtually all vertical relations were considered as 
long-term relations lasting at least two years or longer. It was also found that most 
vertical relations are stable relations, but a great minority of the long-term relations is 
based on repeated short-term contracts as well. 
The relations between potato merchants and farmers usually last for multiple years, if 
not decades. Strikingly, no significant differences were found in this respect between 
marketing co-operatives and private firms that all work with a very stable group of 
suppliers29. At both types of firms, the relations with growers are sometimes even 
passed on from generation to generation. A seed potato merchant noted that 'Most of 
our suppliers are with us since the firm was established ... they only leave us in case of 
conflict and in the rare cases this ever happened we felt it as a big shame? The long-
term relations are considered functional in the sense that they facilitate the achievement 
of both process and product quality improvements which are needed to remain 
competitive. Dutch potato processors generally prefer to rely on long-term commitments 
with a limited number of seed and ware potato merchants for the greater part of their 
supplies30. 
This was noted by Lamont (1992) as well. 
In the past decade, some of these relations have evolved into more formal structures such as joint 
ventures or led to take-overs of potato merchants by potato processors. 
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Figure 5.10 The time span and stability of vertical relations in the Dutch potato industry 
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In this manner the potato processors seek to secure a stable supply of ware potatoes, 
which is of vital importance for the continuity (and efficiency) of their production 
processes. Long-term relations are also present among a limited number of Dutch ware 
potato merchants and retailers. This is in tune with the policy of the large retailers in the 
Netherlands which, like their UK counterparts, prefer to work with a limited number of 
dedicated suppliers for each product group. 
In the discussions with the respondents about the duration of their vertical inter-firm 
relations, the respondents pointed out that they have not very much choice anymore with 
respect to the selection of buyers and suppliers. Figure 5.11 presents the views of potato 
firm managers, who indicated that it is almost impossible to find another customer and 
that the options to switch to another supplier have become quite limited. This is 
important because the number of firms has decreased considerably in the past decades in 
the Dutch potato industry32. However, some managers also pointed out that switching to 
another buyer or supplier was neither easy nor desired, because the inter-firm relations 
32 
The aggregated results of the answers of Dutch managers to question 3 in Section III of the interview 
protocol (see Appendix V). 
Sec also Rademakcrs and McKnight (1998) on the concentration in the Dutch potato industry. 
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had more or less become 'crystallized' over the many decades (up to more than a 
century) their firm was in business. 
Figure 5.11 The ease for Dutch potato firms to switch to another customer or supplier 
& 
difficult 
not very easy 
easy 
0 
3 firms 
8 firms 
V firms 
H i firm 
| 1 firm 
Relations of 12 Dutch potato firms 
D supplier relations D customer relations 
Source: interview data 
The relatively large minority of inter-firm relations that are based on recurrent short-
term contracts can be explained by the finding that not all respondents regarded long-
term contracts as an important basis for long-term relations. A manager expressed the 
view that 'Long-term contracts are not necessary ... the experience is that firms keep 
working together anyway.' The short-term contracts are mainly seen as a way to remain 
flexible within broader, long-term relations. For instance, potato merchants may need to 
switch to another potato variety in case demands decrease. This implies the need for a 
new contract, but not necessarily with another grower. 
It must be noted that, in particular, the trade of ware potatoes in the Netherlands is based 
on a range of different types of contracts for either post- or pre-harvest trade. The 
notation of the (non-monopolized) Bintje variety at the Rotterdam potato exchange is an 
important price setting mechanism in the post-harvest market. This is a spot-market that 
is used by firms to speculate, to sell surpluses or to buy additional supplies. 
Nevertheless it is important with regard to price setting as just a handful of firms are 
The aggregated results of the answers of Dutch managers to question 2 in Section III of the interview 
protocol (see Appendix V). 
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actively involved in this ware potato exchange. The exchange price notation of ware 
potatoes is applied as a reference for the determination of pre- or post-contract prices in 
direct supply relations of potato merchants (both private and co-operative), potato 
processors, and retailers. 
To reduce the risks that come with the considerable price fluctuations of potatoes, 
different types of pre-harvest contracts have been developed. The major contract types 
are based on either spot-market prices (full risk), pool systems34 (reduced risk) or pre-
harvest fixed prices (no risk). In addition, in Amsterdam there is a futures market for 
potatoes, which, apart from speculation by people from both inside and outside the 
industry, is used to a certain extent as a mechanism to temper the risks of price 
fluctuations. 
In practice, the principal suppliers of ware potatoes (i.e., the growers) make use of a 
combination of the available contracting systems to secure a part of their income (which 
is often required by their banks) and to keep some space to speculate on price 
fluctuations. However, speculation becomes increasingly rare because of the increased 
favor of major potato firms to work with pre-harvest contracts. In this manner they 
moderate the financial risks that come with the vast amounts of potatoes they have to 
sell or buy. For instance, when potato processors obtain an order from a large customer, 
they secure most of the needed potato supplies through pre-harvest contracts at a (semi-) 
fixed price, rather than relying on the spot market35. 
Risk sharing in vertical relations is not uncommon for Dutch potato firms. In fact, risk 
sharing in different forms and degrees is practiced by large, small, and medium-sized 
firms across the entire supply chain. Ware potato merchants and potato processors invest 
time and financial resources in the joint development of new potato varieties with 
breeders/seed potato merchants. For instance, some processors and ware potato 
merchants work together with breeders and/or growers in field trials of 'prototype' 
varieties. A manager explained, in tune with many of his colleagues, that 'We put a high 
priority to cooperation with breeders for the development of new potato varieties and 
we invest much money in it.' These activities involve joint investments while returns are 
Pool systems generally work on the basis of a group of growers who put together (part of) their crop. 
The total amount of potatoes is then sold (often via a merchant) in batches over a certain time period, 
which moderates the effects of peaks and dips in the spot-market prices. 
Note that potato processors generally need huge amounts of raw materials while they work with small 
profit margins. Hence, an unanticipated increase of ware potato prices can lead to heavy losses. 
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far from certain. The outcomes of the tests and trials are quite unpredictable and a long 
time (up to 15 years) is needed to arrive at commercially useful results36. 
Risk sharing takes place at the downstream end of the potato supply chain as well. 
Examples are the Dutch potato processors and ware potato merchants who work 
together with retailers (and jointly carry the risks) of new product development and 
introduction for private label products. The joint activities range from the development 
of new packaging to the introduction of new potato products and varieties. Regarding 
the numerous (and sometimes very costly) failures reported by potato firm managers, the 
introduction of new products proves to be a risky matter for all parties involved. Other 
forms of risk sharing at the downstream end are joint logistic systems used by ware 
potato merchants and retailers. These systems imply full integration of a part of the 
product flows of the firms involved. It was explained that the development of such 
logistic systems requires substantial joint investments, while the risks that come with the 
operation of the system are carried together. Finally, some of the cooperative relations 
between Dutch potato firms were found to include risk sharing with regard to price 
variations in the markets of the buyers. In such occasions a (major) supplier temporarily 
lowered its prices to support the buyer to withstand the (price) competition resulting 
from, for instance, aggressive market penetration campaigns of its competitors. A 
respondent explained the philosophy behind this form of risk sharing, telling that 'If a 
customer firm has a problem, we regard it as our problem too, so we always look for 
joint solutions.' The pragmatic underpinning of this line of thinking is that suppliers of 
potatoes or potato products secure an important part of their future sales (at better 
prices) by contributing to the competitive strength of their buyers". 
Vertical integration and self-sufficiency 
Figure 5.12 displays the findings about the level of vertical integration among firms in 
the Dutch potato industry. It is shown that the 12 firms involved in this study are 
engaged in a total of 30 activities, which indicates that the level of vertical integration in 
the Dutch potato industry is quite high. This view is further enhanced through the quite 
Because of the high uncertainty of the results of potato variety development, firms working at the 
downstream part of the supply chain tend to keep in touch with multiple breeders. This is done To 
keep them (the breeders) sharp' and because it is unpredictable which firm would come with a new, 
very useful variety. 
Note that this thinking also strongly reflects the long-term horizon Dutch potato firms tend to work 
with in their vertical relations. 
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Figure 5.12 Vertical integration and core activities of Dutch potato firms 
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equal distribution of the total number of activities per stage in the Dutch potato supply 
chain (except for potato growing and, to a lesser extent, breeding)". 
39 
The aggregated results of the answers of the Dutch managers to the questions in Section I of the 
interview protocol (see Appendix V and also Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2). 
The almost complete absence of firms involved in seed or ware potato growing can be explained by 
the fact that most of the seed and ware potatoes grown in the Netherlands are traded through farmers' 
co-operatives. These co-operatives can be regarded as a form of forward integration by farmers. 
However, individual farmers have not been involved in the field study that forms the basis of this 
analysis. The co-operatives (seed and ware potato merchants) involved in this study have been treated 
as firms that obtain their supplies via contracts with growers. 
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It was found that although all major potato processors are involved in ware potato trade 
(though mainly buying), the seed potato merchants have integrated backwards into 
breeding, and most ware potato merchants are also involved in seed potato trade. In 
general, the firms that dominate the Dutch potato industry (in terms of market share) 
own activities in one or two stages of the Dutch potato supply chain. Apart from these 
firms, there are a few companies that own activities in all stages (except potato growing) 
of the supply chain. 
After a closer examination, the level of vertical integration of Dutch potato firms 
appears to vary considerable. On the one hand, the leading firms in every stage of the 
supply chain are focused on just one or two activities and prefer inter-firm cooperation 
to vertical integration by ownership. On the other hand, most firms cover two or more 
stages of the potato supply chain. For instance, one firm constitutes an entirely 
integrated supply system in its own right, ranging from breeding activities to potato 
processing but not including potato growing activities. A couple of other firms combine 
seed and ware potato trade with minor activities in potato processing. Moreover, potato 
processors incline to integrate backwards into ware potato trading activities. In contrast, 
other firms tend to return to their core activities such as breeding/seed potato trade and 
ware potato trade. 
Regardless of the various levels of vertical integration that have been found in the Dutch 
potato industry, most firms are just moderately self-sufficient. In other words, the firms 
owning activities in multiple stages of the potato supply chain remain largely dependent 
of supplies from other, autonomous organizations. For instance, it was noted that all 
major potato processors are involved in ware potato trade. Nevertheless, autonomous 
ware potato merchants, though few in number at present, remain an important source of 
potato supplies for the processors. 
The combination of high levels of vertical integration and moderate degrees of self-
sufficiency can be linked to the motivations of firms for either forward or backward 
integration. In general, potato firms seek to take advantage of market opportunities 
rather than secure their supplies through backward integration. For instance, some seed 
and ware potato merchants and also farmers moved into potato processing in the past 
decades to take advantage of the growth in the markets for potato products. Most of 
these initiatives failed, were sold or remained a secondary activity of the firms involved. 
Few developed into large, autonomous firms or became business units of holding 
companies. Other examples are the major Dutch seed potato merchants that have 
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integrated backwards into breeding. This can be linked, at least in part, to the strategic 
importance of having breeders' rights over monopolized varieties (see Section 5.1.3) in 
order to get access to major buyers. However, none of these seed potato merchants are 
self-sufficient. They draw from, or work together with autonomous breeders to gain 
access to new potato varieties. 
Overview 
Table 5.6 summarizes the findings about the attributes of vertical inter-firm cooperation 
in the Dutch potato industry. It was found that the flows of knowledge and information 
in the vertical inter-firm relations of potato firms are quite extensive and go beyond 
discrete transactions. The relations are for the most part based on mutual trust which, in 
turn, is based on reputation, social control, and personal contacts. Formal contracts are 
widely used as a practical tool for the coordination and control of transactions. They are 
considered as a necessity for book keeping purposes, rather than a major basis of trust. 
Moreover, the transactions between Dutch potato firms are generally embedded in 
ongoing relations with long time horizons. In addition, both pragmatic and more durable 
forms of risk sharing exist between buyers and suppliers across the Dutch potato supply 
chain. 
Table 5.6 Attributes of vertical inter-firm cooperation in the Dutch potato industry 
Key attributes of cooperative 
Flows of Information 
Flows of mutual expectations 
Flows of resources and 
activity links 
Integration of activities 
customer-supplier relations 
• Surpassing transactional 
information 
• Exchange of knowledge 
• Relations largely based on 
mutual trust 
• Long-term time horizon 
• Risk sharing 
• Degree of vertical integration 
• Degree of self-sufficiency 
Relevance 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+/— 
Source: see text 
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With regard to vertical integration, most firms in the industry are focused on one or two 
activities in the potato supply chain. A minority of firms (in terms of both market share 
and number) is fully integrated. The level of self-sufficiency of the firms in the Dutch 
potato industry tends to be low. In summary, the pattern of the attributes of vertical 
inter-firm cooperation in the Dutch potato industry reflects a strong dominance of 
cooperative relations. 
5.3.2 Horizontal inter-firm relations in the Dutch potato industry 
Cooperation between competing firms is remarkably well developed in the Dutch potato 
industry. Figure 5.13 shows that all respondents indicated their involvement in some 
form of horizontal cooperation. The stance of potato firm managers with regard to this 
issue is well reflected in their remarks that 'In this industry competitors see each other 
also as colleagues.' Nevertheless, the respondents were quick to emphasize that the 
competition among them is very tough as well, pointing to the considerable shakeouts 
and other structural shifts that the industry has witnessed since the late 1980s. In 
addition, it was stressed that the Dutch anti-trust legislation had been sharpened 
considerably in the mid-1990s. 
Information exchange between competitors in the Dutch potato industry is quite 
intensive. Virtually all firms exchange information with their competitors about a wide 
range of (non-commercial) subjects such as problems in export markets, warnings about 
bad debtors, developments of the industry and governmental policies. In a similar 
fashion, particularly Dutch seed potato firms and potato processors take advantage of 
the exchange of knowledge. This mainly concerns technical issues such as measures 
against plant disease and measures for environmentally sound production. 
More intensive forms of knowledge and information exchange occur in the many ad-hoc 
or more structural cooperative arrangements between competing firms in the Dutch 
potato industry. Of the 12 firms in the field study, four are engaged in joint ventures 
with competitors. These joint ventures concern operations in foreign markets, breeding 
activities, and the bundling of ware potato sales for particular varieties. Moreover, 8 out 
of 12 firms undertake joint research and development activities in the field of marketing, 
plant disease control, logistics, quality, and environmentally sound production. 
However, it must be noted that the joint research and development activities of Dutch 
potato firms represent a minor part of the total research efforts in the industry. In 
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addition, it was indicated that by far the most research is non- or pre-commercial in 
nature. 
Figure 5.13: The perceptions of managers of 12 Dutch potato firms about the relevance of 
horizontal cooperation 
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For instance, respondents explained that 'We conduct research with our competitors 
about how to fight plant disease because that is in everybody's interest and because 
there is no danger that we loose competitive strength.' 
Mutual shareholdings are not very common in the Dutch potato industry. Just one firm 
reported to be involved in such a relation. In addition, some arrangements exist that 
indirectly link together a number of major Dutch potato firms. The firms involved are 
partially owned by a large holding-like co-operative and are active in all stages of the 
potato supply chain. Despite this ownership arrangement, the firms largely operate 
independently from each other. 
Equipment sharing can be considered a quite common form of horizontal cooperation 
among firms in the Dutch potato industry (7 of the selection of 12 firms). The sharing of 
equipment is done both ad-hoc and in more structured ways. For instance, ad-hoc 
arrangements are set up when a firm runs into capacity problems because of sudden 
malfunction of machinery, accidents, unanticipated maintenance, or peaks in orders 
from large customers. In such cases, as a respondent explained, 'We call one of our 
colleagues with the question if we can arrange something and we find a joint solution in 
40 
The aggregated results of the answers of the Dutch managers to question 1 in Section IV of the 
interview protocol (see Appendix V). 
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nine of the ten cases.' In a more structural fashion, potato processors make use of the 
possibility to hire capacity from each other via 'horizontal contracts.' Moreover, seed 
and ware potato merchants frequently share transportation equipment/capacity to 
enhance the efficiency of their logistic processes. 
Most of the joint activities of the Dutch potato firms are initiated and managed on the 
basis of informal relations between the directors of the firms. Personal reputation is an 
important basis of trust in horizontal cooperation. Moreover, there is a clear readiness to 
work with each other, and it is a generally accepted practice to take into account each 
other's interests. Formal contracts are used as well, for instance to make explicit the 
agreements made with regard to horizontal arrangements such as joint ventures and 
hiring production capacity. However, these explicit agreements can be considered less 
important as a basis of trust in the horizontal inter-firm relations of Dutch potato firms. 
Table 5.7 Attributes of horizontal inter-firm cooperation in the Dutch potato industry 
Key attributes of horizontal cooperation 
Flows of Information < 
Flows of expectations < 
Flows of resources < 
• Information exchange 
« Knowledge sharing 
> Implicit agreements 
> Explicit agreements 
> Joint investments 
> Mutual shareholdings 
« Equipment sharing 
Relevance 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+/— 
+ 
— 
+ 
Source: see text 
Table 5.7 provides an overview of the attributes of horizontal inter-firm cooperation in 
the Dutch potato industry. The general view that emerged is that horizontal cooperation 
in the Dutch potato industry is well developed, tends to be pragmatic in nature, is often 
aimed to enhance efficiency or share costs, and is limited to non- or pre-commercial 
activities. 
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5.3.3 The relative importance of business associations in the Dutch potato 
industry 
Similar to the discussion about UK business associations, the relative importance of 
their Dutch counterparts will be done on the basis of the possible functions identified in 
Chapter 3. The sequence followed here is also determined by the degree of relevance of 
these functions to the trade associations. 
Facilitation of horizontal cohesion 
Trade associations in the Dutch potato industry function in particular as formal meeting 
points where directors and/or senior managers of competing firms discuss developments 
in the industry. Members have meetings at their association several times a year. In 
these meetings, member firms discuss common problems and the measures that need to 
be taken to resolve them. Issues include, for instance, pressures from society concerning 
environmentally sound production, technical developments, industry restructuring, and 
governmental policies. 
One of the results of joint actions via trade associations to solve a common problem led 
to the abandoning of the quasi-governmental industry association Productschap 
Aardappelen in the second half of the 1990s. Many firms regarded this organization as 
too expensive and also as an anachronism. This organization was replaced by another 
industry association, the Commissie Aardappelen (CA), with considerably less 
manpower, authority, and functions than its predecessor. The major tasks of this 
organization have become limited to gathering and distributing general information 
about the industry and managing communication between the government and the 
industry. The CA also provides a statutory basis for common rules agreed upon by 
representatives of trade associations. The organization, however, has no statutory 
powers itself, but functions as advisor to the general industry board 'Productschap 
Akkerbouw' that does have statutory powers. 
Apart from facilitating joint action, the 'platform' function of the Dutch business 
associations strongly promotes socialization among its members. As one chairman put 
it: 'The gatherings of the various commissions in these associations are social events as 
well.' Although firms sometimes severely compete with each other, their managing 
directors generally view each other as colleagues. On the basis of this attitude, managers 
of competing firms communicate about technical and other developments in the 
industry, and also bundle their firms' resources in pre- or non-competitive joint 
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activities. In this manner, the overall efficiency of the industry is improved, which 
strengthens the position of Dutch potato firms in export markets. 
Development of general rules 
Another well-developed function of the Dutch trade associations is the provision of 
common rules/codes of conduct. This includes general conditions of trade, quality 
norms and specifications, and covenants (agreements with the state that substitute 
formal law). As was indicated earlier, the industry association is used as a vehicle to 
provide self-imposed rules and regulations with a statutory basis. This statutory basis 
provides the possibility to undertake measures in the case of free-rider behavior through 
firms that try to avoid complying with the common rules. The strength and impact of 
these common rules vary to some extent. For instance, although the trade associations 
provide general conditions of trade, these are not seen as a very important basis for the 
exchanges between firms. The inspection protocols and quality specifications that apply 
to the industry are considered more important. They are monitored by independent 
officials from the associations and provide exchange parties certainty about the 
reliability and quality of the products. The ability to provide such certainties are an 
important prerequisite for the development of a reliable supply system for both domestic 
and export markets. The covenants between the government and the industry are very 
relevant as well, because they substitute laws and regulations that otherwise would be 
imposed on the industry. Clearly, the firms that make up the Dutch potato industry value 
self-administration and realize this through joint actions via business associations. 
Arbitration 
Arbitration services appeared to be well-developed functions of the Dutch trade 
associations. The arbitration services are linked to the general conditions of trade and 
are called for several times a year. The commission of arbiters consists of members of 
the association who are elected for this function. The judgement of this commission is 
binding for the firms that appeal to arbitration to solve a conflict. Most potato firm 
managers prefer that people 'of their own' are the arbiters because, as one manager said, 
'They know what they are talking about.' In addition, it was pointed out that in case of 
conflicts the parties do not need to go to court, which would be a costly affair. 
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Promotion of interests 
Trade associations are also used to gain a critical mass for the promotion of common 
interests. Interests can be at stake because of unfavorable governmental policies on 
local, national, or European level and actions of pressure groups. Key issues are, for 
instance, environmentally sound production, export policies, plant diseases, and market 
regimes. The promotion of interests is done through lobbying (particularly in 
'Brussels'), but, more importantly, also through active participation in the development 
of new policies and regulations. Most trade associations have long-term and well-
cultivated informal relations with relevant Ministries. Some relations can be traced back 
to the first decades after W.W.n, when a secure supply of food at low prices was an 
important state objective. This objective was particularly relevant for the potato 
industry, because potatoes constituted a major part of the daily nutrition of the Dutch 
population. However, instead of issuing regulations, the attainment of this state 
objective was largely left to business associations in the potato industry. One chairman 
phrased the past situation as follows: 7« that period the most important activity of our 
association was to ensure that the government did not intervene in the potato prices and 
that enough potatoes were left for the Dutch market.' 
Dissemination of knowledge and information 
All Dutch trade associations are involved in the dissemination of information and 
knowledge. The information is mostly general in nature and concerned with statistics 
about a range of subjects, governmental policies, research outcomes, governance issues, 
and market trends. The activities of the industry association in this respect are more 
confined to the provision of general statistics. Both the trade and industry associations 
function as a collective memory for the industry, as they keep a record of all the 
information they gather and distribute. 
Coordination in case of industry-wide crisis 
In the past decade, the Dutch potato industry has experienced a number of crisis-like 
events including a highly harmful publicity campaign by pressure groups concerning the 
abundant use of pesticides in the industry. The outbreak of 'brown rot' caused another 
crisis for the industry. This highly contagious plant disease meant a very serious threat 
for the seed and ware potato exports, which traditionally account for a vast amount of 
the total production of the Dutch industry. In such situations, the Dutch business 
associations usually play a coordinating role with regard to the communication involved 
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and actions to be taken. For instance, based on previous experiences, the industry 
association has developed 'screenplays' to cope with similar crises in the future. As a 
chairman pointed out, members are quick to telephone their trade association with the 
question 'What are we going to do?' if problems occur that affect the entire (or a part of 
the) industry. Depending on the size and seriousness of the problem, actions are 
undertaken, either or not in cooperation with other associations, and sometimes 
government agencies, to find solutions to temper the negative influences of the crisis. In 
this respect it was remarked that chairmen/secretaries of trade associations, rather than 
managers of individual firms, know how to find their way in governmental circles. 
Initiation and coordination of joint activities 
Both trade and industry associations are involved in the initiation of joint research and 
promotion activities. For instance, they gain subsidies for research and other programs 
aimed at industry development and collect funds for collective industry promotion. The 
trade associations also coordinate joint, non-commercial or pre-competitive (research) 
projects. However, the respondents considered neither of these joint activities very 
substantial in comparison with their individual research and promotion efforts. It was 
pointed out that joint promotion was done on quite a large scale in the past. However, 
because firms grew larger and potato processing, brands, and monopolized varieties 
gained importance, the need for this type of joint action has decreased considerably. 
Facilitation of vertical cohesion 
The facilitation of cohesion between firms across the supply chain was regarded not 
relevant for the Dutch trade associations. A similar view was expressed with regard to 
the industry association, which is considered as 'an association of associations' rather 
than an organization that acts as a liaison for firms across the industry. Comments made 
by the respondents indicated that they consider business associations quite irrelevant 
when it comes to the establishment, development, and maintenance of inter-firm 
relations throughout the supply chain. Moreover, rather than cohesion, some tension was 
noted between the associations for ware potato trade and potato processing with regard 
to views about the future development of the industry. 
The results of the discussion about the functions of business associations in the Dutch 
potato industry are summarized in Tables 5.8 and 5.9. The histograms that comprise part 
of the database used for the above analysis can be found in Appendix X. In short, the 
membership base of trade associations in the Dutch potato industry is both voluntary 
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and inclusive. The trade associations have no statutory powers, but nevertheless have 
the ability to sanction common rules by making use of the industry association, which, 
in turn, is a sub-division of a quasi-governmental body. The industry association of the 
Dutch potato industry has a compulsory membership base. The range of functions 
performed by the trade associations is wide. The horizontal platform function and ways 
of self-administration can be considered most important. In contrast, the industry 
association performs a relatively limited range of activities. 
Table 5.8: Functions of Dutch trade associations 
Relevance 
Strong 
Moderate 
Weak 
Functions 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Facilitation of horizontal cohesion 
Development of general rules 
Arbitration 
Promotion of interests 
Dissemination of knowledge and information 
Coordination in case of industry-wide crises 
Initiation and coordination of joint activities 
Facilitation of vertical cohesion 
Source: see text 
Table 5.9 Functions of the Dutch industry association 
Relevance 
Strong 
Moderate 
Weak 
Not relevant 
Functions 
• Not relevant 
• Development of common rules 
• Dissemination of knowledge and information 
• Initiation and coordination of joint activities 
• Promotion of interests 
• Coordination in case of industry-wide crises 
• Arbitration 
• Facilitation of horizontal cohesion 
• Facilitation of vertical cohesion 
Source: see text 
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Table 5.10 presents an overview of the indicators for the relative importance of business 
associations in the Dutch potato industry, which have been discussed above. 
Table 5.10 The relative importance of business associations in the Dutch potato industry 
Membership base 
Statutory powers 
Range of functions 
Trade associations 
Inclusive (voluntary) 
Indirect 
Wide 
Industry association 
Inclusive (compulsory) 
Indirect 
Limited 
Source: see text 
5.4 Conclusions 
The results of the field study show that supplier relations in the UK potato industry tend 
to be spot-market in nature. Both the degree of vertical integration and self-sufficiency 
of UK potato firms are high. Horizontal cooperation appeared largely limited to 
information exchange. The importance of business associations as forms of inter-firm 
cooperation in the UK potato industry is not very high. Most trade associations have a 
fragmented membership base and in particular have developed as lobby organizations 
and information brokers. The industry association was found to be quite active and also 
firmly established on the basis of statutory powers and compulsory membership. 
The field study in the Dutch potato industry has revealed the prevalence of cooperative 
vertical inter-firm relations. The degree of vertical integration among Dutch potato firms 
appeared to vary considerably, while the degree of self-sufficiency turned out to be low. 
Horizontal cooperation is a strongly developed feature among firms in the Dutch potato 
industry. Virtually all firms are involved in some structural or more ad-hoc forms of 
cooperation with competitors. Business associations in the Dutch potato industry are not 
very numerous and enjoy almost inclusive membership. The Dutch trade associations 
particularly function as platforms for discussions about industry developments. 
Moreover, these organizations strongly facilitate socialization among their members. In 
contrast, the role of the industry association appeared to be very modest. 
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In sum, the descriptions made on the basis of the field study in the UK and Dutch potato 
industries have revealed considerable differences in both the degree and nature of inter-
firm cooperation in the UK and Dutch potato industry. In the next chapter, the patterns 
of inter-firm cooperation will be compared and contrasted with each other and linked to 
the influence of nationally distinct social institutions. 

Part III: Analysis and conclusions 

Chapter Six 
COMPARISON AND DISCUSSION OF 
THE RESULTS FROM THE FIELD STUDY 
This chapter comprises a cross-national comparison of the findings from the field study 
on the nature and degree of inter-firm cooperation in the UK and Dutch potato 
industries. The contrasts and similarities identified are placed against the background 
of nationally distinct social institutions. For this purpose, detailed descriptions are 
made for each country about the nature of state involvement in the industry, the 
financial system, the legal system, and the relative legitimacy of individualistic vs. 
collectivistic behavior. The resulting insights about the patterns of inter-firm 
cooperation in different national contexts are related to the propositions formulated in 
Chapter 3. The outcomes provide empirically supported insights into the combined 
influence of a range of key social institutions on the development of cooperative inter-
firm relations. 
6.1 Comparison of the nature and degree of inter-firm cooperation in the UK 
and Dutch potato industries 
In the following section the nature and degree of vertical and horizontal inter-firm 
cooperation in the UK and Dutch potato industries are compared and contrasted. The 
bilateral forms of vertical inter-firm cooperation are dealt with first, followed by a 
comparison of the findings about horizontal business-to-business relations. Finally, the 
relative importance of business associations in the potato industries of both countries is 
addressed. 
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6.1.1 Comparison of the vertical inter-firm relations 
The patterns of vertical inter-firm organization found in the UK differ in significantly 
from the findings in the Dutch potato industry. The spot-market nature of inter-firm 
relations in the UK contrasts sharply with the prevalence of cooperative relations among 
Dutch firms. This contrast is shown in Figure 6.1, in which the views are compared of 
UK and Dutch potato firm managers with respect to the nature of their vertical inter-
firm relations. 
Figure 6.1 Cooperative vs. spot-market relations in the UK and Dutch potato industry 
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A closer comparative analysis of the attributes of inter-firm cooperation in the UK and 
Dutch potato industries will be made in the sub-sections below. This will reveal more 
details about the contrasts between the way UK and Dutch firms coordinate and control 
their vertical relations. 
Flows of information 
It was found that the exchange of knowledge and information in the vertical relations of 
Dutch firms tends to be quite extensive and usually exceeds the necessary 
communication required for discrete transactions. In the UK, on the contrary, flows of 
information are generally limited to discrete transactions. Exchanging knowledge 
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between buyers and suppliers is rare. Flows of knowledge tend to be one-way directed, 
contract-based, and generally run from relatively powerful buyers to their suppliers. 
Flows of mutual expectations 
The Dutch potato firms, to a great extent, rely on mutual trust based on reputation, 
social control, and personal contacts. Formal contracts are widely used, though in 
combination with oral agreements. The contracts tend to be limited to straightforward 
transactional data such as prices, qualities, and quantities and are largely seen as an 
additional basis of trust. They are largely used to avoid misunderstandings among the 
exchange parties, to secure breeder's rights (if relevant), and to have tangible proof in 
case of disagreements that call for arbitration, negotiations or, in very rare cases, legal 
proceedings. Similarly, the transactions between most potato firms in the UK are based 
on combinations of formal contracts and oral agreements, while having a good 
reputation is also considered highly important. In contrast, social control or personal 
relations are not relevant as a basis of trust in vertical inter-firm relations of UK potato 
firms. Moreover, the large potato traders, processors, and retailers that dominate the 
industry tend to rely on highly specified contracts. 
Flows of resources and activity links 
The time horizons of the vertical inter-firm relations in the UK and Dutch potato 
industries differ considerably. Most of the transactions between Dutch potato firms are 
embedded in ongoing relations with long time horizons. This is not the case with UK 
firms, which generally work with recurrent short-term contracts that involve short-term 
time horizons. Nevertheless, the repeated contracts used by UK firms constitute 
relations that cover multiple years. 
In tune with the long-term view that is common among the Dutch potato firms, risk 
sharing between buyers and suppliers is not unusual. Examples include joint 
investments in the development and operation of logistic systems, joint investments in 
breeding activities, and joint actions of buyers and suppliers to beat the competition. In 
contrast, risk sharing between buyers and suppliers in the UK is virtually absent. 
From the field study it is also apparent that the degree of vertical integration among the 
firms dominating the UK potato industry is higher than in the Netherlands. The Dutch 
potato industry comprises a rather diverse structure of a few fully integrated firms and a 
majority of organizations that comprise two activities across the potato supply chain. 
Moreover, vertical integration by firms in the UK appears mainly supply-driven, while 
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the motivations of their Dutch counterparts are particularly driven by market 
opportunities. Accordingly, the degree of self-sufficiency of Dutch potato firms tends to 
be low, while the integrated firms that dominate the UK potato industry are without 
exception highly self-sufficient. 
Table 6.1 provides a comparative overview of the differences in the attributes of vertical 
cooperative relations in the UK and Dutch potato industries. As can be seen, the patterns 
that reflect the relevance of the attributes of inter-firm cooperation are as good as 
opposite to each other. 
Table 6.1 Vertical inter-firm relations in the UK and Dutch potato industries 
Attributes of vertical cooperative relations 
Flows of Information 
Flows of mutual expectations 
Flows of resources and 
activity links 
Integration of activities 
• Surpassing transactional information 
• Exchange of knowledge 
• Relations largely based on mutual 
trust 
• Long-term time horizon 
• Risk sharing 
• Degree of vertical integration 
• Degree of self-sufficiency 
UK 
+ 
+ 
NL 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+/— 
Source: see text 
6.1.2 Comparison of the horizontal inter-firm relations 
The patterns of the attributes of horizontal cooperation between UK and Dutch potato 
firms reflect some similarities but contrast even more. Table 6.2 indicates that 
horizontal inter-firm cooperation is much stronger developed in the Dutch potato 
industry than in the UK. 
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Table 6.2 Horizontal inter-firm cooperation in the UK and Dutch potato industries 
Attributes of horizontal co-operation 
Flows of Information > 
Flows of mutual expectations 
Flows of resources and < 
activity links < 
> Information exchange 
• Knowledge sharing 
> Implicit agreements 
» Explicit agreements 
> Joint investments 
> Mutual shareholdings 
> Equipment sharing 
UK 
+ 
+/— 
+/— 
NL 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+/— 
+ 
+ 
Source: see text 
Flows of information 
Information exchange between competitors occurs on a wide scale in both the UK and 
Dutch potato industries. Managers of firms talk with each other about a range of 
different but non-commercial subjects including, and in particular, governmental 
policies, developments in overseas markets, and technical aspects of potato growing. 
Contrary to the UK, however, it is far from unusual for Dutch firms to exchange 
knowledge with each other about such issues as, for instance, technology for 
environmentally sound production and ways to fight plant disease. In addition, 
knowledge exchange is part of the structural and ad-hoc cooperative arrangements that 
are common practice among competing firms in the Dutch potato industry. 
Flows of mutual expectations 
Trust in the joint activities of Dutch potato firms is in part based on the personal 
reputation of the managing directors, who generally maintain informal relations with 
each other. These relations are based on mutual respect and facilitate cooperation based 
on implicit agreements. In the UK implicit agreements based on informal relations 
between directors of competing firms are considered irrelevant. Both in the UK and the 
Netherlands, contracts are used as a basis for formal forms of cooperation such as joint 
ventures. However, in the Dutch potato industry these explicit agreements are 
considered of secondary importance in comparison with the implicit agreements based 
on the personal relations between the directors. 
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Flows of resources and activity links 
Joint activities between competing firms in the UK are largely restricted to a limited 
number of joint ventures in breeding activities. Moreover, forms of horizontal 
cooperation based on informal relations between the directors of UK potato firms are 
very rare, if not absent. In contrast, joint activities among competing firms are common 
in the Dutch potato industry and involve, for instance, the joint use of logistic systems, 
joint research, and hiring production capacity from each other. 
Marketing co-operatives as forms of horizontal cooperation between UK potato growers 
turned out to be relatively scarce, certainly if compared to the Netherlands where both 
the seed and ware potato trade is dominated by organizations of this type. Mutual 
shareholdings appeared relevant to neither UK nor Dutch potato firms. 
In conclusion, firms in the Dutch potato industry generally see competition and 
cooperation as two sides of the same coin in gaining competitive strength. In accordance 
with this, a range of horizontal cooperative inter-firm arrangements has been developed. 
These arrangements are, for an important part, based on informal peer-group relations 
between the directors. In contrast, horizontal cooperation among UK potato firms is 
largely limited to information exchange, while the relations between competitors are 
dominantly adverse in nature. 
6.1.3 Comparison of the relative importance of business associations 
The relative importance of both trade- and industry associations differs greatly between 
the Dutch and UK potato industries. The membership base, statutory powers, and range 
of functions of the business associations vary substantially between the two countries. 
Trade associations 
As is reflected by Figure 6.2, the membership base of the UK trade associations is quite 
fragmented while the Dutch organizations enjoy virtually inclusive membership. 
Moreover, unlike most Dutch trade associations, which can make use of statutory 
powers via indirect arrangements with statutory organizations, the trade associations in 
the UK have no statutory means to enforce common rules for their members. In 
addition, with regard to the range of functions performed by the trade associations in 
both countries, the Dutch organizations have a considerably broader repertoire than their 
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counterparts in the UK. The key functions of the associations in both countries differ 
considerably as well (see Table 6.3). 
Figure 6.2: The relative importance of trade associations in the UK and Dutch potato 
industries 
UK NL 
Membership base fragmented •* —• complete representation 
UK NL 
Statutory powers weak < ' ' • strong 
UK NL 
Functions provided limited range < ' *-+• wide range 
Source: see text 
Trade associations in the UK potato industry are particularly active as lobby 
organizations. In this role they aim to influence both national and EU policies in favor 
of their members. Because many regional and product-specific interests appear to exist 
in the UK potato industry, many trade associations have a narrow focus. The promotion 
of interests is also a well-developed function of the Dutch organizations, but the 
emphasis is less on lobbying and more on consultative relations with the government. 
As is shown in Table 6.3, the dissemination of knowledge and information is an 
important function for both UK and Dutch trade associations as well. Most associations 
inform their members on a regular basis about a broad range of subjects considered 
relevant to them. 
In sharp contrast to the UK, Dutch associations function as vehicles for the enhancement 
of horizontal cohesion. This cohesion is largely based on personal meetings between the 
managers of competing firms in the industry. Moreover, some of the Dutch associations 
intentionally facilitate socialization among their members to promote cohesion. In the UK, 
the facilitation of horizontal cohesion by trade associations is weakly developed, if not 
absent. Moreover, most associations are highly specialized, which implies the danger of 
clique formation. The low relevance of the facilitation of horizontal cohesion by UK trade 
associations in comparison with the Dutch associations is reflected in their fragmented 
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membership base, a lower frequency of meetings among members, and less involvement 
of managing directors as representation is often delegated to senior management. 
Table 6.3 Functions of UK and Dutch trade associations in the potato industry 
Strongly 
developed 
Moderately 
developed 
Weakly 
developed 
UK potato industry 
• Promotion of interests (lobbying) 
• Dissemination of knowledge and 
information 
• Facilitation of horizontal cohesion 
• Facilitation of vertical cohesion 
• Development of common rules 
• Arbitration in case of conflicts 
• Coordination in case of industry-
wide crises 
• Initiation and coordination of joint 
activities 
Dutch potato industry 
• Facilitation of horizontal cohesion 
• Development of general rules 
• Promotion of interests 
• Dissemination of knowledge and 
information 
• Arbitration 
• Coordination in case of industry-
wide crises 
• Initiation and coordination of joint 
activities 
• Facilitation of vertical cohesion 
Source: see text 
The functions of trade associations that are strongly developed in the Dutch potato 
industry but moderately or weakly developed in the UK include the development of 
common rules, arbitration services, and coordination in case of industry-wide crisis. In the 
UK, the development of common rules tends to be limited to 'club rules' and general 
conditions of sale. The common rules of Dutch trade associations particularly concern 
quality issues that support the building and maintenance of a good reputation of Dutch 
potato firms in export markets. In addition, the Dutch trade associations play an important 
intermediary role in the development of covenants, which reduce the need of the 
government to impose regulations to the industry. The Dutch business associations, 
which have a broad membership base and usually have a mandate to speak on behalf of 
their members, play a key function in the negotiation processes that precede such 
agreements. 
Both UK and Dutch trade associations provide arbitration services to their members. 
However, this function appeared more strongly developed among the Dutch associations. 
1 
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Their arbitration services are broadly accepted and considered legally sound. In the UK, 
arbitration is directly linked with general conditions of sale. Their use is restricted to the 
members of the business association that developed these conditions of sale. Hence, the 
legal strength of these arbitration services with respect to non-members is considered to be 
questionable. 
The initiation and coordination of actions in case of industry-wide crises is a function that 
is weakly developed among trade associations in the UK but very relevant to their Dutch 
counterparts. In the UK, the fighting of crises is generally seen as a task for the 
government. In the Dutch potato industry (where industry-wide crises somehow seem to 
occur more regularly than in the UK) most trade associations assume an active 
coordinating role. Actions by government agencies are considered important as well, but 
these agencies are supposed to operate in close cooperation with the trade associations. 
The initiation of joint activities, such as joint research and promotion, has not developed 
into a relevant function of trade associations in the UK. The general view is that risks are 
to be taken by individual firms. In contrast, most of the Dutch associations are involved in 
the initiation and administration of pre-competitive and non-commercial research, as well 
as in projects for industry development funded by the members and governmental 
subsidies. Most research and promotional efforts by Dutch potato firms, however, are done 
individually. 
Finally, the facilitation of vertical cohesion among firms across the supply chain is not a 
very strongly developed function of UK trade associations and is even more weakly 
developed among their Dutch counterparts. The contrasts between the UK and Dutch trade 
associations in this respect can be linked to differences in the degree of vertical integration 
of their members, which tend to be higher in the UK. 
Industry associations 
The relative importance of industry associations, as perceived by managers of potato 
firms, differs substantially between the UK and Dutch potato industries as well. This is 
presented in Figure 6.3, which provides a comparative view of the membership base, 
statutory powers, and functions of these organizations. 
Both the UK and Dutch industry associations are inclusive organizations, because 
membership is compulsory for the potato firms across the entire industry. An important 
difference in this respect is that, in the UK, the representatives with a seat in these 
associations are either managers of firms or officials from trade associations. The Dutch 
association merely bundles representatives of trade- and workers' associations. Another 
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difference is that the statutory powers of the Dutch association are much weaker than its 
counterpart in the UK potato industry. This is because the Dutch association has no 
statutory powers, although it provides advice and proposals to a general statutory body 
of which it is a sub-division. In contrast, the association in the UK is an autonomous 
organization with a mandate of the British government to promote the development of 
the domestic potato industry. Moreover, the range of functions provided by the Dutch 
industry association is very limited in comparison with its counterpart in the UK (see 
Table 6.4). 
Figure 6.3 The relative importance of the industry associations in the UK and Dutch potato 
industries 
UKNL 
Membership base fragmented * ^"^ complete representation 
NL UK 
Statutory powers weak •* ' • strong 
NL UK 
Functions provided limited range •« ' • • wide range 
Source: see text 
One of the major functions of the UK industry association is the dissemination of 
knowledge and information to its levy payers which is done through a range of projects, 
events, and media. The activities of the Dutch association, in this respect, are largely 
limited to putting together annual reports with statistics about the industry. 
Another dissimilarity between both organizations concerns the initiation and coordination 
of joint activities in the industry. The UK industry association actively initiates and 
coordinates promotion and research activities, which are partially state- and levy-funded 
and aimed at the further development of the British potato industry. Similar activities are 
carried out by the Dutch industry association but in a much more limited and indirect 
fashion. Via this organization, firms in the Dutch potato industry gain funds from state/EU 
agencies for industry development and collect levies for joint promotional activities to 
stimulate potato export and consumption. The importance of joint promotion for Dutch 
firms, however, has decreased considerably over the past decades, because the key 
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products of the industry have become less generic in nature (e.g., because of the 
introduction of monopolized varieties). 
Table 6.4 Functions of UK and Dutch industry associations in the potato industry 
Strongly 
developed 
Moderately 
developed 
Weakly 
Developed 
Not 
developed 
UK potato industry 
• Dissemination of knowledge and 
information 
• Initiation and coordination of joint 
activities 
• Development of common rules 
• Promotion of interests 
• Facilitation of horizontal cohesion 
• Facilitation of vertical cohesion 
• Coordination in case of industry-
wide crises 
• Arbitration 
Dutch potato industry 
• Not relevant 
• Development of common rules 
• Dissemination of knowledge and 
information 
• Initiation and coordination of joint 
activities 
• Promotion of interests 
• Coordination in case of industry-
wide crises 
• Arbitration 
• Facilitation of horizontal cohesion 
• Facilitation of vertical cohesion 
Source: see text 
The facilitation of horizontal and vertical cohesion among the firms in the industry is 
regarded as a by-product of the main activities performed by the UK industry 
association. Therefore, these functions are moderately developed. In contrast, the Dutch 
industry association bundles together associations instead of firms, which makes these 
two functions not relevant to this organization. 
Although the associations in both countries, among other things, exist to promote the 
interests of the industry, they do not distinguish themselves as lobby organizations. 
Nevertheless, the industry association in the UK is considered to be fairly well involved 
in promoting the interests of the domestic potato industry to the government. In the 
Netherlands the trade associations largely perform this function. 
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There are also some similarities between the two industry associations in the UK and the 
Dutch potato industries. Both industry associations are to some extent involved in the 
development of common rules. The Dutch industry association, in this respect, is mainly 
used as a vehicle to obtain a statutory basis for self-imposed rules and regulations 
developed by the members of trade associations. As yet, the industry association in the 
UK has used this function to introduce a levy system to finance its operations. 
Coordination in case of industry wide crises is considered a weakly developed function 
of both associations. The UK potato industry has not witnessed very many (if any) crises 
in recent years, while in the Netherlands the involvement of the industry association 
tends to remain secondary to the trade associations in such instances. Another similarity 
is that neither of the two industry associations is involved in the provision of arbitration 
services, because this is regarded as a more suitable function for trade associations. 
6.2 Inter-firm cooperation and key social institutions 
Substantial differences have come to light in the comparison of the forms of inter-firm 
cooperation between the UK and Dutch potato industries. Both vertical and horizontal 
forms of bilateral cooperation appear more strongly developed in the Netherlands than 
in the UK. The same is true for trade associations (i.e., forms of horizontal multilateral 
inter-firm cooperation) in the Dutch potato industry which appeared considerably 
stronger developed than their counterparts in the UK. On the contrary, industry 
associations (i.e., forms of vertical multilateral inter-firm cooperation) turned out to be 
much more relevant to firms in the UK potato industry than in the Netherlands. 
How can these marked cross-national differences in the patterns of inter-firm 
cooperation in the same industry be explained? To find answers to this question, the 
dominant forms of inter-firm cooperation that were found in the UK and Dutch potato 
industries will be linked with the nature of nationally distinct social institutions. The key 
social institutions addressed here include nature of state involvement with regard to the 
industry, the financial system, the legal system (as a provider of institutional-based 
trust), and the legitimacy of individualistic behavior. 
6.2.1 State involvement with regard to the industry 
As will be shown below, the nature of state involvement with regard to the potato 
industry differs significantly between the UK and the Dutch. To gain a fuller 
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understanding of the differences, attention will be paid to historical developments in the 
state-industry relations in both countries from the 1930s onwards. 
State involvement in the Dutch potato industry 
Contrary to many other parts of the agriculture sector, state involvement has always 
been 'facilitating' rather than 'regulatory' or 'laissez-faire' in nature with regard to the 
Dutch potato industry1. A market regime for potatoes never existed in the Netherlands. 
Nevertheless, by the 1930s the Dutch government became deeply involved in the 
development of Dutch agriculture. The government became in particular involved in the 
enhancement of the education, information, and knowledge infrastructure of the 
agriculture sector. Examples of this policy are the establishment and maintenance of 
Wageningen Agricultural University", the Agricultural Economics Research Institute 
(LEI-DLO), and the National Council for Agricultural Research (NRLO), which are 
closely linked with the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Nature 
Management. Obviously, the firms in the agriculture sector have greatly benefited from 
this infrastructure, which among others enabled the development of a highly skilled 
labor force, well-educated farmers, and high-grade technologies. 
The involvement of the state in Dutch agriculture can be linked to structural 
developments at the end of the 19lh century and the worldwide economic crisis of the 
1930s. By the end of the 19th century a dense network of co-operatives, farmers' unions, 
and companies emerged as an initiative to enhance the political and economic position 
of farmers (Van Zanden 1985: 273-281). The development of these tight social 
structures happened along the ideological 'pillars' of liberalism, Protestantism, and 
Catholicism (Van Zanden 1997: 86). The highly organized agribusiness community 
gained considerable political influence which has been referred to as 'the green front' 
(Van Zanden and Griffiths 1989: 73). This political influence was largely based on the 
fact that the agribusiness community comprised an important part of the confessional 
parties' electorate. 
Apart from gaining political influence, the high level of association in the agricultural 
community also facilitated a smooth acceptance of private-public organizations in the 
The Dutch government, and laler the EU, has been deeply involved in many parts of the agriculture 
sector through price, structure and trade policies (Maas 1994: 128). 
Contrary to the other Dutch universities, which arc linked with the Ministry of Education, Culture and 
Science, the agricultural university in Wageningen comes under the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature 
Management and Fisheries. 
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early 1950s. The private-public organizations were a product of the institutional renewal 
initiatives of the Dutch government, which aimed to rebuild the national economy and 
to shape a new social order after W.W. II. The idea behind the new social order was 
strongly corporatist in nature; via public-private organizations employers and employees 
would be able to develop and govern their industries in harmony with each other. The 
legal basis of this new industrial order was the 'Wet op de Bedrijfsorganisatie' (Branch 
Organization Act) of 1950. This act made it possible for firms of any Dutch industry to 
bundle themselves in quasi-governmental associations with limited statutory powers and 
with seats appointed to representatives from employers and employees. Strikingly, this 
private-public organizational arrangement became well established in the agriculture 
sector but hardly emerged in other parts of the economy. In the resulting structure of 
Productschappen (Industry Boards, bundling firms across the supply chain) and 
Bedrijfschappen (Product Boards, bundling competing firms) that was established, the 
government had limited influence. This was due to the fact that the coordination of these 
organizations not only became a responsibility of the state, which was the original plan. 
Responsibility was also assigned to a newly established organization, the 'Sociaal-
Economische Raad' (SER)\ According to the Branch Organization Act, the government 
should ask the SER for advice in cases of policy making about social-economic issues 
(Messing 1981: 30). What is important here is that the establishment of the public-
private organizations evoked the need for trade associations (or stimulated the 
maintenance of the existing ones) which could provide the employers' representatives 
for the Boards. The resulting industrial order, which involved close cooperation between 
ministries, Boards and trade associations, remained effective until the 1980s. After this 
era, state involvement in the national industry - and particularly in the agribusiness 
sector- became more and more limited due to the rise of free market ideology. Under 
these circumstances the private-public system gradually deteriorated, though did not 
entirely vanish (Maas 1994: 127). 
At present, new policies that also affect firms in the potato industry (such as laws to 
protect the natural environment and to increase food safety) tend to be formulated on the 
basis of consultations with representatives of business associations. Since the late 1980s 
there has been a revival of self-administration. On the one hand, the Dutch state aimed 
to limit the issuing of new laws, while, on the other hand, new policies were developed 
To date, Ihe SER (which is sometimes nicknamed 'The Board of Wise Men') is still an important 
advisor of the government. However, it has become remote from the function as a coordinator of the 
virtually defunct Product- and Industry Boards. 
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and needed implementation. Hence, rather than acts, new state policies for food- and 
agribusiness are often implemented on the basis of covenants. In these formal 
agreements with the government, firms in an industry collectively agree on changing 
their behavior (for instance using PVC-free packing material). In this manner, as long as 
such covenants prove to work out, firms avoid the government's issuing of more and 
more laws to achieve its policy objectives. 
Although the Dutch government never imposed regulations on the potato industry, such 
policy was considered in the past. In the post-W.W.II period potatoes constituted a 
major source of nutrition for the Dutch population. Because it was of great political 
importance to secure a stable supply of cheap food, having some degree of control over 
the potato industry became strategically important to the government. Nevertheless, the 
Dutch potato firms managed to remain largely aloof from state involvement. This was 
achieved through forms of self-administration, which had emerged during W.W.II and 
were expanded on the basis of the 1950 Branch Organization Act. In tune with this, the 
Industry Board for Potatoes (Productschap voor Aardappelen) was established. This, in 
turn, strengthened the relevance of trade associations, which represented all types of 
firms in the potato industry ranging from breeders to potato processors. In addition, 
cooperative state-industry relations were developed in which the chairmen of trade 
associations often played an important role. In this manner, the state gained limited but 
sufficient influence over the industry to secure the achievement of its political 
obligations, while the potato industry remained unregulated. From the 1970s onwards 
and despite the abundant supplies of food that resulted from the eminent success of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (Goodman 1996: 115; De Veer, Mansholt, Van Dijk and 
Veerman 1992) the political interest of securing a stable supply of potatoes vanished. 
The structure of private-public organizations was downsized and partially abandoned, 
but the spirit of self-administration and the consultative nature of state-industry relations 
remained relevant to the potato industry. In addition, the structure of voluntary trade 
associations remained intact. 
Van Waarden (1992: 530) argued that crises and the attending increase of state 
intervention often provide a threat to industries and raise the need for the establishment 
of business (interest) associations. This supports the idea that the possibility of self-
administration aimed to keep state involvement as low as possible, has stimulated 
collective action among Dutch potato firms via trade associations. These associations, in 
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turn, have been developed over a long time period, whereupon the thread of state 
intervention gradually declined and the Industry Board was abolished. As the 
organizations involved try to adapt to the altering circumstances in order to survive, 
these changes are likely to have encouraged the associations to develop services and 
roles exceeding the management of state-business liaisons and the facilitation of self-
administration. 
The consultative nature of state-industry relations, which remained intact, also implied a 
reduction of uncertainties for firms about the behavior of the state with regard to the 
industry. This environment, in which the state is a limited source of uncertainty and also 
explicitly stimulates joint action, is likely to encourage firms to cooperate with each 
other. In particular, the development of business associations, which was encouraged by 
the state, enabled Dutch potato firms to control and stabilize part of their business 
environment. The increased control allowed firms to work with long time horizons 
which, in turn, is likely to have facilitated the development of both vertical and 
horizontal cooperative inter-firm relations (cf. Whitley 1992b, Lane and Bachmann 
1996: 376). 
State involvement in the UK potato industry 
Contrary to the traditional laissez-faire policy of the UK government with respect to 
industry (Blank 1973; Whitley 1992b; Lane 1989; 1992; 1995; 1996), the potato 
industry was regulated from the early 1930s until 1997. In this era, the behavior of the 
state with respect to the industry was neither really developmental nor facilitating in 
nature. In fact, the government combined features of the 'developmental' and 'laissez-
faire' state types as it determined the output of potato production without being actively 
involved in the strategy of firms. 
To secure the supply of potatoes, which represented an important source of nutrition in 
the UK, the British government developed a Potato Marketing Scheme based on the 
Agricultural Marketing Act from the 1930s. This Act authorized Ministers to provide an 
assured market for potato producers in Great Britain: 'Home production' should meet 
'home demand' (PMB 1987). In 1934, the Potato Marketing Board (PMB) was 
established to realize this policy. The PMB functioned as an organization that advised 
the government and monitored the developments in potato production. The organization 
enjoyed statutory powers as to determine quotas, set minimum quality standards, and 
grant licenses to potato merchants. The necessary funds partially came from levies paid 
by potato firms and from the state. In 1997, the Potato Marketing Scheme was 
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eliminated under pressure from the consequences of EU membership and a strong lobby 
supported by potato processors and retailers. As a consequence, the PMB was 
downsized, lost most of its statutory powers and was transformed into the British Potato 
Council (BPC). This new organization became a levy-financed organization with the 
task to promote the development of the British potato industry. The behavior of the state 
with regard to the potato industry became largely laissez-faire in nature. In tune with 
this, the influence of the government in the UK potato industry became largely limited 
to the impact of general regulations such as the 1990 Food Safety Act and the 1990 
Environmental Protection Act. 
The state has played a dominant regulating role in the UK potato industry. From the 
1930s to the late 1990s, a market regime was effective involving quotas, fixed prices, 
and centrally determined quality standards. The dominant presence of the state in the 
UK potato industry, until recently, can be linked to the relatively weak development of 
cooperative relations between UK potato firms. Indeed, the state, via the PMB, can be 
regarded as one the most important sources of (un)certainty for potato firms. It is likely 
that this has been a hindering factor for the development of either horizontal or vertical 
cooperative inter-firm relations. The reasoning is that in such tightly regulated markets 
managers are encouraged either to 'go with the flow' or to compete for political support 
and short-term advantages, rather than to engage in joint activities (cf. Whitley et al. 
1996: 399; Rademakers 1998a). Moreover, the sudden transformation from market 
regulation to a free market system, combined with the absence of alternative market 
ordering mechanisms, increased uncertainties of firms concerning the stability of supply 
and demand. These circumstances, at least in part, explain the growing dominance of 
large integrated firms in the UK potato industry and the apparent low relevance of inter-
firm cooperation after the transformation. Moreover, the regulation of prices and 
quantities by a quasi-governmental organization, which existed for decades, provides a 
partial explanation for the finding that UK trade associations, in particular, developed as 
lobby organizations. After all, because of their lobby activities, the trade associations 
were particularly useful for potato firms to gain some influence over the actions of the 
PMB and the state. Clearly, the regulation of the industry by the state has been 
particularly supportive of the development of a strong industry association. 
Nevertheless, since the abandoning of the regulations in the late 1990s, the industry 
association has shown a remarkable strength to continue. This can be seen in light of the 
behavior of the state with regard to the industry, which became laissez-faire in nature, 
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while among the potato firms there remained a need to have a common organization for 
the promotion of industry cohesion and development. 
6.2.2 The Financial system 
At first glance, the way UK and Dutch agribusiness firms tend to meet their capital 
needs seems not to differ greatly. In both countries bank loans are an important source 
of capital for firms, while the banks are usually not involved in the strategies of firms. 
Nevertheless, some remarkable differences exist in the financial systems of both 
countries, in particular with respect to the agriculture sector. 
The financial system in the Dutch agriculture sector 
The Dutch financial system is quite polymorph in nature, with no clear dominance of 
capital markets over bank loans or vice-versa There is a wed-developed capital market, 
banks are generally involved in the provision of medium- and short-term credit, and 
pension funds and insurance companies are the main providers of long-term credit to 
the industry (Van Iterson and Olie 1992: 110: Messing 1981: 52). In the agri-food 
industry, however, the financial system is dominantly credit-based. The divergent nature 
of the financial system in the Dutch agri-food industry can be understood from a 
historical perspective, which will be provided below. 
Banks did not play a very important role in the industrialization of the Dutch economy 
that took place in the late 19! century. Rather than banks, private railway companies 
and large steamship lines were the major capital providers in this process (Messing 
1981, Van Zanden and Griffiths 1989: 9). This situation changed between 1913 and 
1920 when bank loans became more and more important as a source of investment 
capital in the Netherlands. Many new firms were established or expanded their business 
during this period5 (Van Zanden and Griffiths 1989: 124). However, an economic 
depression that hit the Dutch economy in the 1920s stopped this development, because 
many banks were confronted with serious problems caused by bad loans. The banks 
responded with a retreat from granting long-term credits to industrial firms and turned to 
In 1990, the Dutch government abolished the regulatory Jivision between banking and insurance 
which ga\e way lo mergers and takeovers among major Dulch banks and insurance companies. Since 
the early 1990 Dutch banks have also moved towards the 'Allfinanz' concept (Hulsink 1997). 
Among these firms were the predecessors of multinationals such as Philips. Royal Dutch Shell, 
Koninklijke Hoogo\ens. and KLM. 
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their traditional role o: merchant bankers with a focus on short-term credit. As a result, 
retained earnings (i.e.. internal funding) and the stock exchange became major sources 
of investment capital. In particular, internal funding became common practice, as this 
was stimulated by the Dutch state via favorable tax regulations (Van Zanden and 
Griffiths 1989: 244). 
Apart from these developments in the Dutch financial system as a whole, a more or less 
autonomous development took place in the agriculture sector of the Dutch economy. By 
the end of the 19lh century the Dutch agriculture sector witnessed the establishment of a 
number of co-operative banks6 (Van Zanden 1985: 279; Hulsink 1997: 115). This meant 
that in the Dutch banking sector a dual structure developed; commercial banks focused 
on the industry and co-operative banks became dominant in the agriculture sector of the 
Dutch economy. As a result, apart from internal funding, loans from co-operative banks 
have become a major source of investment capital for Dutch farmers and agri-food 
firms". These loans usually involve long-term relations between the co-operative banks 
and their customers/members. In addition, the co-operative banks developed 
information systems to be able to assess the risks involving their loans as well as to 
stimulate the performance of their customers. Up to present, the co-operative bank 
structure in the Netherlands has flourished but not without undergoing considerable 
structural change. In the early seventies the two major co-operative banks in the 
Netherlands, the Raiffeisenbank and the Boerenleenbank merged into one centra! co-
operative bank: the Rabobank. This bank is known to represent a market share of about 
90% of the Dutch agri-food sector (Maas 1994: 168), with a total value of 
approximately NLG 30 billion in 1996s. The relevance of bank loans in the Dutch agri-
food business is strengthened because of the dominant presence of co-operatives in this 
sector. Due to the ownership structure of the co-operative (the owners are also the 
suppliers or customers of the firm), obtaining investment capital from the stock market 
is at best an uncommon option. Hence, co-operatives generally draw their investment 
capital from retained earnings and bank loans. However, if co-operatives wish to expand 
their business both rapidly and substantially (for instance to enjoy economies of scale or 
Co-operaiive banks included the Friesland Bank, the Protestant Raii'feiser.' banks, and '.he Catholic 
'Boerenleen' banks. These banks were established by village communities and farmers who, in this 
way, successfully imprtved their access to investment capital iVar, Zander 1985). 
Exceptions are mukinauonals such as Unilever, CSM and Nutreco, which are listed ai the Amsterdam 
stock exchange. 
Source: Financieel DagMad. No. -9. March 8. 1996-
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to gain market power), this often involves higher capital needs than can be met either 
via internal funding or bank loans. In such cases growth is realized via mergers which 
tend to be preceded by intense cooperation between the firms involved. If a merger 
appears not possible, co-operatives have the option to engage into collaborative 
arrangements with other firms. 
The financial system in the Dutch agriculture differs from the more polymorph system 
that prevails in other sectors of the Dutch economy. The capital needs of Dutch potato 
firms are generally filled via internal funds and loans from co-operative banks. Firm-to-
bank relations are usually long-term in nature and involve extensive information 
services. As a result, managers can work with long time horizons for their investments. 
As stock capital is not relevant to them, they do not have to meet the short-term 
requirements (i.e., favorable quarterly profit figures) of anonymous shareholders. The 
absence of uncertainties about the availability of capital in the short run and the 
irrelevance of hostile takeovers provides management with more space to maneuver on 
the basis of long-term horizons. The stability in the financial resource base of firms and 
the inherent possibility to work with long-term horizons is likely to facilitate the 
development of stable relations between firms (Lane 1996: 279; Lane and Bachmann 
1996: 377; Whitley 1992b: 32-35). 
The nature of the financial system in the Dutch agribusiness sector is considered to 
influence the relative importance of business associations as well. The information 
services of banks that prove investment capital may substitute part of the information 
and knowledge-disseminating role of business associations. However, the pressure for 
firms (and in particular co-operatives) to expand their business or enhance their market 
position via either mergers or cooperation enhances the need of managers for personal 
contact with potential partners. This adds to the relevance of business associations 
through which managers can socialize, obtain first-hand information about 
developments of (potential) partners, and can have meetings without being noticed in an 
early stage by competitors or worse, by members of the co-operative9. 
Rumors about mergers between co-opcratives tend to cause heavy unrest between the members of the 
organizations involved and may lead to early complications in the process or even a brake-off. 
Keeping merger plans secret as long as possible gives managers the time needed to work out their 
plans before they have to defend them to the members of the co-operatives. 
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The financial system in the UK agriculture sector 
The financial system in the UK, including the agricultural sector, is largely capital-based 
(Hutton 1996: 132). The dominance of this system can be explained from a historical 
perspective. In the early-industrialized UK economy, bank loans became common 
during the 19,h century. However, after the bad experiences of banks that were damaged 
due to over-extension, lending became mainly confined to short-term credit (Lane 1995: 
30). Towards the end of the century, UK firms in need of external capital for new 
investments began to raise capital by issuing shares on the stock market. In this way the 
stock market became the most prominent source of capital, apart from internal funding 
through retained earnings. In this capital-based financial system the managers of UK 
firms financed with equity capital had to cope with the short-term time horizons of stock 
holders and their expectations of quick and substantial profits (Hutton 1996: 134; Lane 
1995: 31). In addition, the banks never became closely involved in the business of their 
client firms because they mainly provided short-term loans. Moreover, the development 
of close firm-to-bank relations was hindered as the government discouraged large bank 
stakes in non-financial firms10. Throughout the 20lh century, the nature of the UK 
financial system has not changed very much. The system is still strongly equity-based 
and centered on the stock market (Lane 1995: 47). 
The financial system in the UK agriculture sector is also capital-based in nature, while 
co-operative banks are virtually non-existent. There is one co-operative bank in the UK, 
named Coop. This bank, however, is neither an important player in the UK nor focused 
on the agriculture sector. The major (but non-co-operative) banks that operate in this 
sector include Barclay, Lloyds, Midwest, Midland, and AMC. Their investments in the 
UK agribusiness equaled an amount of approximately NLG 19 billion in 1996". A 
possible reason for the absence of a co-operative bank system is the farm ownership 
structure in the UK, which is likely to have hindered the development of co-operative 
banks by farmers. In the beginning of this century, the ownership relations in UK 
agriculture were dominated by a 'landlord-tenant farmers' system. In this system 
farmers owned no land, while the landlords were not dependent on income from their 
land alone (Tracy 1989: 48). On the contrary, in the Netherlands most farmers were 
poor, small but independent, and had their own (small) piece of land. It is this 
Prowsc, S. (1994:160, Corporate Governance in an International Perspective: A Survey of Corporate 
Control Mechanisms among Large Firms in the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan and 
Germany, Basle: Bank for International Settlements. Reference adapted from Lane (1995: 30). 
Source: Financieel Dagblad No. 49, March 8, 1996. 
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independence of small farmers that can be considered not only an important condition 
for, but also a result of, the establishment of co-operative banks. Obviously, the 
prevalence of the landlord-tenant system was not very conducive to the development of 
financial institutions that both required and reinforced the independence of farmers. 
The financial system in the UK is largely capital-based: investment capital is largely 
obtained via short-term bank loans and the stock market. It was argued that the 'mores' 
of the capital-based financial system push managers to adopt short-term time horizons 
which are likely to undermine the development of long-term cooperative relations 
among firms (Franks and Mayer 1990; Whitley 1992b). In addition, the access to cheap 
stock capital encourages firms to expand via takeovers, which then encourages vertical 
and horizontal integration rather than the development of cooperative inter-firm 
relations. Moreover, in a capital-based financial system the handling of risks can be 
accomplished more easily by highly dispersed shareholdings than by pooling risks 
through cross-shareholding or collective agreements between firms (Lane 1997: 66). In 
addition, as was observed by Turner (1988: 173), in these circumstances the attempts of 
UK-based firms to create horizontal links via trade associations tend to be short-lived 
and not very effective. 
The capital-based financial system can be regarded as one of the social institutions that 
facilitates the dominance of spot-market relations which, in turn, is likely to reduce the 
relative importance of trade associations in the UK potato industry. The nature of the 
financial system in the UK can also be connected to the finding that some UK potato 
firms are part of publicly listed corporations. This contrasts with the situation in the 
Netherlands where none of the Dutch-owned potato firms has such a listing. In line with 
this, it can be noted that the small firms in the UK potato industry are not financed by 
stock market capital. They rely on retained earnings and short-term bank loans. Because 
of limited possibilities for substantial growth, these firms have become niche players or 
have been sold to larger competitors. This is reflected by the overall industry structure 
with a few large dominant organizations, a few medium-sized firms, and a host of small 
enterprises. 
6.2.3 Laws and the legal system 
The nature of the legal system is considered to influence the prevalence of particular 
types of trust between exchange partners. This can be linked with the finding that in the 
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Dutch and UK potato industries the basis of trust in exchange relations differ 
considerably. Formal and detailed contracts prevailed in the UK while a combination of 
standard contracts and personal relations were found to be more important among the 
Dutch firms. 
The Dutch legal system 
The Dutch legal system is formal and detailed in nature. According to Lane and 
Bachmann (1996: 386) such a 'Germanic' legal system provides a basis for greater 
uniformity and hence the predictability of both the use and evaluation of contracts by the 
parties involved in an exchange relation. Such a system makes the use of general 
conditions of sale more relevant to firms, because it provides them with a clear legal 
basis. Hence, the formal legal system is likely to encourage the use of standard contracts 
rather than drawing up highly specified documents for every transaction. Standard 
contracts are considered well suited for use in combination with personal relations as a 
basis of exchange relations. These contracts, if enforced by formal law, can provide 
some level of certainty to the exchange parties. This is considered as conducive to the 
generation of a climate of goodwill in which trust may grow (Lane 1996: 285). Such 
circumstances, in turn, can be regarded supportive to the development of cooperative 
inter-firm relations. These were found in the Dutch potato industry. Among the Dutch 
potato firms, formal contracts are considered important but secondary to informal bases 
of trust underpinning the long-term relationships in which their exchange relations tend 
to be embedded. 
With regard to the relative importance of business associations, it is relevant to 
emphasize the 1950 Business Organization Act (see the previous section). This Act 
provided business associations with a clear legal position with respect to their members 
and other organizations. In this way, the Act facilitated, to a large extent, the 
establishment of new business associations and the strengthening of the positions of 
existing ones. In addition, it provided a basis for Dutch business associations to develop 
a range of functions, including arbitration, in case of trade conflicts. 
The legal system in the UK 
The empirical nature of British common law, which works according the principle of 
'case law,' implies a high degree of uncertainty for firms involved in commercial 
exchange relations. Moreover, the importance of legal precedence reduces the relevance 
of general conditions of sale being a source of certainty in exchange relations. For 
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instance, Lane and Bachmann (1996: 386) point out that in Britain payment periods for 
goods received are not legally codified, which implies that much delayed payment is not 
sanctionable by law. The greater reliance on voluntarism in the regulation of exchange 
relations in the UK can be linked to the finding that many UK potato firms inclined to 
use their own conditions of sale. In this situation, the large (potato buying) firms, in 
particular, appeared able to be to impose their conditions to their exchange partners. In 
circumstances where large firms in large measure define the rules of the game, the 
generation of trust based on personal relations is not likely to develop very well. The 
uncertainties for smaller firms that are inherent in this case law system are likely to 
encourage the development of more adverse inter-firm relations, rather than 
cooperation. Rather, firms may be inclined to develop their own rules and make use of 
detailed contracts to have as much evidence as possible, to be used to put buyers or 
suppliers under pressure, if problems or disagreements were to arise. 
The relatively weak importance of trade associations in the UK potato industry can be 
linked to their equally weak legal status. The establishment and development of trade 
associations in the UK was inhibited in the first part of the 20th century by a lack of laws 
that could clarify the legal position of these organizations. As stated by Turner (1988: 
176): 'The law was blind to trade associations as such, and treated them on the same 
footing as associations of workers.' The 1876 Trade Union Act made the situation 
worse because it made all agreements within any trade combination unenforceable. 
Hence, trade associations had no means to enforce any joint activity on unwilling 
members. This situation did not change during the first half of the 20lh century. 
Moreover, the uncertainty about the position of trade associations was enhanced by the 
nature of the legal system in the UK. As pointed out earlier, British common law has 
been based on an evolutionary body of case law. Disputes involving trade associations 
were looked at case by case and in the late 19lh century outcomes of lawsuits were not 
very favorable to these organizations (Turner 1988: 177). Moreover, with respect to the 
UK agriculture, another law hindered the development of trade associations. The 
Agricultural Marketing Act from the 1930s led to the establishment of Marketing 
Boards which regulated parts of the agriculture sector (Tracy 1989), including the potato 
industry. Because of the vast influence on the industries they operated in and their wide 
range of functions, the statutory organizations (such as the Potato Marketing Board) are 
likely to have impeded the development of trade associations. 
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6.2.4 The legitimacy of individualistic behavior 
Individualistic behavior can be considered highly legitimate both in UK and Dutch 
society (Hofstede 1980). However, with regard to the agri-food industry, the nature of 
individualistic behavior and the importance of collectivistic elements differ greatly 
between the two countries. In the UK, collective aims are generally inferior to individual 
interests. Moreover, collective institutions tend to be reduced to individual self-interest 
(Macfarlane 1978; Whitley 1992b: 22). In contrast, individualism in the Dutch society is 
largely based on the Calvinist moral of accountability as an individual responsibility (De 
Voogd 1996: 121). In addition, individualism in Dutch society is overshadowed by the 
great importance given to conformity (Van Iterson and Olie 1992: 107; Van Iterson 
1997). 
Individualism in the Netherlands 
The Dutch 'version' of individualism has deep roots in the historical development of the 
country. Principles of cooperation and consensus developed as pragmatic solutions to 
the strongly religious fragmentation in the Dutch Republic of the 17th century and the 
need to unite in order to withstand external hostilities from, among others, England. 
This led to the emergence of a society with a strongly developed corporatist system, 
with segregation between ideological groups united by some form of coalition among 
their elite groups (Van Iterson 1997: 57). 
The cooperative spirit has developed particularly strong among farms and firms in the 
Dutch agricultural sector. Over several ages, individual farmers (and later also firm 
owners and managers) have developed and reproduced the conduct of compromise and 
coalition in the Dutch agricultural sector. The early development of these principles can 
be tracked back to the middle ages. From this era onwards, the need for collective action 
was encouraged by a combination of factors. These included the weak development of 
feudalism or other forms of centralized power governing farmers/peasants (De Voogd 
1996: 34; 42), the need to bundle strengths to reclaim land from the water, and to curb 
the danger of floods. Moreover, it was a necessity to compensate for the smallness of 
most farms with regard to buyers. These circumstances, which have remained 
remarkably stable over many centuries, made cooperation among autonomous actors 
both legitimate and/or beneficial. 
By the turn of the 19lh century, Dutch farms generally were small family businesses 
which had a weak position with regard to their less numerous customers. This situation 
led to the establishment of co-operatives, which created a countervailing power of 
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farmers against merchants and retailers (Van Zanden 1985: 274). By the beginning of 
this century co-operatives had become dominant organizations in the Dutch agri-food 
industry and this structural feature has persisted to present (cf. Van Zanden 1985: 362). 
The long tradition in Dutch agriculture, in which collective action among individuals 
has dominated over the pursuit of self-interest, can be seen as an important facilitating 
factor for the development of both vertical and horizontal inter-firm relations. Clearly, 
the notion of cooperation has a positive connotation in the Dutch potato industry as 
well, where the managers of many firms have strong roots in agribusiness. Moreover, it 
is likely that the strong legitimacy of consensus, coalition, and cooperation in the Dutch 
agricultural sector has encouraged the development of business associations and has also 
been reinforced by these organizations. 
Individualism in the UK 
Traditionally, business behavior in the UK has been characterized by the principle of 
individualism (Yuzawa 1988: 199). Pursuing self-interest is legitimate and adverse 
competitive behavior among firms, rather than cooperation, is common both in the 
industry and in the agriculture sector. In addition to this, agriculture in the UK has 
shown a path of development that is markedly different from their Dutch counterparts. 
Contrary to the Netherlands, in the UK feudalism had become widespread in the 
centuries before the country transformed into a capitalist society (Macfarlane 1978: 34). 
In this feudal era large-scale farm businesses emerged that were owned by landlords and 
run by tenant farmers. In fact, this system did not change when the country became 
industrialized. The landlord-tenant structure hindered the rise of independent farmers 
and inhibited common action (Tracy 1989: 49). This is exemplified in the meager role 
of farmer's co-operatives in comparison with private firms in the UK agri-food industry. 
Concerted action in the UK agribusiness has remained limited to the promotion of 
common interests with respect to the government. However, these actions generally 
have not been very successful (Davenport-Hines 1988). The limited scope of collective 
action in the UK is also reflected by the findings from the field study that most of the 
trade associations in the UK potato industry function mainly as lobby organizations. The 
development of effective business associations with a broader range of functions is 
likely to have been inhibited by the legitimacy of pursuing self-interest for the mere fact 
that it hinders members to overcome the dissimilarities in their interests (cf. Okayama 
1988: 228). The same line of reasoning can be followed with regard to the development 
of other forms of vertical and horizontal cooperation between firms in the UK potato 
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industry. The dominance of spot-market relations over vertical inter-firm cooperation, 
the low degree of horizontal inter-firm cooperation and the utilitarian nature of the few 
partnerships that have been found in this industry fit well with the predominantly 
individualistic attitude that prevails in the UK. 
6.3 The UK and Dutch inter-firm relations in their national contexts 
The results from the discussion on the nature of nationally distinct social institutions and 
their likely influence on the development of forms of inter-firm cooperation in the UK 
and Dutch potato industries are summarized in the Figures 6.4 and 6.5. The two figures 
show the contrasting nature of both national systems of inter-firm organization and key 
social institutions. 
The general pattern of inter-firm organization in the Dutch potato industry is largely 
cooperative in nature. This is reflected by the strong dominance of vertical cooperative 
relations over spot-market relations and the high degree of cooperation between 
competing firms. Moreover, trade associations are well developed and perform a wide 
range of functions. Industry associations, on the contrary, are not very relevant to the 
Dutch potato firms anymore since the system of branch organizations set up in the 
1950s lost most of its strength in the 1980s and 1990s. The nationally distinct nature of 
the institutional environment firms in the Dutch potato industry are embedded in, is very 
likely to have facilitated the development of forms of cooperative inter-firm 
organization. The facilitating nature of the state, the credit-based financial system, the 
formal law system and informal mechanisms to ensure trust, and the low legitimacy of 
pursuing self-interest that apply to the Dutch potato industry form a cohesive system of 
mutually reinforcing influences in this respect. 
In contrast with the findings in the Netherlands, inter-firm organization in the UK potato 
industry is dominantly adverse in nature. Spot-market relations dominate over vertical 
cooperative relations, while cooperation between competing firms is very limited. In 
line with this, the importance of trade associations, apart from their lobby function, is 
relatively low. Strikingly, the industry association is highly active and quite relevant to 
firms in the UK potato industry, certainly in comparison with the trade associations and 
its Dutch counterpart. The way and degree in which forms of inter-firm cooperation 
have developed in the UK potato industry can be connected to the influences from key 
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social institutions that are nationally distinct in nature. These social institutions include 
state regulation of the industry (replaced by a laissez-faire stance in 1997), the capital-
based financial system, the case law system, the virtual absence of informal basis of 
trust, and the high legitimacy of pursuing self-interest. This system of social institutions 
is likely to encourage firms to be self-reliant and to discourage the development of 
cooperative inter-firm relations. 
Figure 6.4 Inter-firm relation characteristics and the nature of key social institutions in the 
Dutch potato industry 
THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
Credil-based: 
retained earnings and bank loans 
as major sources of capital. 
STATE INVOLVEMENT 
Thread of state regulation until 
the late 1950s, but highly 
facilitating in the era thereafter. 
Cooperative relations 
strongly dominate over 
spot-market relations 
High degree of 
horizontal firm-to-
firm cooperation 
Relatively high 
importance of 
trade associations 
Relatively low 
importance of 
industry associations 
INDIVIDUALISM VS. COLLECTIVISM 
Low legitimacy of pursuing self-interest; 
Cooperation highly legitimate. 
MECHANISMS TO ENSURE TRUST 
Institutionally-based: formal law system, clear legal 
status both for trade- and industry associations. 
Characteristic-based: high level of socialization* 
Process-based: high relevance of personal 
reputation.* 
*see Chapter 5 
Source: see text 
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Figure 6.5 Inter-firm relation characteristics and the nature of key social institutions in the UK 
potato industry 
THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
Capital-based: 
retained earnings and stock market 
as major sources of capital. 
STATE INVOLVEMENT 
Regulation (market regime) 
in the post-war era. Shift to 
laissez-faire in 1997. 
Spot-market relations 
strongly dominate over 
cooperative relations 
f \ 
Low degree of 
horizontal firm-to-
firm cooperation 
V ' J 
Relatively low 
importance of 
trade associations 
Relatively high 
importance of 
industry associations 
INDIVIDUALISM VS. COLLECTIVISM 
High legitimacy of pursuing self-interest; 
Cooperation not very legitimate. 
MECHANISMS TO ENSURE TRUST 
Institutionally-based: case-law system; 
weak legal status of trade associations vs. 
a strong status for marketing boards. 
Characteristic-based: not relevant* 
Process-based: personal reputation not 
very relevant.* 
*see Chapter 5 
Source: see text 
Not incorporated in Figures 6.4 and 6.5, but worth paying attention to, is the 
unanticipated finding that a number of mutually influencing forms of inter-firm 
cooperation stand out in the Dutch and UK systems of inter-firm organization. The 
Dutch trade associations seem to gradually have pushed aside the initially quite 
powerful industry association by substituting most of its activities. In this manner the 
members of the trade associations in fact increased their joint control over the 
development of the industry. Moreover, the trade associations, as forms of multilateral 
horizontal inter-firm cooperation, are likely to facilitate bilateral cooperative 
arrangements between firms as well. 
Finally, it seems that in the UK the dominant presence of the industry association has 
limited the relevance of trade associations. Contrary to the Dutch trade associations, 
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however, the active role of the UK industry association cannot be considered to have 
facilitated the development of bilateral forms of cooperative inter-firm relations. 
6.4 Feedback to the propositions 
In Chapter 3 (Section 3.5.2) a total of 5 propositions have been formulated about the 
combined influence of nationally distinct key social institutions on the development of 
forms of inter-firm cooperation. The five propositions cover a continuum constituted of 
distinct combinations of key social institutions that, in different degrees, facilitate or 
hinder the development of inter-firm cooperation (see Figure 6.6). Propositions 1 and 2 
represent the extremes of this continuum. Propositions 3 to 5 cover the major 
'middleground' possibilities. In the following, the propositions will be confronted with 
the empirical results from the field study and the discussions about the nature and 
influence of key social institutions in the UK and Dutch potato industries. The results of 
this discussion are summarized in Figure 6.6, which can be found at the end of this 
section. 
Proposition 1 stated that: 
Firms are likely to develop cooperative rather than adverse inter-firm 
relations if they are embedded in an institutional environment that 
combines a facilitating state and a credit-based financial system, trust 
based on either collective identities or a formal law system, and cultural 
conventions that legitimate collectivistic behavior. 
This proposition reflects one of the extremes of the continuum, which makes it virtually 
ideal-typical in nature. Despite of this, the proposition is strongly supported by the 
findings reported on the inter-firm organizational system of the Dutch potato industry. 
The nature of all key social institutions matches with the proposition: state behavior is 
facilitating, the financial system is largely credit-based, the legal system is based on 
formal law, collective are identities well developed, and pragmatic forms of 
collectivistic behavior are highly relevant. The findings from the field study indicate that 
the nature of the key social institutions in the Dutch potato industry mutually reinforce 
each other with respect to their suggested facilitating influence on the development of 
cooperative inter-firm relations. In accordance with this observation, this study revealed 
that both vertical and horizontal cooperative inter-firm relations strongly dominate over 
COMPARISON AND DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS FROM THE FIELD STUDY 171 
adverse relations between the buyers, suppliers, and competitors in the Dutch potato 
industry. However, the relevance of the industry association as a form of inter-firm 
cooperation appeared to be very limited. As was pointed out earlier, this may be due to 
well-developed trade associations in the industry, which largely substitute for functions 
that could be (or were) performed by the industry association. 
Proposition 2 stated that: 
Firms are likely to develop adverse rather than cooperative relations if 
they are embedded in an institutional environment that combines 
'developmental' or 'laissez-faire' state behavior and a capital-based 
financial system with trust largely based on either past experiences or a 
case law system, and cultural conventions that legitimate individualistic 
behavior. 
The findings about the patterns of inter-firm organization and the nature of key social 
institutions in the UK potato industry support this proposition, which represents the 
other extreme of the continuum. It must be noted, though, that state involvement in the 
UK potato industry has been neither developmental nor laissez-faire but strongly 
regulatory in nature for decades. In fact, until the late 1990s, state behavior in the UK 
potato industry combined features of the 'developmental' and 'laissez-faire' types, 
undermining the development of cooperative inter-firm relations. After all, the nature of 
the key social institutions in the UK potato industry are mutually reinforcing with regard 
to their influence on the development of inter-firm relations. The financial system is 
capital based, the legal system is based on case law and individualistic behavior is 
highly legitimate. The nature of these social institutions is considered supportive to the 
development of adverse, rather than cooperative inter-firm relations. Accordingly, 
vertical inter-firm relations in the UK potato industry are dominantly spot-market in 
nature and bilateral forms of horizontal inter-firm cooperation, apart from some joint 
ventures, are rare. Moreover, trade associations are present but tend to have a 
fragmented membership base and a limited range of functions. Strikingly, the industry 
association is well developed and can be linked with the dominant role of the state in the 
past and the absence of a well-developed structure of trade associations in the UK potato 
industry. 
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The remaining 'middleground' propositions concern the influence of less cohesive 
institutional environments on the development of cooperative inter-firm relations. 
Proposition 3 stated that: 
Firms are likely to develop cooperative inter-firm relations if they are 
embedded in an institutional environment in which key social institutions 
that are facilitating in nature are more dominant than the hindering ones. 
Proposition 4 stated that: 
Firms are likely to develop spot-market relations if they are embedded in 
an institutional environment in which key social institutions that are 
hindering in nature are more dominant than the facilitating ones. 
Proposition 5 stated that: 
A disjointed pattern of cooperative and spot-market relations is likely to 
develop in industries that are embedded in an institutional environment in 
which there is no dominance of key social institutions that are either 
facilitating or hindering in nature. 
Because the two cases in this study turned out to involve nationally distinct sets of 
mutually reinforcing social institutions that reflect the extremes of the continuum 
developed in Chapter 3, their usefulness to address the relevance of the three remaining 
propositions is limited. Obviously, future research is needed to gain empirical evidence 
for these propositions. Nevertheless, the propositions to some extent appeal to the shifts 
that have occurred in the behavior of the state in the UK and to a lesser degree in the 
Dutch potato industry (see also Chapter 7). While the nature of the other social 
institutions remained remarkably stable over the past decades, state behavior in the UK 
shifted from a regulating role to a laissez-faire policy in the late nineties. In the 
Netherlands, the performance of the potato industry was of considerable political 
interest to the state in the post-war years but faded in the 1970s and the years thereafter. 
Strikingly, in both instances the decrease of state interest in the industry led to a 
considerable decline in the relative importance of industry associations. In the 
Netherlands, the organization was virtually eliminated on instigation of the (members of 
the) trade associations, while in the UK the industry association was considerably 
downsized but remained quite active. However, the influence of the state in both 
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countries did not change with respect to the other forms of inter-firm cooperation in the 
industry. The Dutch state remained largely facilitating, while in the UK the shift of state 
behavior from regulating to laissez-faire meant a continuation of the negative influence 
on the development of cooperative inter-firm relations. This finding supports 
proposition 5, which indicates that shifts in the nature of social institutions can lead to 
changes in particular forms of inter-firm organization, while other forms remain largely 
unaffected. 
Figure 6.6: Summary of the confrontation between the propositions and empirical findings 
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6.5 Summary 
[n this chapter the findings from the field study on inter-firm cooperation in the UK and 
Dutch potato industries have been compared and contrasted with each other and also 
connected with the nature of key social institutions. This has revealed that the Dutch and 
UK potato industries constitute two considerably different systems of inter-firm 
174 CHAPTER SIX 
organization. The patterns of inter-firm cooperation in the UK and Dutch potato 
industries appeared to contrast with each other to a large extent. Moreover, the nature of 
key social institutions turned out to be both nationally distinct and industry-specific. The 
empirical findings supported the propositions stating that national contexts comprised of 
mutually reinforcing social institutions have either a marked positive or negative 
influence on the development of forms of inter-firm cooperation. Finally, it was pointed 
out that the relative importance of industry associations appeared to vary considerably 
with both the degree of state interest in the industry and the strength of trade 
associations. 
Chapter Seven 
CONCLUSIONS 
This concluding chapter presents a retrospective view of the research outcomes. The key 
findings are reviewed and fed hack to the central research question. In addition, the 
implications of the research findings for management, business associations, 
governments, and also theory development are discussed. Moreover, attention is paid to 
the limitations of this study. Finally, an agenda for future research is presented and 
concluding remarks are made. 
7.1 Key findings and answers to the central research question 
7.1.1 Review of the findings 
Four distinct forms of vertical and horizontal inter-firm cooperation in the UK and 
Dutch potato industries have been described, analyzed and compared with each other. 
This included bilateral and multilateral forms of inter-firm cooperation. The bilateral 
forms taken into account were both vertical (i.e., buyer-supplier) and horizontal 
(between competitors) forms of inter-firm cooperation. Trade- and industry associations 
(or business associations) have been taken into account as forms of multilateral inter-
firm cooperation (see Chapter 3). The bilateral forms of inter-firm cooperation have 
been addressed with regard to the degree and relevance of their constituent 'flows' of 
knowledge and information, mutual expectations, and resources. Insights into the 
relative importance of the business associations in the UK and Dutch potato industries 
were obtained through investigating the relevance and degree of development of a range 
of possible functions of these organizations (see Chapter 5). 
The four forms of inter-firm cooperation in both countries have been placed against a 
background of nationally distinct social institutions (see Chapter 6). Based on the 
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literature of economic sociology, four key social institutions that are considered to 
influence the development of inter-firm cooperation have been identified. These include 
1) the degree and nature of state involvement in the industry, 2) the nature of the 
financial system, 3) dominant mechanisms to ensure trust between exchange partners, 
and 4) the legitimacy of individualistic behavior as opposed to collectivistic behavior 
(see Chapter 3). 
Considerable differences have been revealed with regard to the nature of key social 
institutions and the forms of inter-firm cooperation in the UK and Dutch potato 
industries. The combined influence of the nationally distinct social institutions in each 
industry differs greatly between the two countries. In the Netherlands, the institutional 
environment is supportive of the development of cooperative inter-firm relations. The 
involvement of the Dutch state with respect to the industry is facilitating in nature, 
leaving firms much space for initiatives and self-governance. Moreover, the financial 
system in the Dutch agricultural sector is largely credit-based, involving access to 
medium and long-term (bank) loans that enable managers to work with long-term time 
horizons for their investments. Concerning mechanisms to ensure trust, managers of 
firms in the Dutch potato industry can rely on a formal law system, personal reputation, 
and social control. The possibility of relying on different and well-developed bases of 
trust is very likely to facilitate the development of cooperative inter-firm relations. 
Finally, the managers of most Dutch potato firms consider individualistic behavior, in 
the sense of pursuing self-interest at the expense of others, self-defeating rather than 
legitimate. Moreover, pragmatic cooperation is highly valued. 
The institutional environment of firms in the UK potato industry is considerably less 
supportive to the development of cooperative inter-firm arrangements. Rather, the 
combined influence of the key social institutions encourages self-sufficiency, spot-
market relations, and adverse competition. The UK government has regulated the 
domestic potato industry for many decades, which made the state a key source of 
(un)certainty to firms. The market regime in the UK potato industry made the 
development of cooperative inter-firm relations largely irrelevant. In the late 1990s, the 
market regime was abandoned, which increased the uncertainty of firms about the 
security of their supplies and/or sales. Given the absence of any tradition of cooperation, 
the laissez-faire type of state behavior that followed the market regime encouraged the 
development of greater self-sufficiency, spot-market relations, and adverse competitor 
relations. In addition, the financial system in the UK is strongly capital-based, implying 
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that firms (including those in the agricultural sector) have to rely on retained earnings, 
short-term bank loans, and (if possible) the stock market for their capital needs. The 
demand for quick results that comes with the external sources of capital in this financial 
system is likely to have encouraged management to work with short time horizons. 
Mechanisms to ensure trust between exchange parties are weakly developed in the UK, 
which hampers the development of cooperative inter-firm relations. In particular, the 
smaller firms are confronted with the uncertainties that come with the 'case law'-based 
legal system, while managers indicated that personal reputation and social control are 
not very relevant as a basis of trust. Finally, individualistic behavior in the sense of 
pursuing self-interest is considered highly legitimate in the UK business community. 
This is seen to have encouraged the development of adverse inter-firm relations, rather 
than cooperative business-to-business links. 
Figure 7.1 Inter-firm cooperation and social institutions in the UK and Dutch potato industries 
of the late 1990s 
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The influence of the nationally distinct social institutions in the UK and Dutch potato 
industries is reflected by the patterns of inter-firm cooperation. These patterns turned out 
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to be each other's opposites. Bilateral forms of inter-firm cooperation are remarkably 
more developed in the Netherlands than in the UK. In the Dutch potato industry, 
transactions tend to be 'embedded' in informal long-term inter-firm relations. In the UK, 
relations generally last as long as the formal contracts of the parties involved. A similar 
view is reflected by the relative importance of trade associations, which are strongly 
developed in the Dutch potato industry but are rather weak and fragmented in the UK. 
However, the industry association that succeeded the semi-governmental Potato 
Marketing Board in the UK appeared much more active and relevant to firms than its 
Dutch counterpart which has been virtually pushed aside by strongly developed trade 
associations. Put briefly, the results of this study show that the Dutch and UK potato 
industries constitute two considerably different systems of inter-firm organization. 
Figure 7.1 provides a condensed overview of the research results. 
7.1.2 Answers to the central research question 
The upshot of this study enables the formulation of answers to the central research 
question: 
What is the influence of key social institutions on the 
development of cooperative inter-firm relations? 
It has been found that firms are embedded in national contexts which are comprised of a 
range of distinct social institutions that either facilitate or hinder the development of 
different forms of inter-firm cooperation. The empirical findings about the UK and 
Dutch potato industries show that the combined influence of nationally distinct key 
social institutions strongly facilitate the development of cooperative inter-firm relations 
in the Netherlands and adverse inter-firm relations in the UK. In the Dutch potato 
industry, the combination of a facilitating state, a credil-based financial system, a legal 
system based on formal law, the relevance of social obligations, and personal reputation, 
and a low legitimacy of individualistic behavior was found to facilitate the development 
of cooperative arrangements between firms. In contrast, it was found that in the UK 
potato industry the combined influence of a regulating state (laissez-faire since 1997), a 
capital-based financial system, a legal system based on case-law, a low relevance of 
personal reputation and social obligations, and a high legitimacy of pursuing self-
interest was found to hinder the development of cooperative inter-firm relations. In 
short, the empirical evidence found in this study underpins the conclusion that the 
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relative ease of developing cooperative inter-firm relations varies with the nationally 
distinct nature of a range of key social institutions. 
7.2 Practical implications 
7.2.1 General implications for management 
As was pointed out in Chapters 1 and 2, inter-firm cooperation can be regarded as a 
critical managerial issue as it closely connects with competitive strength (see also Van 
den Bosch 1998: 15-17). More particularly, firms that operate in dynamic markets can 
gain greatly from durable forms of cooperation that enable them to meet requests from 
customers such as speed of delivery, punctuality, product quality, and innovation. This 
view is strongly supported by the outcomes of the present study on the UK and Dutch 
potato industries. The degree of both vertical and horizontal inter-firm cooperation 
among Dutch potato firms is very high and is widely seen as an important basis for the 
considerable international competitive strength of this industry'. By contrast, 
cooperation is not really a strong feature of UK potato firms. The international market 
position of the UK potato industry is not very strong as well. Even more illustrative in 
this respect is that, at present, some Dutch potato firms have a quite strong presence in 
certain segments of the UK potato market, whereas very few UK potato firms have a 
foothold in the Netherlands. 
It has been shown that the institutional contexts of geographically proximate countries 
such as the UK and the Netherlands accommodate very different systems of inter-firm 
organization. In other words, the nature of social institutions that either hinder or 
facilitate inter-firm cooperation tends to vary between countries. Put in strategic 
management terms, this implies that firms are likely to gain from a high degree of 'fit' 
between their inter-organizational relations and the institutional environment, both in 
domestic and overseas markets . With this observation in mind, three different 
managerial actions can be distinguished to maintain or improve the 'institutional fit' of 
inter-firm relations. First of all, management will gain from taking into account the fit 
between the institutional environment and the way their inter-firm relations are 
This view is among others supported by British and Australian scholars who were involved in 
comparative analysis of aspects of the Dutch potato industry with its British counterpart (see Lamont 
1992; Martin and Hughes 1992; Schroder 1993). 
2 
The underlying assumption is that divergent organizational behavior may lead to difficulties in inter-
firm relations, which, in turn, have a negative impact on competitive strength. 
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organized when strategic analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of their organization 
are made. In this way, possible frictions between institutional pressures and 
organizational features of the firm are identified and, if considered necessary, 
appropriate measures can be taken. 
Secondly, management is likely to gain from similar analysis prior to investments that 
involve the establishment of inter-firm relations in overseas markets. International 
alliances are notorious for their high failure rates. Institutional analyses prior to the 
development of such collaborative arrangements produce important knowledge that is 
needed to guide such processes as it reduces the risk of failure due to misunderstandings 
or miscalculations based on wrong assumptions about the future behavior of the other 
party. 
Thirdly, management can improve the competitive position of their firm by actively 
influencing the nature of 'proximate' key social institutions in their industry. Through 
lobbying, consultation, and initiatives for self-administration/regulation firms, groups of 
firms or entire industries have the ability to influence the degree and mode of state 
intervention. In fact, this happened in both the UK and Dutch potato industries. In the 
Netherlands, potato firms jointly avoided far-reaching state intervention in their industry 
through consultative relations and self-regulation (Van den Bosch and Veerman 1983). 
In the UK, particular potato firms and retail organizations were successful in their lobby 
to abandon the market regime for potatoes. In a similar fashion, firms may bring about 
changes in laws and regulations that affect their industry or, particularly, the way 
transactions can be managed. Moreover, in countries with 'dual' financial systems such 
as the Netherlands, firms have the option to choose between either stock capital or long-
term loans to fill their capital needs. This choice allows management to deliberately 
influence the length of their time horizons with regard to investments in, among others, 
cooperative inter-firm relations. 
7.2.2 Implications for firms in the agri-food industry 
Apart from the general implications for management addressed in the section above, 
remarks can be made that are relevant to the agri-food industry in general and more in 
particular to firms in the UK and Dutch potato industries. First of all, the consequences 
of changing key social institutions for firms in the agri-food industry will be discussed. 
Secondly, the obstacles and advantages that come with the nationally distinct market 
organization of the UK and Dutch potato industries will be discussed in the light of the 
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need for suitable responses to the current fundamental shifts in their business 
environment. 
A changing institutional environment 
The nature of the key social institutions that have been discussed in the present study 
tends to be fairly stable. Nevertheless, this nature can change either gradually or 
suddenly. The UK potato industry witnessed a dramatic shift in the nature of state 
involvement in 1997 (see Chapter 6). The market regime for potatoes was abandoned 
and replaced by a laissez-faire policy, although some governmental research funding 
remained. In short, the UK potato industry has become exposed to international market 
forces, which are not or slightly moderated by structuring influences of national social 
institutions. Moreover, the industry is going through a process of restructuring in which 
larger firms become larger and smaller firms gradually disappear from the scene. 
Shifts in the nature of key social institutions are also underway within the Dutch 
agribusiness, including the potato industry. These shifts are even wider in scope and 
more salient than in the UK. For almost the entire 20lh century, the economic 
organization of the Dutch agribusiness sector has been considerably distinct in nature 
with respect to most other Dutch economic sectors. This was largely due to the sector-
specific nature of key social institutions including a strongly facilitating state 
involvement in the agribusiness, a credit-based financial system, and a high legitimacy 
of collectivistic behavior (see Chapter 6). However, the nature of the social institutions 
has begun to change considerably. In other words, the (institutional) rules of the game 
are changing, which urges management of agribusiness firms to revise their strategies 
and structures. What are the shifts and developments in the institutional environment of 
the Dutch agribusiness, and what does this mean for the firms involved? 
CHANGING STATE INVOLVEMENT: Since the 'purple' coalition3 came into power in Dutch 
government at the expense of the confessional parties in the early 1990s, the political 
influence of the 'green front' (i.e., the strong agribusiness lobby) has corroded 
considerably. In tune with this, state involvement in the agribusiness has started to 
change fundamentally. The facilitating behavior of the Dutch government is more and 
more replaced by a laissez-faire policy, implying that firms are increasingly left to their 
The 'purple' coalition is comprised of three political parties: PvdA (socialists), W D (liberal) and 
D'66 (democrats). The party of the Christian democrats (CDA), which has been part of most coalitions 
that formed the Dutch a government since W.W. II, was left out. 
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own devices. Moreover, regulations that have an impact on the industry are more and 
more developed in 'Brussels,' rather than by national governments. Consultation with 
government officials seems to be replaced by lobbying at the agencies of the EU. In 
addition, EU regulations that foster an increase of free market competition are being 
applied with greater consistency. As a result, firms are left with more uncertainties about 
policies that have an impact on their business operations and are confronted with 
limitations to their possibilities of self-administration. What is even more relevant for 
Dutch agribusiness firms to take into account is that the substantial governmental 
funding of research, development, and education is decreasing at a rapid pace. This can 
be considered a serious threat to -particularly- small and medium-sized agribusiness 
firms that have limited resources for research and development. Given the high 
importance of knowledge and innovation as success factors in present-day competition, 
agribusiness firms must be quick to find ways to pool their resources to avoid a decrease 
of research efforts as a result of the withdrawal of government funds. Moreover, 
fragmentation of research and development activities will prove to be devastating for the 
unique and extensive knowledge infrastructure that underpins much of the past and 
present successes of Dutch agribusiness. Corrosion of this infrastructure will irreversibly 
harm the leading competitive position of many Dutch firms in international agribusiness 
markets in the long run, because much of their competitive advantage is knowledge-
based. In particular, firms with limited access to investment capital run the risk of being 
outperformed by the highly self-sufficient multinational companies that have substantial 
resources for research and development, which enable them to launch new products and 
services at a high pace. 
A CHANGING FINANCIAL SYSTEM: The mutually reinforcing nature of social institutions is 
reflected in the apparent change in the nature of the financial system in Dutch 
agribusiness. Shifts in this system can be linked at least in part to the changes in the 
state involvement in the industry. The decline of state support to the agribusiness on 
both national and EU levels implies greater risks for the banks that have high stakes in 
this particular sector of the economy. Illustrative in this respect is that Rabobank, the 
most important bank in the Dutch agribusiness sector, has started to shift part of its 
focus towards other markets. As the risks of capital provision increase, access to capital 
by agribusiness firms is likely to become more difficult than before due to more 
stringent conditions of the banks. Moreover, publicly listed banks are becoming more 
active in the agribusiness sector, which makes it likely that short-term returns on loans 
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will get a higher priority. The changing nature of the financial system has also 
consequences for firms that seek to expand their operations and that want to enhance 
their research efforts in response to the pressures of increasing international 
competition. These firms may be tempted to look for other sources than bank loans to 
fill their capital needs. Moreover, the co-operatives, which dominate in many sectors of 
the Dutch agribusiness, are pressed to reconsider and adjust their governance structures 
in order to be able to the attract external capital they need for future investments. 
CHANGING BASES OF TRUST: The bases of trust underlying the exchange relations in the 
Dutch (but also the UK) agribusiness are becoming increasingly dominated by formal 
contracts. This is due to the increasing size of transactions between firms (embodying 
greater risks) the alienation process between firms that grow larger while the farmers 
that supply them remain relatively small, and the increase of guarantees for food safety 
required by major customers. If the issue of trust is looked upon from an international 
perspective, it can be stated that firms with cross-border activities will continue to be 
confronted with a variety of ways to build trust in different countries because different 
types of contract law exist in different national contexts. Given the inherent 
uncertainties that come with the use of formal contracts in international markets, 
process-based trust is likely to remain important. 
THE DECLINE OF coLLECTiviSTic BEHAVIOR: The general trend of the increasing 
individuali-zation of society is also present in the agribusiness. In particular the Dutch 
co-operatives are affected by this development. The behavior of the members of co-
operatives in the agribusiness is becoming more individualistic in nature (see, e.g., 
Veerman 1998: 75). As a result, managers of co-operatives are confronted with growing 
tensions between the original foundations of their organization, i.e., solidarity, pressures 
for more rapid responses to market developments, and the demands of the members that 
put more emphasis on their individual -and often short-term- interests. This 
development calls for organizational solutions that deal effectively with the increasing 
tension between the long-term interests of the co-operative and the individual 
preferences of its members. This is necessary to keep co-operatives viable forms of 
economic organization. However, if management and the members of co-operatives are 
not able to develop new governance structures that enable their organization to operate 
decisively in increasingly competitive markets, private firms are likely to take over as a 
dominant form of organization in the Dutch agribusiness. 
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It has been argued that the nature of nationally distinct social institutions in the UK and 
Dutch agribusiness is changing and that firms need to respond to survive this transition 
process. In the Netherlands, the institutional environment is becoming much less 
supportive of, or even hostile to, many of the (collaborative) organizational structures 
that have developed and functioned in the agribusiness for many decades. Co-operatives 
and industry associations can be seen as examples of this. In short, firms in the Dutch 
agribusiness are challenged to cope in an environment that is becoming considerably 
less facilitating to the development of inter-firm cooperation, while, paradoxically, the 
importance of strategic inter-firm cooperation increases. 
Structural change in the UK and Dutch potato industries 
Similar to other industries such as car manufacturing, publishing, oil, and transportation, 
the agri-food industry is becoming more and more dominated by large multinational 
companies (MNCs) that operate on a global scale and which grow ever larger in an 
ongoing process of takeovers and mergers. The accelerating internationalization and 
concentration processes driven by the mergers and takeovers of large European and 
American food retail corporations (such as Royal Ahold, Carrefour, Wal-Mart, and 
Tesco) lead to a redefinition of the rules of competition in the agri-food industry. The 
suppliers of food products are becoming confronted with fewer and larger customers 
that operate in international markets. The demands of these large food retail 
corporations are changing in accordance to this situation. Concepts such as 'preferred 
suppliers' and 'global sourcing' are being applied and developed to exploit cross-border 
economies of scale, while local tastes need to be taken into account as well. This pushes 
firms to invest heavily in the development of knowledge, processes, services, products, 
and sufficient production capacity to meet the needs of their fewer but larger customers. 
In short, this means that the suppliers of large food retailers and other MNCs in the agri-
food industry are being challenged to grow along with their major customers or to 
become niche market players. Firms that follow neither of these generic strategies are 
very likely to be reduced to marginal players with unfavorable future prospects, such as 
being taken over or disappearing from the scene in the long run. How do these strategic 
developments relate to the research findings? 
THE UK POTATO INDUSTRY: With respect to the fundamental and rapid industry-wide 
restructuring called for by the developments sketched above, the UK potato industry 
seems to have an advantage over its Dutch counterpart. After abandoning the market 
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regulations for potatoes in the UK, the restructuring process accelerated. This could 
happen because the national system of key social institutions legitimizes -and certainly 
not inhibit- that dominant firms such as large retailers and processors restructure the 
potato industry in a way that best fits their interests (see Chapter 6). In the short run, this 
is an unfavorable scenario for many small and medium-sized firms that may not find 
ways to grow rapidly or bundle their strengths in highly cohesive networks. However, 
for the long run, this process is likely to yield a potato supply system comprised of a 
limited number of large and highly competitive potato firms that are able to cope with 
the demands of international MNC-dominated competition. In other words, the low 
degree of market organization in the UK enables rapid and fundamental restructuring 
that is directed by MNCs. This, in turn, is likely to lead to the development of large and 
internationally competitive potato firms. As a next step, it is not unthinkable that these 
firms will expand internationally. Owing to their large size and access to stock capital 
for investments and takeovers, they may become tough competitors of other European 
firms, including Dutch ones. 
THE DUTCH POTATO INDUSTRY The Dutch potato industry has witnessed an ongoing 
restructuring process for more than a decade. However, apart from a few mergers and 
increasing concentration levels, this process has not led to changes that equal the impact 
of the large-scale mechanization that enhanced the competitiveness of the Dutch potato 
industry in the 1960s and 1970s (see Chapter 5). The present pressures for growth and 
internationalization are another important and durable source of competitive strength for 
the Dutch potato industry, but they also seem to endanger the future competitiveness of 
particularly the medium-sized and small firms. On the one hand, the widespread 
capabilities of Dutch potato firms to cooperate with strategically important partners 
facilitate joint product development, increased efficiency, and the development of 
advanced supply chain services to major customers (Chapter 5). On the other hand, the 
highly structured national business environment of Dutch potato firms, as is described in 
Chapter 6, seems to impede possibilities of gaining a critical size with respect to large 
multinational companies. The major possibility for rapid growth for Dutch firms is 
through mergers. This is due to the saturation of the domestic market and the limited 
access of many firms (and in particular co-operatives) to capital for takeovers or 
autonomous growth. However, owing to the (still) supportive institutional environment 
for inter-firm cooperation, Dutch potato companies relatively easily engage into 
collaborative arrangements to obtain access to strategically important assets such as, for 
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instance, monopolized potato varieties. In this way, firms are tempted to not only 
nurture their autonomy - but they also remain small. This 'recipe' may have worked for 
decades. However, given the present 'small firm squeeze' that is going on in a less and 
less supportive institutional environment, it does expose small and medium-sized firms 
to the danger of becoming marginal players with respect to large and internationally 
operating (and expanding) customers and competitors. In fact, to remain competitive in 
the long run, Dutch potato firms need to get the best of both worlds. They certainly 
should take advantage of their capabilities of inter-firm co-operation. At the same time, 
however, they should try to develop themselves into larger entities that are able to meet 
the demands of an industry, which is rapidly becoming dominated by large multinational 
companies. 
7.2.3 Implications for business associations 
It has been shown that business associations are forms of joint action that enable firms 
to expand their influence over their business environment. For instance, business 
associations were instrumental to Dutch potato firms in preventing the government from 
imposing regulations on their industry shortly after W.W. II. Moreover, the establish-
ment of joint promotion, quality standards, and control systems through business 
associations has contributed to the export success of Dutch potato firms. In the UK, 
trade associations of potato processors have supported the lobby that eventually led to 
the abandoning of the market regime in their domestic market, which helped to increase 
their control over their supplies. In this respect, it was interesting to see that some 
multinational companies were able to enhance their position in foreign markets through 
their membership of national business associations. 
The relevance of national business associations is challenged by decreasing numbers of 
members due to ongoing concentration in the industry, more stringent competition 
regulations, the increased ability of large firms to promote their interests at national and 
EU levels, and the decreased need for collective promotion. Moreover, policy 
development increasingly happens at European or global levels and the building of trust 
between business partners more and more occurs between different countries, rather 
than within national borders. As a result, the need of firms to control parts of their 
business environment through business associations is shifting from a national level to 
European and global levels. These developments push national business associations to 
develop new functions for their members. Moreover, competition may be evoked 
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between different national business associations because they will increasingly compete 
for influence over important international policies and regulations. However, there is 
also a growing need for mutual cooperation between national business associations. 
Cooperation is particularly needed to gain the critical mass that is required to influence 
the political developments in the international business environment that affect their 
members. In addition to this, business associations with international membership and 
scope are likely to increase in importance. This is very similar to structural 
developments among business associations earlier this century, when regionally 
operating business associations were replaced by organizations that operated on a 
national level. 
Despite this dark scenario for national business associations, there are also possibilities 
to increase their relevance to the industry. For instance, given the developments in the 
Dutch agribusiness, business associations can increase their relevance through assuming 
or extending their role in the initiation and coordination of jointly funded research. In 
this way, they would help keeping the knowledge infrastructure of the industry alive and 
productive. Moreover, they would avoid a harmful fragmentation of the industry and a 
less efficient use of resources. 
7.2.4 Implications for governmental policies 
The results from the analysis in Chapter 6 support the fact that the nature and degree of 
state involvement in the industry does strongly influence the way firms coordinate and 
control their inter-firm relations. Moreover, it has been shown that state behavior with 
regard to the industry can also vary greatly. It has been indicated that both state-imposed 
market regimes and laissez-faire state behavior (found in the UK) hamper initiatives of 
firms to develop cooperative relations with each other. In contrast, facilitating behavior 
comprised of substantial investments in knowledge generation and dissemination, 
consultative state-business relations, and allowing for high degrees of self-regulation 
through voluntary business associations (found in the Netherlands) encourages inter-
firm cooperation. Seen against this background, it is argued that industry development 
benefits from inter-firm cooperation (cf. Best 1990; Schmitz 1996; Humphrey and 
Schmitz 1998) and that governments can contribute to higher degrees of collaboration 
within and across industrial sectors (Hollingsworth et al. 1994). Except for large 
multinationals, the costs and risks of knowledge creation as well as product and process 
innovation increasingly exceed the capacity and capabilities of individual firms. As a 
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result, small and medium-sized firms, but also larger ones, are pressed to engage in 
arrangements of coordinated specialization to be able to meet increasing competitive 
pressures. This is particularly true for the agri-food industry where many small and 
medium-sized firms are active. These firms are confronted with increased international 
competition, higher customer demands, shortening product life cycles, high efficiency 
demands, and increasing degrees of knowledge intensity of products, services, and 
processes. Governments that intend to support the enhancement of the competitive 
power of small and medium-sized firms confronted with such demands may look at the 
(past) relations between the state and the highly competitive Dutch potato industry for 
inspiration. Forms of state involvement which encourage (or sometimes push) firms to 
undertake joint initiatives to develop the industry seem to work remarkably well. This 
differs greatly from state regulation via market regimes, which discourage bottom-up 
initiatives, or laissez-faire state behavior that evokes adverse competition between firms. 
7.3 Theoretical implications 
7.3.1 Institutions and economic organization 
In Chapter 6 the propositions, which were deduced from the analytic framework, have 
been confronted with the empirical findings. Moreover, the in-depth analysis of the 
potato industries in the two countries have generated detailed insights in how the firms 
involved tend to organize their relations with other companies. In this manner, the 
comparative case study of the UK and Dutch potato industries has contributed to our 
understanding of the influence of nationally distinct institutional environments on the 
development of cooperative inter-firm relations (see Section 7.1). This adds to the 
accumulating body of literature about the institutional embeddedness of forms of 
economic organization (see Chapters 1 and 3). 
What is more interesting here is that the results of this study also demonstrate that the 
nature and influence of key social institutions can differ considerably from industry to 
industry within a country (see Chapter 6). Inter-organizational arrangements are likely to 
vary accordingly4. In other words, the nature of the same types of social institutions can 
In this light it is relevant to refer to a remark in a 1990 policy report (Nota) about the strengths and 
weaknesses of the Dutch economy, which was written on behalf of the Dutch government. In this 
report, it was stated that 'In general, cooperation is not a very strongly developed characteristic of our 
(i.e. the Dutch) business culture.' This is diametrically opposing the findings about the potato industry, 
which apparently has different organizational features in comparison with many other industries in the 
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vary considerably across different industries that are located in a single country. Indeed, 
the nature of key social institutions including state involvement in the industry, the 
financial system and the legitimacy of individualistic behavior appeared to be specific to 
the Dutch potato industry. Moreover, the market regime for potatoes in the UK before 
1997, which had lasted for decades, contrasted sharply with the laissez-faire policy of the 
British government with regard to most other industries. These findings of this study add 
to the observations made by other authors about institutional heterogeneity between 
industries. However, the present findings are different from the observations by Herrigel 
(1996) who investigated the co-existence of different regional institutional systems in 
Germany. These differences appeared to be based on variations in institutional frameworks 
across the 'Landern' that make up Germany. In addition, Hollingsworth et al. (1994: 8) 
argued that different industries (or sectors) represent different institutional legacies and 
that forms of economic organization differ accordingly. They have shown that different 
industries in different countries constitute different modes of economic governance. 
However, they provided no empirical evidence about the co-existence of key social 
institutions that are different in nature with respect to different industrial sectors within 
single countries. Nevertheless, their argument that capitalism can no longer be studied as a 
whole, but that it must be broken down into parts at an industry level, is fully endorsed by 
the findings of the present study. This is not to say that studies of general patterns of 
economic organization on a national level, which is central to the 'National Business 
Systems' discourse (see, among others, Whitley and his associates 1990 - 1999), should be 
rejected. Rather, the results of this study point out that the nature of inter-organizational 
systems within different industries may vary vis-a-vis broad patterns of economic 
organization on a national level. 
7.3.2 Limitations of the research project 
The research design and the conceptual framework used in the present study bring about 
inevitable limitations. With regard to the external validity of the findings, it remains 
difficult to say to what extent the results can be generalized to other sectors of the agri-
food industry (that either are or are not subject to a market regime), let alone sectors in 
the manufacturing and services industries. Moreover, because of the vast complexity of 
the subject investigated and the conceptual scope of this study, the explanations that 
have been offered for the findings are regarded largely tentative in nature (cf. Lane 
Dutch economy. Source: Nota 'Economie met Open Grcnzcn', Vergaderjaar 1989-1990, 21.670, Nrs. 
1-2, Den Haag: Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, page 10. 
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1995: 2). For instance, it is not supposed that the range of key attributes that have been 
identified to capture patterns of inter-firm cooperation on industry level is inclusive. It is 
likely that in the future relevant attributes are added and others altered. Nevertheless, the 
attributes used in the field study are considered at least adequate to achieve a broad view 
of the way firms coordinate and control their inter-firm relations and should certainly 
prove to be useful in future research. 
It should be noted as well that the analyses in this study have been focused on the 
combined impact of a limited range of key social institutions that influence the 
development of cooperative inter-firm relations (see Chapters 5 and 6). It may be that 
'shaping factors' for inter-firm cooperation have been overlooked or disregarded 
because of the necessarily limited scope of the research. For instance, it is by no means 
certain that the set of key social institutions incorporated in the analytic framework is 
sufficient to account for patterns of inter-firm organization in other industries. In 
addition, although industry-specific variables were kept constant to a large extent by 
comparing same industries across different countries, the 'national' cases are not likely 
to be entirely congruent in this respect. This implies that the results have been biased to 
some extent by incidents and idiosyncrasies of the firms/industries involved in this 
study. 
Another limitation of this study is that the combined influence of social institutions has 
been analyzed, but the possible mutual influence between them has remained rather 
indefinite. Moreover, apart from the development of industry associations, it has not 
become clear if perhaps one or more social institutions dominate others with regard to 
their influence on the development of forms of inter-firm organization . Finally, light 
has been shed on the direct or indirect influence of nationally distinct social institutions 
on the development of inter-firm relations. However, the design of this study did not 
allow obtaining a sharp view of micro-level processes. Rather, a synchronic analysis 
was made of the situation in the potato industries in both countries in the last half of the 
1990s. Hence, it has not been ascertained in great detail how key social institutions have 
channeled and constrained the actions of management that led to the development of the 
forms of inter-firm cooperation found in the UK and Dutch potato industries. To gain 
more insights into this matter, future research is needed which combines longitudinal 
micro-, meso-, and macro-level analyses of economic organization processes. In the next 
section more attention will be paid to possible directions for future research. 
See Rademakers (1998) for an example about the influence of the state over the financial system and 
how this influences the development of inter-firm relations. 
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7.3.3 An agenda for future research 
The outcomes of the present study have not only delivered new insights, but have also 
given rise to many more questions pertaining to the social construction of forms of inter-
firm organization. Subjects that call for more attention are (1) the expansion of the 
research database; (2) the extension of the analytic framework; (3) the interaction between 
trust, power, inter-firm relations, and institutions; (4) the process dimension of inter-
organizational development under the influence of key social institutions; and (5) the 
role of nationally distinct institutions on the development of inter/intra-firm cooperative 
arrangements of multinationals. Below, these subjects will be discussed in more detail. 
Expansion of the research database 
• In Chapter 6 the research findings have been fed back to the propositions formulated 
in Chapter 3. It turned out that the cases involved in this study revealed mutually 
reinforcing combinations of key social institutions. This implies that there is limited 
empirical evidence to test the propositions about the development of cooperative 
inter-firm relations in institutional environments where not all of the key social 
institutions reinforce each other. Hence, future research involving less cohesive 
institutional environments is called for to gain empirical evidence that can be used to 
support or reject these propositions. 
• Stronger empirical evidence about the influence of social institutions on the 
development of cooperative inter-firm relations can be gained by expanding this line 
of research to more industries in different countries. In addition, more elaborate and 
extensive research methods may be applied, such as case studies designed according 
to the two-sided comparative method (Ragin 1989). Such research would require an 
examination of inter-firm organization in same industries that are located in three 
different countries, comprised of two similar and one dissimilar type of institutional 
environment (see, for instance, Djelic 1998: 15). For instance, concerning the potato 
industry, such research would include the Netherlands and most likely Germany as 
similar cases, and the UK as the dissimilar one. 
Extension of the analytic framework 
• Are there other nationally distinct social institutions that have a significant influence 
on how managers shape inter-firm relations? This question calls for further 
refinements of the analytic framework that was built for the present study. For 
example, during the field research it was noted that job mobility among the managers 
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in the UK tends to be higher than in the Netherlands. Therefore, the employnent 
system may be considered to be an additional institutional influence on the 
development of cooperative inter-firm relations (cf. Lane 1996). Indeed, high job 
mobility is likely to hamper the development of long-term relations between firms as 
they are based on relations between people. However, more research is needed to find 
out to what extent this influences cooperative inter-firm behavior in combination vith 
other institutional factors and other aspects, such as the stability of ownership (cf. 
Franks and Mayer 1990). 
• A more complete view of how inter-firm relations are developed calls for research 
that combines analyses of inter-organizational structures in their institutional context 
with other aspects of economic organization such as ownership structures and 
authority relations (cf. Whitley 1992b). An extension of the present findings with 
additional research into the features of intra-firm organization in the UK and Dutch 
potato industries would be very useful for such purposes. Concepts for the analytic 
framework needed for such an endeavor could be drawn from the business systems 
framework (see Chapter 3). Such research may, for instance, reveal possible 
variations in the capabilities of cooperation between private firms (prevailing in the 
UK) and co-operatives (which dominate the Dutch potato industry). 
Trust, power, inter-firm relations, and social institutions 
• During the field research and the subsequent analysis of the data it became evident 
that in the UK, large firms with considerable market power tend to perceive the 
nature of their inter-firm relations as more cooperative than the smaller ones. A 
possible explanation is that large firms are in the position to determine the 'rules of 
the game' in the industry, and that the managers of the large enterprises see the 
compliance of the smaller firms to these rules as cooperative behavior. However, in 
the Netherlands such an effect was not detected. Future research is needed to find 
out to what degree managerial perceptions of cooperative behavior are influenced by 
the market power of their firms, and what the role of the institutional environment is 
in this matter. 
• The results of the present study indicated, among other things, that business 
associations can play an important facilitating role in processes of socialization and 
reputation building. Future research is called for to gain more detailed knowledge 
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about the role of business associations as vehicles for the production of trust 
between firms and under which circumstances they are likely to perform such a 
function. 
The process dimension of inter-organizational development 
• What exactly is the influence of social institutions on managerial processes involved 
in the development of inter-firm relations? As was pointed out above, future 
research is needed to gain insights into the micro-level processes involved in the 
development of inter-firm relations under the influence of social institutions. Central 
to such research are the managerial perceptions about the direct or indirect influence 
of key social institutions. The assumption underlying such research is that 
managerial perceptions guide managerial actions that lead to the development of 
new or revised organizational structures in response to changes in the institutional 
environment. 
Multinationals and inter/intra-firm cooperation 
• Given the nationally distinct forms of inter-firm organization that have been found 
in the present study, the question can be raised as to how multinationals deal with 
this matter and how this relates to their international performance. Answers to this 
question can be found through research on the organizational behavior of 
multinationals and the national systems of inter-firm organization in the countries 
where they operate. In this way, insights are gained into the relative success of the 
strategies of multinational firms concerning the way they deal with variations in 
institutional pressures6. 
• Various authors have observed that large firms, including internationally operating 
corporations and co-operatives, are transforming themselves from hierarchical 
organizations into intra-firm networks. Examples are the 'federal organizations' 
constituted by IBM (Child and Faulkner 1998) and the 'internal network 
organization' of the Rabobank (Van Wijk and Van den Bosch 1999). The questions 
about different systems of inter-firm organization apply to a large extent to these 
intra-firm networks as well. For instance, are intra-firm networks of internationally 
Concerning the potato industry, research could involve large and well-established multinational firms 
such as Pepsico, Unilever, and Nestle, but also smaller and younger internationally operating firms 
such as McCain, Farm Frites, and Aviko. 
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operating firms organized along the lines of dominant forms of inter-firm 
organization in the domestic market of these organizations? Alternatively, are these 
intra-firm networks comprised of a range of autonomous business units in different 
countries that make use of nationally specific coordination and control systems? 
Obviously, there is much work to be done to obtain a deeper understanding of the 
influence of nationally distinct social institutions on the development of forms of inter-
and intra-firm cooperation. 
7.4 Concluding remarks 
The cross-national comparison of forms of inter-firm cooperation in the UK and Dutch 
potato industries, embedded in their distinct national contexts, has uncovered sharply 
contrasting systems of inter-firm organization. The Dutch case displayed a system in 
which bilateral cooperative inter-firm relations as well as trade associations have 
developed considerably within a cohesive institutional environment encouraging inter-
firm cooperation. By contrast, the UK case exhibited a system in which spot-market 
relations are more prevalent and horizontal cooperative inter-firm relations are much 
more weakly developed than in the Netherlands. The UK potato industry appeared to be 
embedded in an institutional environment encouraging self-sufficiency, short-term 
horizons, and the pursuit of self-interest. 
Surprisingly, the industry association in the UK was found to be considerably more 
active and relevant than its counterpart in the Dutch potato industry. This finding has 
been accounted for by referring to the dominant role of the state in the UK potato 
industry (until the late 1990s) which has until recently supported this organization. In 
the Netherlands, by contrast, the strongly developed trade associations seem to have 
limited the relevance of the industry association. 
Finally, with regard to the Dutch case, it has been revealed that within national 
economies markedly distinct forms of inter-firm organization can emerge under the 
influence of key social institutions that are industry-specific in nature. 
This thesis has highlighted the influence of nationally distinct social institutions on the 
development of forms of inter-firm organization. The results indicate that, in spite of the 
globalization processes, it is likely that many nationally distinct systems of inter-firm 
cooperation are present in the free market economies around the world. This issue is 
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considered highly relevant to the strategic management of internationally operating 
firms. Indeed, firms increasingly depend on successful cooperative inter-firm 
arrangements in both domestic and cross-border markets to gain competitive strength. 
At the same time, there is, as yet, much uncharted water with regard to the 'institutional 
fit' of cooperative inter-firm arrangements. Obviously, this calls for future research on 
this topic, as well as efforts to derive practical implications for management from the 
body of knowledge in this field. 
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Appendix I 
Overview of the organizations involved in the explorative stage of the research project 
Explorative study ~ the Dutch potato industry 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
n 
14. 
15. 
16. 
Organization 
Agrico 
Aviko 
Cebeco-Handelsraad 
Fruit Chips 
Landbouw-Economisch Instituut 
McCain NL 
Nedato 
NIVAA 
Productschap Aardappelen 
NVZP 
Rabobank 
VAVI 
VBNA 
PAGV 
CZAV 
ZPC 
No. of 
interviews 
2 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
4* 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
3 
1* 
1 
Located in 
Emmeloord 
Steenderen 
Rotterdam 
's-Gravenpolder 
Den Haag 
Hoofddorp 
Oud-Beijerland 
Den Haag 
Den Haag 
Zeist 
Utrecht 
Den Haag 
Den Haag 
Lelystad 
Middelharnis 
Leeuwarden 
Organization type 
Firm (co-operative) 
Firm (coop-owned) 
Firm (co-operative) 
Firm 
Research Institute 
Firm 
Firm (coop-owned) 
Association 
Association 
Association 
Firm (co-operative) 
Association 
Association 
Research Institute 
Firm (co-operative) 
Firm (co-operative) 
* Interviews for an in-depth case study 
Explorative study ~ the UK potato industry 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10 
Organization 
Potato Review (Journal) 
Potato Products International 
Wye College/London University 
University of Edinburgh/VTSC 
J.Taylor 
Agrico (export managers) 
British Potato Council 
Potato Processors Association 
Fresh Produce Consortium 
National Joint Association of 
British Potato Merchants 
No. of 
interviews 
1 
1* 
1* 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Located in 
Great Missenden 
USA 
Wye 
Edinburgh 
Oxford 
Emmeloord 
Oxford 
London 
London 
Spalding 
Organization type 
Firm 
Firm 
University 
University/trd.ass. 
Consultant 
Firm (co-operative) 
Association 
Association 
Association 
Association 
* Via internet/e-mail 
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Appendix II 
The selection of UK and Dutch firms: their activities and core business 
Dutch 
firms 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
Activities in the potato industry supply chain 
Breed-
ing 
• 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
e 
X 
X 
Seed 
potato 
growing 
• e 
Seed potato 
trade 
• 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
e 
Ware 
potato 
growing 
• 
X 
e 
Ware potato 
trade / pre-
packing 
• 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
e 
Potato 
processing 
• 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
e 
• = Involved in this activity, 100% ownership 
6 = Involved in this activity, partial ownership 
x Bold = Core business 
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APPENDIX II CONTINUED 
UK 
firms 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
Activities in the potato industry supply chain 
Breeding 
• 
X 
X 
e 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Seed 
potato 
growing 
• 
X 
X 
X 
X 
e 
X 
Seed potato 
trade 
• 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
e 
X 
X 
Ware 
potato 
growing 
• 
X 
X 
9 
X 
Ware potato 
trade / pre-
packing 
• 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
e 
Potato 
processing 
• 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
e 
• = Involved in this activity, 100% ownership 
9 = Involved in this activity, partial ownership 
x Bold = Core business 
Appendix III 
The firms, their locations, and the interview types involved in the comparative analysis of inter-
firm relations in the UK and Dutch potato industry 
Firms in the Netherlands 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
Firm 
Agrico (NL) 
Aviko (NL) 
Eriva 
Farm Frites (NL) 
Hettema 
Koval 
McCain Foods (NL) 
Lamb-Weston/Meijer (NL) 
Nedato 
Schaap 
Van Rijn 
ZPC 
Location 
Emmeloord 
Steenderen 
Zeewolde 
Oudenhoorn 
Emmeloord 
Ittervoort 
Hoofddorp 
Kruiningen 
Oud-Beijerland 
Biddinghuizen 
's-Gravenzande 
Leeuwarden 
Interview 
type £ 
t> 
o 
t> 
t> 
s 
w
, t> 
t> 
w
, t> 
•B 
x} o 
'O' = Face-to-face interview 
" = Telephone interview 
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APPENDIX III CONTINUED 
Firms in the United Kingdom 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
Firm 
Anglian Produce 
Aberdeen Seed Potato Org. 
Baxter Avey 
Bird's Eye Walls 
Branston Potatoes 
Esk Frozen Foods 
Fenmarc Produce 
Fisher Frozen Foods 
Gordon & Innes 
Horberry & Baker 
Idwal Fisher 
MBM Produce 
McCain GB 
PBI Cambridge 
R&P Baker 
Smillie Ltd 
Worth & Co 
Location 
Loddon 
Aberdeen 
Castor 
Lowestoft 
Branston 
Montrose 
March 
Kings Lynn 
Alves 
Haxey 
Bradford 
March 
Scarborough 
Cambridge 
Norfolk 
Perth 
Fleet 
Interview 
type 
t > 
s 
v> 
$ 
t > 
o 
o 
"B 
o 
tV 
s 
s 
o £ 
tV 
s 
t > 
O1 = Face-to-face interview 
s
 = Telephone interview 
Appendix IV 
The selection of business associations in the UK and Dutch potato industry: 
locations and interview types. 
Dutch Business associations 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Commissie Aardappelen 
(CA) 
=> industry association 
Nederlandse Federatie Pootaardappelen 
(NFP) 
=> trade association 
Vereeniging ter Behartiging van den 
Nederlandschen Aardappelhandel (VBNA) 
= > trade association 
Vereniging voor de Aardappel Verwerkende 
Industrie (VAVI) 
=> trade association 
Location 
The Hague 
The Hague 
The Hague 
The Hague 
Interview 
type 
t> 
t> 
t> 
o 
UK Business associations 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
British Potato Council 
(BPC) 
=> industry association 
National Association of Seed Potato Merchants 
(NASPM) 
= > trade association 
Scottish Potato Trade Association 
(SPTA) 
= > trade association 
Potato Processors Association 
(PPA) 
= > trade association 
Location 
Oxford 
Ipswich 
Perth 
London 
Interview 
type 
t> 
•a 
"B 
t> 
£V = Face-to-face interview 
W = Telephone interview 
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Appendix V 
Interview protocol for firms (English version) 
Interview protocol 
# 
Firms in the UK Potato Industry 
2 , d k ^ t A * ^ ) 
Erasmus Uiuversitert Rotterdam 
Martyn F.L. Rademakers 
Rotterdam School of Management, F2-39 
Erasmus University Rotterdam 
PO Box 1738 
3000 DR Rotterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel:+31 10 408 2384 
Fax:+31 10 453 0137 
Name of the organisation 
Name of the respondent 
Date of the interview 
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I Level of vertical integration 
1. In which stage(s) of the potato supply chain does your firm operate? 
Please tic [V] 
Breeding 
[] not relevant 
[] activity 100% owned 
[] activity partially owned 
Seed potato growing 
[] not relevant 
[] activity 100% owned 
[] activity partially owned 
Seed potato trade 
[] not relevant 
[] activity 100% owned 
[] activity partially owned 
Ware potato growing 
[] not relevant 
[] activity 100% owned 
[] activity partially owned 
Ware potato packing and/or trade 
[] not relevant 
[] activity 100% owned 
[] activity partially owned 
Potato processing (pre-fried products) 
[] not relevant 
[] activity 100% owned 
[] activity partially owned 
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II The nature of inter-firm relations 
EXPLANATION 
On the next page(s) you will be asked to typify the nature of the buyer-supplier relations of 
your firm by making use of the following continuum: 
spot-market [] [] [] [] co-operative 
relations relations 
Characteristics of spot-market relations 
1. Information exchange limited to price, quality, and quantity 
2. No exchange of knowledge 
3. Relations based on formal contracts 
4. Short-term relations: limited to a single transaction/season; 
5. The price and quality are the major selection criteria for buyers/suppliers 
Characteristics of co-operative relations 
1. Information exchange, going beyond transactional information 
2. Exchange of knowledge 
3. Relations largely based on trust 
4. Long-term relations: time periods of more than 3 years 
5. Risk sharing (e.g., joint investments, joint operations, and/or joint R&D projects). 
Examples: 
spot-market [\] 
relations 
spot-market [] 
relations 
spot-market [] 
relations 
spot-market [] 
relations 
[] [] [] 
[V] [] [] 
[] [V] [] 
[] [] [V] 
co-operative => 
relations 
co-operative => 
relations 
co-operative => 
relations 
co-operative => 
relations 
The buyer-supplier 
relation is 
spot-market in nature 
The buyer-supplier 
relation is mainly spot-
market in nature 
but has co-operative 
features too 
The buyer-supplier 
relation is mainly co-
operative in nature 
but has spot-market 
features too 
The buyer-supplier 
relation is co-operative 
in nature 
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BUYER-SUPPLIER RELATIONS OF THE SEED POTATO MERCHANT 
* If your firm (or a part of it) is not a seed potato merchant, please go to the next page. 
Supply side: the relations of your firm.. 
with breeders 
spot-market [] [] [] [] 
relations 
co-operative 
relations 
not relevant O 
with seed potato farmers 
spot-market [] [] 
relations 
[] [] co-operative 
relations 
not relevant O 
Demand side: relations of your firm. 
with ware potato farmers 
spot-market [] [] [] 
relations 
co-operative 
relations 
not relevant O 
with ware potato merchants 
spot-market [] [] [] 
relations 
co-operative 
relations 
not relevant O 
with potato processors 
spot-market [] [] 
relations 
[] [] co-operative 
relations 
not relevant O 
with food retailers 
spot-market [] 
relations 
[] [] [] co-operative 
relations 
not relevant O 
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BUYER-SUPPLIER RELATIONS OF THE WARE POTATO MERCHANT / 
PACKER 
* If your firm (or a part of it) is not a ware potato merchant / packer, please go to 
the next page. 
Supply side: the relations of your firm.. 
with ware potato farmers 
spot-market [] [] [] [] 
relations 
co-operative 
relations 
not relevant O 
with seed potato merchants 
spot-market [] [] [] 
relations 
co-operative 
relations 
not relevant O 
Demand side: relations of your firm. 
with potato processors 
spot-market [] [] 
relations 
co-operative 
relations 
not relevant O 
with food retailers 
spot-market [] 
relations 
[] [] co-operative 
relations 
not relevant O 
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BUYER-SUPPLIER RELATIONS OF THE POTATO PROCESSOR 
* If your firm (or a part of it) is not a potato processor, please go to the next page. 
Supply side: the relations of your firm.. 
with breeders 
spot-market [] [] [] [] 
relations 
co-operative 
relations 
not relevant O 
with seed potato merchants 
spot-market [] [] [] 
relations 
co-operative 
relations 
not relevant O 
with ware potato farmers 
spot-market [] [] [] 
relations 
co-operative 
relations 
not relevant O 
with ware potato merchants 
spot-market [] [] [] 
relations 
co-operative 
relations 
not relevant O 
Demand side: relations of your firm. 
with food retailers 
spot-market [] 
relations 
[] 0 co-operative 
relations 
not relevant O 
with fast-food restaurant chains 
spot-market [] [] [] 
relations 
co-operative 
relations 
not relevant O 
with wholesalers 
spot-market [] 
relations 
[] [] co-operative 
relations 
not relevant O 
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III The basis of your company's inter-firm relations 
1. What is in general the basis of your firm's exchange relations? 
Supply side: [] Formal contracts 
0 standard contracts 
0 very precise contracts for every transaction 
[] Informal agreements 
0 based on personal relations 
0 based on previous experiences 
0 based on social control 
[] Combination formal contract and informal agreement 
0 agreements by telephone which are confirmed by fax 
0 other ways 
Demand side: [] Formal contracts 
0 standard contracts 
0 very precise contracts for every transaction 
[] Informal agreements 
0 based on personal relations 
0 based on previous experiences 
0 based on social control 
[] Combination formal contracts and informal agreement 
0 agreement by telephone which is later confirmed by fax 
0 other ways 
2. Is it easy or difficult for your firm to switch to another buyer or supplier? 
To another buyer: 
To another supplier: 
[] easy 
[] not very easy 
[] difficult 
[] easy 
[] not very easy 
[] difficult 
[] exceptions 
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3. What is (in general) the time span of your firm's buyer/supplier relations? 
supplier relations [] 0-1 year/season 
[] 1-2 years 
[] 2 or more years 0 stable relations 
0 repeated short-term 
contracts 
buyer relations [] 0-1 year 
[] 1-2 years 
[] 2 or more years —» 0 stable relations 
0 repeated short-term 
contracts 
[] exceptions: 
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IV Horizontal relations 
1. Has your firm any co-operative relations with competitors/colleagues? 
[]No 
[] Sometimes, or to a limited extend 
[] Yes => If this is the case, does this include: 
[] information sharing 
[] joint activities (e.g., a joint venture) 
[] joint research and development 
[] sharing of (parts of) the production capacity 
[] mutual share holdings 
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V Functions of trade/industry associations 
Please select the association(s) which are relevant to your firm (e.g., membership). 
Then circle the appropriate symbols to indicate the degree in which the function(s) 
mentioned are performed by the association(s). 
Symbols: + = function performed 
+/- = function more or less performed 
= function not performed 
Associations: BPC British Potato Council 
NASPM National Association of Seed Potato Merchants 
SPTA Scottish Potato Trade Association 
FPC Fresh Produce Consortium 
PPA Potato Processors Association 
APPENDIX V 233 
Associations relevant to [] [] [] [] [] others 
your firm => BPC NASPM SPTA FPC PPA 
Functions 
- The development of general 
rules and monitoring them 
- Arbitration in case of 
conflicts between firms 
• The reduction of destructive 
competition (e.g.: price 
dumping) 
- Diffusion of knowledge and 
information 
- Risk sharing through the 
initiation of joint activities 
- Initiation and co-ordination 
of actions in case of sector-
wide crises 
- Promotion of interests with 
respect to EU and national 
state policy 
- Meeting point where 
directors of competing firms 
discuss developments in their 
industry 
- Meeting point where 
directors of buying and 
supplying firms discuss 
developments in their 
industry 
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
+ +/- -
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VI General Information 
1. In which year was your firm established? 
In 
2. What is the number of employees of your firm? 
(approximately) 
3. What is the firm's rank in the market in terms of market share (e.g.: no. 1, 2, etc....)? 
(Estimation) 
4. What is the firm's annual turnover in terms of money or production? 
(Approximately) 
5. Is there a recent profile of the firm, an annual report and/or a company history 
available? 
END OF THE INTERVIEW 
MANY THANKS! 
Appendix VI 
Interview protocol for business associations (English version) 
Interview protocol 
# 
Business associations in the UK Potato Industry 
— Erasmus Uroversiteil Rotterdam 
Martyn F.L. Rademakers 
Rotterdam School of Management, F2-39 
Erasmus University Rotterdam 
PO Box 1738 
3000 DR Rotterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel:+31 10 408 2384 
Fax:+31 10 453 0137 
Name of the organisation 
Name of the respondent 
Date of the interview 
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INTRODUCTION 
Key question: 
What is the role of trade/industry associations in the UK and Dutch potato industry? 
Firms and flows in the potato supply chain 
polalosuply chain 
Trade/industry associations for firms (not farmers) in the potato industry 
1 Breeders' associations 
2 Seed potato merchants' associations 
3 Ware potato merchants' associations 
4 Packers' associations 
5 Potato processors' associations 
II QUESTIONS 
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1. When, by whom, and why was your organisation established? 
2. What are the most important activities of the organisation? 
3. What are the most important collective and/or individual services provided to the 
members of your organisation? 
4. Have any shifts occurred in the role played by your organisation in the past decade? 
• e.g.: change of objectives, more active vs. less active. 
5. Are there any formal/informal relations with other intermediary organisations in the 
potato industry? 
• If yes: what is the purpose and the content of these relations? 
6. Does your organisation play a role in the development of formal/informal inter-firm 
relations? 
7. What is the most important reason for firms to become a member of your 
organisation? 
8. What is your vision about the future role of your organisation in the potato 
industry? 
• For instance: new activities, internationalisation, increasing or decreasing 
importance. 
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III ACTIVITIES OF TRADE/INDUSTRY ASSOCIATIONS 
[V ] Please tic a box ('high', 'medium', or 'low') to indicate the relevance of 
the activities mentioned. Please motivate your choice. 
Relevance 
High Medium Low 
[] 0 [] 
[] [] [] 
[] [] [] 
[] [] [] 
Activities 
Reduction of uncertainties 
- The development of general rules and monitoring them 
- Arbitration in case of conflicts between firms 
- The reduction of destructive competition 
- Diffusion of knowledge and information 
High Medium Low 
[] [] [] 
[] [] [] 
Reduction of risks 
- The initiation of joint activities such as research projects 
- Initiation and co-ordination of actions in case of 
sector wide crises such as brown rot 
High Medium Low 
[] [] [] 
[] [] [] 
[] [] [] 
Industry cohesion 
- Promotion of interests with respect to governmental 
policies (national and European level) 
- Formal or informal meeting point for the directors of 
firms which are each other's competitors (horizontal 
cohesion) 
- Formal or informal meeting point for the directors of 
firms which operate in different stages of the supply 
chain (vertical cohesion). 
END OF THE INTERVIEW many thanks! 
Appendix VII 
Interview data about the nature of inter-firm relations in the UK potato industry 
UK firms 
Firm 
UK1 
UK2 
UK3 
UK4 
UK5 
Firm type 
Seed potato 
merchant 
Seed potato 
merchant 
Seed potato 
merchant 
Seed potato 
merchant 
Seed potato 
merchant 
Relation 
with: 
breeders 
s-farmers 
w-farmers 
w-merchants 
processors 
retailers 
breeders 
s-farmers 
w-farmers 
w-merchants 
processors 
retailers 
breeders 
s-farmers 
w-farmers 
w-merchants 
processors 
retailers 
breeders 
s-farmers 
w-farmers 
w-merchants 
processors 
retailers 
breeders 
s-farmers 
w-farmers 
w-merchants 
processors 
retailers 
Nature of the inter-firm 
relations 
1 
X 
X 
X 
2 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
3 
X 
X 
X 
4 
X 
X 
not 
relevant 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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UK6 
UK7 
UK8 
UK9 
UK10 
Seed potato 
merchant 
Seed potato 
merchant 
Seed potato 
merchant 
Ware potato 
merchant/packer 
Ware potato 
merchant/packer 
Ware potato 
merchant/packer 
breeders 
s-farmers 
w-farmers 
w-merchants 
processors 
retailers 
breeders 
s-farmers 
w-farmers 
w-merchants 
processors 
retailers 
breeders 
s-farmers 
w-farmers 
w-merchants 
processors 
retailers 
s-merchants 
w-farmers 
processors 
retailers 
s-merchants 
w-farmers 
processors 
retailers 
s-merchants 
w-farmers 
processors 
retailers 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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UK11 
UK12 
UK13 
Seed potato 
merchant 
Ware potato 
merchant/packer 
Seed potato 
merchant 
Ware potato 
merchant/packer 
Seed potato 
merchant 
Ware potato 
merchant/packer 
Potato 
Processor 
breeders 
s-farmers 
w-farmers 
w-merchants 
processors 
retailers 
s-merchants 
w-farmers 
processors 
retailers 
breeders 
s-farmers 
w-farmers 
w-merchants 
processors 
retailers 
s-merchants 
w-farmers 
processors 
retailers 
breeders 
s-farmers 
w-farmers 
w-merchants 
processors 
retailers 
s-merchants 
w-farmers 
processors 
retailers 
breeders 
s-merchants 
w-merchants 
w-farmers 
retailers 
fast-food rest. 
wholesalers 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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UK14 
UK15 
UK16 
UK17 
Potato 
Processor 
Potato 
Processor 
Potato 
Processor 
Potato 
Processor 
breeders 
s-merchants 
w-merchants 
w-farmers 
retailers 
fast-food rest. 
wholesalers 
breeders 
s-merchants 
w-merchants 
w-farmers 
retailers 
fast-food rest. 
wholesalers 
breeders 
s-merchants 
w-merchants 
w-farmers 
retailers 
fast-food rest. 
wholesalers 
breeders 
s-merchants 
w-merchants 
w-farmers 
retailers 
fast-food rest. 
wholesalers 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
1 = The buyer-supplier relation is spot-market in nature. 
2 = The buyer-supplier relation is mainly spot-market in nature 
but has some cooperative characteristics as well. 
3 = The buyer-supplier relation is mainly cooperative in nature 
but has some spot-market characteristics as well. 
4 = The buyer-supplier relation is cooperative in nature. 
Arial font = supply side 
Times font = demand side 
Italics font = core activity of the firm 
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Totals of the scores 
Total (abs.) 
Total % of 64 
Supply (abs.) 
Supply % of 30 
Demand (abs.) 
Demand % of 34 
1 
23 
36% 
11 
37% 
12 
35 
2 
21 
33% 
7 
23% 
14 
41 
3 
10 
16% 
3 
10% 
7 
21 
4 
10 
16% 
9 
30% 
1 
3 
not relevant 
60 
48% 
24 
44% 
37 
52 
Total possible relations: 125 (54 supply and 71 buyer relations) 
Criteria used to arrive at the scores 
Characteristics of spot-market relations 
1. Information exchange limited to price, quality, and quantity 
2. No exchange of knowledge 
3. Relations based on formal contracts 
4. Short-term relations: limited to discrete transactions and/or single seasons; 
5. The price and quality are the major selection criteria for buyers/suppliers 
Characteristics of cooperative relations 
1. Information exchange, going beyond transactional information 
2. Exchange of knowledge 
3. Relations for an important part based on mutual trust 
4. Long-term relations: time periods of more than 3 years 
5. Risk sharing (e.g., joint investments, joint operations, and/or joint R&D projects). 
Examples: 
spot-market [V] [] [] [] cooperative 
relations relations 
The buyer-supplier relation is spot-market in nature 
(4-5 of the spot-market characteristics are relevant, and 0-1 of the cooperative characteristics). 
spot-market [] [V] [] [] cooperative 
relations relations 
The buyer-supplier relation is mainly spot-market in nature but has cooperative features too. 
(3-4 spot-market and 1-2 cooperative characteristics are relevant). 
spot-market [] [] [V] [] cooperative 
relations relations 
The buyer-supplier relation is mainly cooperative in nature but has spot-market features too. 
(3-4 cooperative and 1 -2 spot-market characteristics are relevant). 
spot-market [] [] [] [V] cooperative 
relations relations 
The buyer-supplier relation is cooperative in nature. 
(4-5 of the cooperative characteristics are relevant, and 0-1 of the spot-market characteristics). 

Appendix VIII 
Interview data about the nature of inter-firm relations in the Dutch potato industry 
Dutch firms 
Firm 
Dl 
D2 
D3 
D4 
Firm type 
Seed potato 
merchant 
Seed potato 
merchant 
Ware potato 
merchant/packer 
Seed potato 
merchant 
Seed potato 
merchant 
Ware potato 
merchant/packer 
Relation 
with: 
breeders 
s-farmers 
w-farmers 
w-merchants 
processors 
retailers 
breeders 
s-farmers 
w-farmers 
w-merchants 
processors 
retailers 
s-merchants 
w-farmers 
processors 
retailers 
breeders 
s-farmers 
w-farmers 
w-merchants 
processors 
retailers 
breeders 
s-farmers 
w-farmers 
w-merchants 
processors 
retailers 
s-merchants 
w-farmers 
processors 
retailers 
Nature of the inter-firm 
relations 
1 2 3 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
4 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
not relevant 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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D5 
D6 
Seed potato 
merchant 
Ware potato 
merchant/packer 
Potato 
Processor 
Seed potato 
merchant 
Ware potato 
merchant/packer 
breeders 
s-farmers 
w-farmers 
w-merchants 
processors 
retailers 
s-merchants 
w-farmers 
processors 
retailers 
breeders 
s-merchants 
w-merchants 
w-farmers 
retailers 
fast-food rest. 
wholesalers 
breeders 
s-farmers 
w-farmers 
w-merchants 
processors 
retailers 
s-merchants 
w-farmers 
processors 
retailers 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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D7 
D8 
D9 
Seed potato 
merchant 
Ware potato 
merchant/packer 
Potato 
Processor 
Ware potato 
merchant/packer 
Potato 
Processor 
breeders 
s-farmers 
w-farmers 
w-merchants 
processors 
retailers 
s-merchants 
w-farmers 
processors 
retailers 
breeders 
s-merchants 
w-merchants 
w-farmers 
retailers 
fast-food rest. 
wholesalers 
s-merchants 
w-farmers 
processors 
retailers 
breeders 
s-merchants 
w-merchants 
w-farmers 
retailers 
fast-food rest. 
wholesalers 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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D10 
Dll 
D12 
Seed potato 
merchant 
Ware potato 
merchant/packer 
Potato 
Processor 
Potato 
Processor 
Potato 
Processor 
breeders 
s-farmers 
w-farmers 
w-merchants 
processors 
retailers 
s-merchants 
w-farmers 
processors 
retailers 
breeders 
s-merchants 
w-merchants 
w-farmers 
retailers 
fast-food rest. 
wholesalers 
breeders 
s-merchants 
w-merchants 
w-farmers 
retailers 
fast-food rest. 
wholesalers 
breeders 
s-merchants 
w-merchants 
w-farmers 
retailers 
fast-food rest. 
wholesalers 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
1 = The buyer-supplier relation is spot-market in nature. 
2 = The buyer-supplier relation is mainly spot-market in nature 
but has some cooperative characteristics as well. 
3 = The buyer-supplier relation is mainly cooperative in nature 
but has some spot-market characteristics as well. 
4 = The buyer-supplier relation is cooperative in nature. 
Arial font= supply side; Times font= demand side; Italics font = core activity of the firm 
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Totals of the scores 
Total (abs.) 
Total % of 78 
Supply (abs.) 
Supply % of 34 
Demand (abs.) 
Demand % of 44 
1 
5 
7% 
0 
0% 
5 
11% 
2 
11 
14% 
6 
18% 
5 
11% 
3 
28 
36% 
11 
32% 
17 
39% 
4 
34 
44% 
17 
50% 
17 
39% 
not relevant 
40 
34% 
18 
36% 
22 
33% 
Total possible relations: 118 (52 supply and 66 buyer relations) 
Criteria used to arrive at the scores 
Characteristics of spot-market relations 
1. Information exchange limited to price, quality, and quantity 
2. No exchange of knowledge 
3. Relations based on formal contracts 
4. Short-term relations: limited to discrete transactions and/or single seasons; 
5. The price and quality are the major selection criteria for buyers/suppliers 
Characteristics of cooperative relations 
1. Information exchange, going beyond transactional information 
2. Exchange of knowledge 
3. Relations for an important part based on mutual trust 
4. Long-term relations: time periods of more than 3 years 
5. Risk sharing (e.g., joint investments, joint operations, and/or joint R&D projects). 
Examples: 
spot-market [V] [] [] [] cooperative 
relations relations 
The buyer-supplier relation is spot-market in nature 
(4-5 of the spot-market characteristics are relevant, and 0-1 of the cooperative characteristics). 
spot-market [J [V] [] [] cooperative 
relations relations 
The buyer-supplier relation is mainly spot-market in nature but has cooperative features too. 
(3-4 spot-market and 1-2 cooperative characteristics are relevant). 
spot-market [] [] [V] [] cooperative 
relations relations 
The buyer-supplier relation is mainly cooperative in nature but has spot-market features too. 
(3-4 cooperative and 1-2 spot-market characteristics are relevant). 
spot-market [] [] [] [V] cooperative 
relations relations 
The buyer-supplier relation is cooperative in nature. 
(4-5 of the cooperative characteristics are relevant, and 0-1 of the spot-market characteristics). 

Appendix IX 
Functions of business associations in the UK potato industry 
Relevance of functions for UK trade associations 
according to potato firm managers (n=17) 
Meeting point vertically linked firms |6% 
Meeting point horizontally linked firms 
Promotion of interests 
Coordination if crisis occurs 
Coordination joint R&D 16% 18% 
Dissemination of information pSH29% 
Arbitration services I 
Development general rules I 
0% 100% 
I high • medium • low relevance 
Relevance of functions for UK trade associations 
according to their chairmen/secretaries 
Meeting point vertically linked firms 
Meeting point horizontally linked firms 
Promotion of interests 
Coordination if crisis occurs 
Coordination joint R&D 
Dissemination of information 
Arbitration services 
Development general rules 
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Functions of the industry association BPC 
according to UK potato firm managers (n=20) 
Meeting point vertically linked firms BSM 
Meeting point horizontally linked firms 
Promotion of interests 
Coordination if crisis occurs 
Coordination joint R&D 
Dissemination of information 
Arbitration services 
Development general rules 
0% 100% 
• High • Medium BLow 
Relevance of functions for the industry association 
according to a BPC manager 
Meeting point vertically linked firms 
Meeting point horizontally linked firms 
Promotion of interests 
Coordination if crisis occurs 
Coordination joint R&D 
Dissemination of information 
Arbitration services 
Development general rules 
Appendix X 
Functions of business associations in the Dutch potato industry 
Relevance of funct ions for Dutch trade associations according to 
potato firm managers (nmembership=25) 
Meeting point vertically linked firms H 1 
Meeting point horizontally linked firms 
Promotion of interests 
Coordination if crisis occurs 
Coordination joint R&D 
Dissemination of information 
Arbitration services 
Development general rules 
0% 100% 
I high • medium • low relevance 
Relevance of functions for Dutch trade associations 
according to their chairmen/secretaries 
Meeting point vertically linked firms 
Meeting point horizontally linked firms 
Promotion of interests 
Coordination if crisis occurs 
Coordination joint R&D 
Dissemination of information 
Arbitration services 
Development general rules 
• high Dmedium Blow relevance 
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Relevance of functions for industry association CA 
according to its secretary 
Meeting point vertically L _ ^ _ ^ _ ^ _ ^ _ ^ _ ^ _ _ 
linked firms ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Meeting point • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
horizontally linked firms ^ " ^ " ^ " ^ " ^ " * 
Arbitration services | 
Low Medium High 
Functions of the industry association CA 
according to potato firm managers (n=7) 
Meeting point vertically linked firms 
Meeting point horizontally linked firms 
Promotion of interests 
Coordination if crisis occurs 
Coordination joint R&D 
Dissemination of information 
Arbitration services 
Development general rules 
0% 100% 
I High • Medium BLow 
Appendix XI 
Congress papers with preliminary findings of the research project, presented to 
practitioners and/or scholars1 
Published congress papers 
Rademakers, M.F.L. (1999), Same Structures, Different Roles: Business Associations in the 
Dutch and UK Agri-Food Industry. Proceedings of the 151h EGOS Colloquium: 
'Organizations in a Challenging World: Theories, Practices and Societies', July 4-6, 
Warwick, UK (forthcoming). 
Rademakers, M.F.L. (1999), Agents of Trust: Dutch and British Business Associations in 
Networks of Agri-Food Firms. Proceedings of the IAMA World Food and Agribusiness 
Congress: 'Building Trust in the Agro-Food System: Trade, Technology and 
Competitivenes', June 13-16, Florence, Italy, (forthcoming). 
Rademakers, M.F.L. (1999), Different Environments, Different Links: Inter-Firm Relations in 
the UK and Dutch Agri-Food Industry. Proceedings of the 5'h National LAiOOB Conference: 
'Go with the Flow- Management Hypes and Hype Management', February 25, Amersfoort, 
the Netherlands, pp. 205-214. 
Rademakers M.F.L. (1998), Authority as Inter-firm Co-ordination Mechanism in Different 
Institutional Settings: The Dutch and UK potato industry compared. Proceedings of the 14"' 
EGOS Colloquium: 'Stretching the Boundaries of Organization Studies into the Next 
Millenium'. July 9-11, Maastricht, the Netherlands, pp. 18-19. 
Rademakers, M.F.L. (1998), Inter-firm Co-operation in Agribusiness: Towards a Framework 
for Cross-national Analysis. In: Ziggers, G.W., J.H.Trienekens, P.J.P. Zuurbier, 
Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Chain Management in Agribusiness 
and the Food Industry, May 28-29, Wageningen, the Netherlands, pp. 903-910. 
Rademakers, M.F.L. (1997), Internationalisation and Concentration of Food Supply Systems: 
implications for firms in the European Potato Sector, Proceedings of the conference 
'Globalisation of the Food Industry: Policy Implications', September 18-19, Reading, 
England, pp.456-480. 
1
 EGOS = European Group for Organization Studies 
IAMA = International Food and Agribusiness Association 
SMS = Strategic Management Society 
EMOT = European Management and Organization in Transition 
LAiOOB = Landelijk AiO-Overleg Bedrijfskunde 
(national platform for doctoral students of management and organization) 
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Rademakers, M.F.L. (1996), Transformation of Management and Organisation in 
Agribusiness: Towards a Framework for Analysing the Creation of Competitive 
Governance Structures. Proceedings of the 4th National LAiOOB Conference 'Grenzen aan 
Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek: Kaders van Theoretisch en Ontwerpgericht Onderzoek', 
November 27, Amersfoort, the Netherlands, pp. 41-50. 
Bosch, F.A.J, van den, C.P. Veerman, M.F.L. Rademakers (1996), Managing the Boundaries 
of Firms in Agribusiness: Managerial Aspects of Corporate Governance Concerning 
Vertical and Horizontal Integration. Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on 
Chain Management in Agri- and Food Business, May 30-31, Wageningen, the Netherlands, 
pp. 603-605. 
Refereed but unpublished congress papers 
Rademakers, M.F.L., Distinct Institutions, Different Links: Supply Relations in the UK and 
Dutch Agro-Food Industry. Interactive paper for the Academy of Management Conference: 
Change and Development Journeys into a Pluralistic World, August 8-11, 1999, Chicago, 
USA. 
Rademakers, M.F.L., Cross-national Analysis of Inter-firm Collaboration: The Dutch and UK 
potato industry compared. Paper for the Mercosur IAMA World Food and Agribusiness 
Congress: Building Relationships to Feed the World, June 28, 1998, Punta del Este, 
Uruguay. 
Rademakers, M.F.L., Managing the Renewal of Inter-firm Relations in European 
Agribusiness: A Framework for Analysis, Paper for the 17th. SMS Annual International 
Conference: Managing in an Interconnected World, 5-8 October 1997, Barcelona, Spain. 
Rademakers, M.F.L., Managing & Creating Inter-firm Relationships in European 
Agribusiness. Paper presented at the EMOT Summer School: The Comparative Analysis of 
Changing Management and Organisation in Europe, August 22-27, 1997, Helsinki, 
Finland. 
Rademakers, M.F.L., Changing Inter-firm Relations in European Agribusiness: towards a 
framework for cross-national comparative analysis. Paper presented at the EMOT Summer 
School: The Relational Perspective in Organizational Research: Concepts and Research 
Methods, September 16-20, 1997, Bologna, Italy. 


Samenvat t ing (summary in Dutch) 
1 Inleiding 
Samenwerking tussen bedrijven heeft in het afgelopen decennium veel aandacht 
gekregen in de management- en organisatieliteratuur. Dat komt omdat bedrijven 
concurrentievoordeel kunnen behalen door samen te werken met leveranciers, afnemers, 
concurrenten en/of ondememingen uit andere industrietakken. De huidige literatuur 
over samenwerking tussen bedrijven behandelt een zeer breed scala van vormen, typen 
en ontwikkelingen op dit vlak. Dit wordt bovendien gedaan vanuit diverse 
gezichtspunten, benaderingen en disciplines. Desondanks is er tot op heden weinig 
aandacht besteed aan de invloed van sociale instituties op de ontwikkeling van 
samenwerking tussen bedrijven. Dit is opmerkelijk, gegeven de groeiende consensus 
onder management- en organisatiewetenschappers dat sociale instituties de 
ontwikkeling van economische organisatievormen in belangrijke mate beinvloeden. In 
dit verband worden sociale instituties beschouwd als complexe cognitieve, normatieve 
en regulatieve structuren en activiteiten die na verloop van tijd een zekere stabiliteit 
gekregen hebben. Deze instituties geven betekenis aan sociaal gedrag. Voorbeelden zijn 
wetten, culturele conventies en financiele systemen. Vanuit een bedrijfskundig 
perspectief kunnen sociale instituties beschouwd worden als factoren die de percepties 
en interacties van managers kanaliseren. Daardoor beinvloeden zij ook de ontwikkeling 
van inter-organisationele structuren. 
ONDERZOEKSVRAGEN. Het onderzoek dat ten grondslag ligt aan dit proefschrift is 
bedoeld om kennis te genereren over hoe dominante sociale instituties (sociale 
kerninstituties) de ontwikkeling van samenwerking tussen bedrijven beinvloeden. 
Ofwel: wat is de invloed van sociale kerninstituties op de ontwikkeling van 
259 
260 SAMENVATT1NG 
samenwerking tussen bedrijven? Deze centrale vraag valt uiteen in drie verschillende 
deelvragen. Ten eerste: Wat zijn de belangrijkste attributen van horizontale en verticale 
samenwerking tussen bedrijven? Ten tweede: Van welke sociale instituties kan 
verondersteld worden dat deze de ontwikkeling van samenwerkingsrelaties tussen 
bedrijven bei'nvloeden? Ten derde: Wat is het karakter van de sociale keminstituties 
waardoor zij de ontwikkeling van samenwerkingsrelaties tussen bedrijven bemoeilijken 
of juist aanmoedigen? Deze vragen worden in dit proefschrift behandeld. 
2 Theorie 
DE RELEVANTIE VAN SAMENWERKING. Een verkenning van de management- en 
organisatieliteratuur leert dat samenwerking tussen bedrijven een belangrijk onderwerp 
is dat zowel management als wetenschap bezig houdt. Via goed gestuurde en 
georganiseerde vormen van samenwerking blijken bedrijven in staat te zijn hun 
innovatiekracht, responsiesnelheid, efficiency en/of strategische vaardigheden te 
vergroten en hun strategische marktpositie(s) te verbeteren. 
MARKTEN, HIERARCHIEEN EN NETWERKEN. Door te verwijzen naar werkelijk bestaande 
vormen van samenwerking die in de literatuur beschreven staan, kan worden 
aangegeven dat samenwerkingsarrangementen tussen bedrijven doorgaans een mix van 
karakteristieken in zich herbergen van ideaaltypische netwerken, markten en 
hierarchieen. Op basis van dezelfde literatuur kan worden gedestilleerd dat er een breed 
scala van sterk verschillende samenwerkingsvormen bestaat in diverse industrietakken 
van verschillende landen. 
PARADIGMA'S EN POSITIONERING. De literatuur op het gebied van samenwerking tussen 
bedrijven is zeer uitgebreid maar ook sterk gefragmenteerd. Dat komt doordat 
onderzoek over dit onderwerp is (en wordt) gedaan op basis van veel verschillende 
theorieen en methoden. Daarbij komt dat er gewerkt wordt met verschillende 
analyseniveaus. Desondanks kan het zeer brede onderzoeksveld onderverdeeld worden 
in slechts twee paradigma's: het 'bestuurs' en het 'sociale netwerk' paradigma. Het 
onderzoek in dit proefschrift kan in het 'bestuursparadigma' geplaatst worden en dan in 
het bijzonder in de 'institutionele theorie' variant hiervan. Een nog nauwkeuriger 
positionering van dit onderzoek wordt verkregen door dieper in te gaan op het 
gehanteerde perspectief op sociale instituties. Dit perspectief komt overeen met recente, 
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hoofdzakelijk Europese stromingen in het denken over sociale instituties en hun invloed 
op vormen van economische organisatie. Deze stromingen beschouwen sociale 
instituties als fenomenen met een hoofdzakelijk nationaal-specifiek karaker. Hierin 
verschilt het perspectief van andere benaderingen waarin bijvoorbeeld ook bedrijven als 
sociale instituties worden beschouwd en geanalyseerd, of waarin men zich beperkt tot 
formele wetten en organisatiestructuren. 
3 Constructie van het analysekader 
ANALYSEKADERS VOOR VERGELIJKEND ONDERZOEK. In de literatuur zijn vier 
hoofdbenaderingen te onderscheiden die gebruikt worden om internationaal 
vergelijkende studies te maken van economische organisatievormen in hun 
institutionele context. De vier benaderingen staan bekend als de 'societal approach', de 
'societal logic approach', de 'comparative capitalism approach' en de 'business systems 
approach'. Ze verschillen aanzienlijk van elkaar voor wat betreft hun primaire 
aandachtsgebied, gebruikte analysekaders, methoden en niveaus van analyse. Een 
overeenkomst is dat in alle vier de benaderingen aandacht wordt besteed aan zowel de 
aard als de historische wortels van sociale instituties, gezien vanuit een nationaal 
perspectief. 
HET 'MARKET ORGANIZATION FRAMEWORK'. De benadering die het beste past als 
conceptuele basis voor het onderzoek is de 'business systems approach'. Deze 
benadering verschaft een analysekader, bekend als het 'market organization 
framework', dat het mogelijk maakt om karakteristieken van samenwerkingsrelaties op 
een systematische manier in verband te brengen met een set van sociale kerninstituties. 
Het analysekader voor dit onderzoek is een aangepaste en verder uitgewerkte versie van 
dit 'framework'. Het resultaat is een analysekader waarin onderscheid gemaakt wordt 
tussen verticale en horizontale samenwerkingsverbanden enerzijds, en bilaterale en 
multilaterale samenwerkingsverbanden anderzijds (zie de onderstaande matrix). 
Matrix: Vormen van samenwerking tussen bedrijven 
Verticaal 
Horizontaal 
Bilateraal 
Relaties tussen klant en 
leverancier 
Relaties tussen twee 
concurrenten 
Multilateral 
Industrieorganisaties 
Brancheorganisaties 
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DE KERNATTRIBUTEN VAN SAMENWERKING. De belangrijkste attributen van de bilaterale 
samenwerkingsrelaties zijn nader gespecificeerd door deze uit te drukken in termen van 
de inhoud van 'hoofdstromen' tussen organisaties. Deze 'stromen' omvatten informatie-
uitwisseling, wederzijds vertrouwen, en middelen en activiteiten. Deze concepten 
helpen om onderscheid te maken tussen verticale samenwerkingsrelaties en het 
tegengestelde daarvan: korte-termijn relaties (of: gelegenheidsrelaties). Daarnaast kan 
aan de hand van deze 'stromen' ook de mate en wijze van samenwerking tussen 
concurrenten in kaart gebracht worden. De multilaterale vormen van samenwerking 
worden in het analysekader onderscheiden in brancheorganisaties en industrie-
organisaties. Brancheorganisaties brengen concurrerende bedrijven samen, terwijl 
industrieorganisaties bedrijven in de verschillende stappen van de waardeketen met 
elkaar verbinden. De relevantie van deze vormen van multilaterale samenwerking wordt 
in het analysekader behandeld door in te gaan op het ledental (volledige of gedeeltelijke 
vertegenwoordiging), hun wettelijke bevoegdheden en de functies die deze organisaties 
uitoefenen. 
SOCIALE KERNINSTITUTIES. Het analysekader omvat ook een viertal sociale kerninstituties 
waarvan verondersteld wordt dat zij een belangrijke invloed kunnen hebben op de 
ontwikkeling van samenwerkingsverbanden tussen bedrijven. Hieronder bevinden zich 
instituties die de culturele en historische achtergrond van maatschappijen weerspiegelen. 
Daarnaast zijn er instituties die direct betrokken zijn bij economische activiteiten omdat 
ze gedeeltelijke of volledige controle uitoefenen over de toegang van bedrijven tot 
bedrijfsmiddelen, eigendomsrechten en de politiek. 
De vier sociale kerninstituties in het analysekader zijn: 1) mechanismen om vertrouwen 
te genereren, 2) de legitimiteit van collectivistisch versus individualistisch gedrag, 3) de 
betrokkenheid van de overheid in de industrie en 4) het financiele systeem. Het karakter 
van deze instituties kan van land tot land en ook van industrie tot industrie verschillen. 
Mechanismen om vertrouwen te genereren kunnen onderverdeeld worden in 'proces' 
(vertrouwen opgebouwd op basis van ervaringen in het verleden), 'karakteristiek' 
(vertrouwen op basis van groepskenmerken) en 'institutioneel' (vertrouwen op basis 
van formele, afdwingbare wetten). Het karakter van deze sociale keminstitutie bepaalt 
in belangrijke mate waarop de relaties tussen bedrijven gebaseerd zijn. Het karakter van 
de tweede sociale keminstitutie weerspiegelt het relatieve gemak waarmee bedrijven 
wederzijdse toewijding en loyaliteit kunnen genereren. De derde sociale keminstitutie 
wordt in het analysekader opgesplitst in drie verschillende typen. Dit zijn de 
SUMMARY IN DUTCH 263 
'ontwikkelende', 'faciliterende' en de 'laissez-faire' overheidstypen. De 'ontwikkelende 
overheid' is zeer actief en direct betrokken bij de ontwikkeling van de industrie. Door 
de sterke bemoeienis is een dergelijke overheid een belangrijke bron van (on)zekerheid 
voor bedrijven. De 'faciliterende overheid' ondersteunt de ontwikkeling van de 
industrie, doch de belangrijkste initiatieven worden overgelaten aan het bedrijfsleven. 
De overheid creeert een zekere stabiliteit in de bedrijfsomgeving en moedigt zelfbestuur 
aan. De overheid van het 'laissez-faire' type laat de ontwikkeling van de industrie over 
aan marktkrachten. In een dergelijke situatie is de bedrijfsomgeving niet of slechts 
weinig gestructureerd. De vierde en laatste sociale kerninstitutie, het financiele systeem, 
wordt onderscheiden in twee typen: het kredietsysteem en het kapitaalsysteem. De 
eigenschap van het kredietsysteem is dat lange-termijn leningen, verstrekt door banken, 
de belangrijkste manier vormen voor bedrijven om in hun kapitaalbehoefte te voorzien. 
Hierdoor kunnen managers voor hun investeringen met relatief lange tijdshorizonten 
werken. De belangrijkste eigenschap van het kapitaalsysteem is dat bedrijven voor hun 
investeringen aangewezen zijn op ingehouden winsten of zeer liquide kapitaalmarkten, 
wat een korte-termijn houding van managers in de hand werkt. 
Het karakter en de mogelijke invloed van sociale kerninstituties zijn hierboven 
afzonderlijk van elkaar behandeld, maar het moet benadrukt worden dat bij de analyse 
hun gezamenlijke invloed in beschouwing genomen dient te worden. 
PROPOSITUS. Op basis van het analysekader zijn een vijftal proposities geformuleerd 
over de invloed van combinaties van sociale kerninstituties - met een verschillend 
karakter - op de ontwikkeling van samenwerking tussen bedrijven. Deze proposities 
beslaan twee extremen en drie middenposities op een continuum. Bij dit continuum 
worden de uiteinden gemarkeerd door combinaties van sociale kerninstituties die 
zodanig van karakter zijn dat ze tezamen of een sterk faciliterende of juist een sterk 
hinderende omgeving vormen voor de ontwikkeling van samenwerking tussen 
bedrijven. 
4 Methodologie 
Dit onderzoek is uitgevoerd als een internationaal vergelijkende casestudie. De te 
vergelijken cases betreffen de aardappelsectoren in Nederland en het Verenigd 
Koninkrijk en bestaan uit gedetailleerde beschrijvingen van hoe en in welke mate 
bedrijven daar met elkaar samenwerken. Bovendien omvatten de cases per land een 
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beschrijving van de karaktertrekken van de sociale keminstituties, bezien vanuit het 
perspectief van de Industrie. 
Het onderzoeksproces is uitgevoerd volgens een proces dat een voortdurende interactie 
tussen theorie en praktijk weerspiegelde. In 1997 en 1998 zijn gegevens verzameld over 
twaalf Nederlandse en zeventien Britse bedrijven. Deze bedrijven tezamen domineren 
de aardappelsectoren van beide landen met gezamenlijke marktaandelen tot meer dan 
80% voor iedere stap in de waardeketen. Naast de aardappelbedrijven zijn in ieder land 
ook vier aardappelorganisaties in het onderzoek opgenomen. De gegevens werden 
verkregen door half gestructureerde, persoonlijke interviews. Extra gegevens werden 
verkregen uit secundaire bronnen. De analyse van deze gegevens vond plaats volgens 
een 'gesjabloneerde analyse', waarbij een lijst van kemconcepten (afgeleid van het 
analysekader) werd gebruikt om alle data te scannen, te categoriseren en te 
hergroeperen. De resultaten van de analyse werden vergeleken met de proposities die op 
basis van het analytische kader geformuleerd waren om op die manier te komen tot 
analytische generalisaties en conclusies. 
5 Resultaten van de veldstudie 
VERKENNING VAN DE SECTOR. De aardappelsector houdt zich in grote lijnen bezig met de 
productie van uitgangsmateriaal, de productie en distributie van consumptieaardappelen 
en aardappelverwerking. In beide landen wordt de aardappelsector gedomineerd door 
een relatief klein aantal bedrijven. Opmerkelijk is dat Nederlandse aardappelbedrijven 
zeer succesvol zijn in het buitenland. Dit is in tegenstelling tot hun tegenhangers in het 
Verenigd Koninkrijk, die meer gericht zijn op hun thuismarkt. De belangrijkste 
structurele veranderingen in de aardappelsector in de laatste helft van de 20e eeuw 
waren de grootschalige mechanisatie van de aardappelteelt, de internationalisatie van de 
markt voor aardappelen en aardappelproducten, de opkomst van aardappelverwerkers 
als dominante spelers in de sector, de introductie van het kwekersrecht, veranderende 
voorkeuren van consumenten, en de groeiende marktmacht van het grootwinkelbedrijf 
en de fastfood ketens. 
BEVINDINGEN OVER DE NEDERLANDSE AARDAPPELSECTOR. Samenwerking tussen 
Nederlandse aardappelbedrijven is relatief sterk ontwikkeld. Dit wordt weerspiegeld 
door de bevinding dat verticale, bilaterale samenwerkingsrelaties domineren over korte-
termijn relaties. De uitwisseling van kennis en informatie in de verticale relaties van de 
bedrijven overstijgt doorgaans het niveau van de transactie zelf. De relaties zijn voor het 
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grootste dee] gebaseerd op wederzijds verlrouwen dat geworteld is in reputatie, sociale 
controle en persoonlijke contacten. Formele contracten worden praktisch altijd gebruikt, 
doch vooral als een praktische manier om transacties af te wikkelen en niet zozeer om 
vertrouwen te genereren. De transacties tussen Nederlandse aardappelbedrijven zijn 
doorgaans ingebed in lange-termijn relaties waarbij zowel pragmatische als meer 
duurzame vormen van risicodeling tussen afnemers en leveranciers voorkomen. De 
bedrijven die de Nederlandse aardappelindustrie domineren zijn bijna allemaal gericht 
op een of twee opeenvolgende activiteiten in de waardeketen. Een minderheid van 
dominante aardappelbedrijven is volledig verticaal gei'ntegreerd. De graad van 
zelfvoorziening is over het algemeen vrij laag. 
In de Nederlandse aardappelsector is, ondanks de hevige onderlinge concurrentie, 
samenwerking tussen concurrenten en vrij normaal verschijnsel. Deze samenwerking is 
vaak pragmatisch maar soms ook strategisch van aard. De algemene tendens is dat (de 
managers van) bedrijven elkaar als concurrenten beschouwen, maar ook als collegae. 
Multilaterale horizontale samenwerking in de vorm van brancheorganisaties is sterk 
ontwikkeld. In de Nederlandse aardappelsector verzorgen de brancheorganisaties een 
breed scala van functies en diensten voor hun leden. De versterking van de horizontale 
cohesie in de industrie wordt door de ondervraagde managers als een van de 
belangrijkste functies van deze organisaties beschouwd. Het ledenbestand van de 
brancheorganisaties omvat een grote meerderheid van (en soms praktisch alle) bedrijven 
die actief zijn in een bepaalde stap van de waardeketen. Lidmaatschap is op vrijwillige 
basis. De brancheorganisaties hebben zelf geen wetgevende bevoegdheden, maar 
kunnen wel via een indirecte weg algemeen geldende regels voor hun leden ontwikkelen 
en laten bewaken. De enige industrieorganisatie in de Nederlandse aardappelsector, die 
gefinancierd wordt op basis van heffingen, wordt door de meesje managers als een 
anachronisme beschouwd. De activiteiten en de omvang van deze organisatie zijn op 
initiatief van de aardappelbedrijven in de jaren '90 dan ook sterk ingekrompen. 
BEVINDINGEN OVER DE AARDAPPELSECTOR IN HET VERENIGD KONINKRIJK. Samenwerking 
tussen bedrijven in het Verenigd Koninkrijk blijkt niet erg sterk ontwikkeld te zijn. 
Korte-termijn relaties domineren sterk over samenwerkingsrelaties tussen kopende en 
verkopende partijen. Meer dan driekwart van die verticale relaties zijn volgens de 
ondervraagde managers van het korte-termijn type. Informatie-uitwisseling is beperkt 
tot de transactie, terwijl kennisuitwisseling doorgaans niet van toepassing is. De relaties 
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met leveranciers zijn over het algemeen gebaseerd op combinaties van formele en 
informele contracten en afspraken. De relaties met afnemers (in het bijzonder de 
supermarkten en verwerkers) zijn vrijwel zonder uitzondering gebaseerd op nauw 
gespecificeerde contracten. De verticale relaties duren even lang als het contract geldig 
is. Desalniettemin komen ook lange-termijn relaties voor, die bestaan uit opeenvolgende 
korte-termijn contracten. Daarnaast blijken dominante aardappelbedrijven in het 
Verenigd Koninkrijk in hoge mate verticaal gei'ntegreerd te zijn en een groot vermogen 
te hebben om zichzelf te bedruipen. 
Ook horizontale samenwerking tussen aardappelbedrijven in het Verenigd Koninkrijk 
komt slechts in zeer beperkte mate voor. Er is sprake van enkele joint ventures, maar 
andere mogelijke vormen van horizontale samenwerking zijn zeldzaam. 
De activiteiten van brancheorganisaties worden door de managers grotendeels 
onbelangrijk gevonden. Uitzonderingen zijn lobby-activiteiten en informatieversprei-
ding. Het ledenbestand van deze organisaties is gefragmenteerd. Damaast hebben ze 
geen wetgevende bevoegdheden. Verrassend is dat er wel een zeer actieve en door de 
managers van aardappelbedrijven ook relevant gevonden industrieorganisatie actief is. 
De bedrijven zijn verplicht om heffingen aan deze organisatie te betalen waarmee 
collectieve activiteiten gefinancierd worden. 
6 Vergelijking en discussie van de bevindingen 
De patronen die de mate en wijze van samenwerking in de aardappelsectoren van 
Nederland en het Verenigd Koninkrijk weerspiegelen, blijken nagenoeg tegengestelden 
van elkaar te zijn. Deze bevindingen kunnen voor een belangrijk deel verklaard en 
begrepen worden door de invloed van het nationaal-specifieke karakter van sociale 
kerninstituties in beschouwing te nemen. 
SOCIALE KERNINSTITUTIES IN NEDERLAND. De institutionele omgeving van de Nederlandse 
aardappelsector kan als sterk faciliterend van karakter beschouwd worden met 
betrekking tot de ontwikkeling van samenwerking tussen bedrijven. 
De betrokkenheid van de overheid is van het faciliterende type. De Nederlandse 
agrarische sector wordt ondersteund door substantiate overheidsinvesteringen in 
kennisontwikkeling en infrastructuur. Verder hebben Nederlandse aardappelbedrijven 
veel ruimte om via zelfbestuur initiatieven te ontplooien ter versterking en verdere 
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ontwikkeling van hun sector. Het financiele systeem in de Nederlandse agrarische sector 
is hoofdzakelijk van het kredietsysteem type. De toegang tot middellange en lange-
termijn leningen stelt managers in staat om bij investeringen met lange tijdshorizonten 
te werken. Bovendien kunnen de Nederlandse managers in hun uitwisselingsrelaties met 
andere bedrijven vertrouwen genereren op basis van een formed wetsysteem, 
persoonhjke reputatie en sociale controle. Tenslotte beschouwen de meeste managers 
van Nederlandse aardappelbedrijven individualistisch gedrag, in termen van het 
uitsluitend najagen van eigenbelang ten koste van anderen, als niet legitiem. 
Samenwerking wordt als een veel vruchtbaarder manier van werken beschouwd. 
SOCIALE KERNINSTITUTIES IN HET VERENIGD KONINKRUK. De institutionele omgeving van 
aardappelbedrijven in het Verenigd Koninkrijk is aanzienlijk minder stimulerend van 
karakter voor de ontwikkeling van samenwerking tussen bedrijven. 
De Britse overheid heeft decennia lang de nationale aardappelindustrie gereguleerd via 
een quotasysteem. Een quasi-overheidsorganisatie zorgde voor de uitvoering van dit 
marktregime. Hierdoor was de overheid een belangrijke bron van (on)zekerheid voor de 
betrokken bedrijven. Het is zeer waarschijnlijk dat dit marktregime, dat pas in 1997 
opgeheven werd, de ontwikkeling van samenwerkingsrelaties voor aardappelbedrijven 
irrelevant maakte omdat de afzet en aanvoer van aardappelen grotendeels door de 
marktordening gegarandeerd werd. De betrokkenheid van de overheid in de industrie 
veranderde na 1997 echter van het 'regulerende' naar het 'laissez-faire' type. De quasi-
overheidsorganisatie die het marktregime uitvoerde werd opgeheven, maar daarna op 
aandringen van het bedrijfsleven in de (afgeslankte) vorm van een industrieorganisatie 
voortgezet. Het ontbreken van enige traditie van samenwerking en de toegenomen 
onzekerheid lijkt de bedrijven in deze omstandigheden te stimuleren om hun 
zelfvoorzieningsgraad verder op te voeren en de onderlinge concurrentieverhoudingen 
verder aan te scherpen. Het financiele systeem in het Verenigd Koninkrijk is van het 
'kapitaalsysteem' type. Bedrijven zijn daardoor voor hun kapitaalbehoefte aangewezen 
op ingehouden winsten, korte-termijn leningen en, indien mogelijk, op de uitgifte van 
aandelen. Het gebruik van extern kapitaal vereist korte-termijn resultaten en dwingt 
managers om met een korte tijdshorizon te werken. Mechanismen om vertrouwen 
tussen zakenpartners te genereren zijn in het Verenigd Koninkrijk niet erg sterk 
ontwikkeld, wat de ontwikkeling van samenwerkingsrelaties bemoeilijkt. In het 
bijzonder de kleinere bedrijven hebben te kampen met de onzekerheden die het Britse 
'case-law' systeem met zich meebrengt. Daarnaast vormen persoonhjke reputatie en 
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sociale controle geen relevante basis voor vertrouwen tussen bedrijven. Daar komt bij 
dat individualistisch gedrag, ofwel het najagen van eigenbelang ten koste van anderen 
een normaal verschijnsel gevonden wordt. Het is zeer waarschijnlijk dat dit de 
ontwikkeling van korte-termijn relaties en scherpe concurrentieverhoudingen stimuleert 
en pogingen tot samenwerking ontmoedigt. 
TERUGKOPPELING NAAR DE PROPOSITIES. De resultaten van de vergelijkende studie 
ondersteunen twee van de vijf proposities die eerder op basis van het analysekader 
geformuleerd werden. De bevindingen over de Nederlandse aardappelsector 
weerspiegelen de vrijwel ideaaltypische propositie 1, terwijl de situatie die aangetroffen 
werd in het Verenigd Koninkrijk de andere extreme propositie, nummer 2, ondersteunt. 
De bruikbaarheid van de onderzoeksresultaten om de overige drie proposities te 
behandelen is beperkt. Dit komt omdat de twee 'nationale' cases de proposities 
ondersteunen die de extremen vertegenwoordigen van een continuum waarop de overige 
drie proposities middenposities innemen. De behandeling van de overige drie 
proposities vereist daarom verder onderzoek. 
7 Conclusies 
De empirische bevindingen van dit onderzoek laten zien dat het karakter van sociale 
kerninstituties nationaal-specifiek kan zijn, maar ook specifiek kan wezen voor sectoren 
binnen een bepaald land. Het unieke institutionele karakter van de Nederlandse agro-
voedingsindustrie ten opzichte van de nationale context als geheel illustreert dit. Deze 
observatie steunt de bevindingen uit eerdere onderzoeken die in de literatuur te vinden 
zijn en ook het argument dat kapitalistische systemen uitstekend onderzocht kunnen 
worden door analyses uit te voeren vanuit het perspectief van de industrie. Dit betekent 
echter niet dat daarmee het discours over nationale 'business systems' minder relevant 
is. Het betekent eerder dat vormen van samenwerking binnen bepaalde industrietakken 
of sectoren kunnen afwijken van de patronen die op nationaal niveau te onderkennen 
zijn. De resultaten laten ook zien dat de gecombineerde invloed van sociale 
kerninstituties met een nationaal-specifiek karakter de ontwikkeling van 
samenwerkingsrelaties tussen bedrijven in belangrijke mate kunnen faciliteren of juist 
ontmoedigen. 
IMPLICATES VOOR MANAGEMENT. Er is een aantal suggesties voor managers te 
formuleren op basis van de uitkomsten van dit onderzoek. In de eerste plaats kunnen 
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managers voordeel behalen door bij het ontwikkelen van hun strategische plannen 
rekening te houden met de 'fit' tussen de manier waarop zij hun relaties met andere 
ondernemingen inrichten en het karakter van de institutionele omgeving waarin zij 
opereren. Ten tweede kunnen managers het risico van falen van samenwerkingsrelaties 
in het buitenland verminderen door rekening te houden met invloeden uit de 
institutionele omgeving. Ten derde kunnen managers van bedrijven hun 
concurrentiepositie verbeteren door invloed uit te oefenen op het karakter van sociale 
kerninstituties die een directe impact hebben op de industrie. 
IMPLICATES VOOR DE AGRO-VOEDINGSINDUSTRIE. Er zijn ook gevolgtrekkingen te 
formuleren die relevant zijn voor bedrijven in de agro-voedingsindustrie. Door 
structurele verschuivingen in het karakter van sociale kerninstituties in deze 
economische sector veranderen de 'spelregels' voor het behalen van concurrentiekracht. 
In de Nederlandse agro-voedingsindustrie wordt het karakter van de institutionele 
omgeving steeds minder bevorderlijk voor samenwerkingvormen die decennia lang 
goed hebben gefunctioneerd, zoals cooperaties, brancheorganisaties en industrie-
organisaties. De betrokkenheid van de overheid wordt steeds meer 'laissez-faire' van 
karakter en het financiele systeem lijkt meer richting het kapitaalsysteem te schuiven. 
Verder worden bedrijven door de toenemende globalisering van activiteiten en 
transacties meer en meer geconfronteerd met verschillende wetgevingssystemen. 
Hierdoor kan vertrouwen gebaseerd op ervaringen in het verleden aan belang winnen. 
Tenslotte is er een trend te onderkennen van afnemende solidariteit en toenemende 
individualisering onder bedrijven in de Nederlandse agro-voedingsindustrie. Deze 
verschuivingen dwingen het management van agro-voedings-bedrijven en in het 
bijzonder die van cooperaties om hun plannen en strategieen voor de toekomst te 
herzien. Want ondanks de verschuivingen naar een institutionele omgeving die minder 
bevorderlijk is voor de ontwikkeling van samenwerkingsrelaties, neemt het strategische 
belang van samenwerking eerder toe dan af. 
IMPLICATES VOOR DE AARDAPPELSECTOR. Net als vele andere branches en 
industrietakken wordt de aardappelsector in zowel Nederland als het Verenigd 
Koninkrijk meer en meer gedomineerd door grote multinationals. In het bijzonder de 
schaalvergroting onder grootwinkelbedrijven leidt ertoe dat concurrentieverhoudingen 
en spelregels veranderen. Angelsaksische concepten als 'preferred suppliers' en 'gobal 
sourcing' worden verder ontwikkeld en nemen in belang toe. Om concurrerend te 
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blijven moeten bedrijven daarom steeds meer investeren in kennis, productiecapaciteit 
en nieuwe producten en diensten om aan de wensen van hun afnemers te kunnen 
voldoen. Gegeven deze situatie hebben bedrijven in de agro-voedingsindustrie en in het 
bijzonder de aardappelsector de keuze om met hun afnemers mee te groeien, zich zeer 
sterk te specialiseren, of tot marginale spelers gedegradeerd te worden. 
In de aardappelsector van het Verenigd Koninkrijk lijken de bedrijven onder deze 
omstandigheden een voorsprong te hebben omdat daar sinds de recente afschaffing van 
het marktregime de herstructurering van de sector versneld doorzet. Het lijkt erop dat 
zich daar een klein aantal zeer grote bedrijven zal ontwikkelen die, gefinancierd door 
aandelenkapitaal of investeringsbanken, op termijn hun vleugels naar het Europese 
continent kunnen uitslaan. 
De Nederlandse aardappelsector maakt daarentegen een meer geleidelijke 
herstructurering mee waarin bedrijven in aantal afnemen en in omvang groeien. Of dit 
proces snel genoeg gaat om de internationale ontwikkelingen bij te houden is echter de 
vraag. Het lijkt erop dat een sterke eigenschap van Nederlandse bedrijven, het 
vermogen om samen te werken, ook een zwakte met zich meebrengt. Bedrijven lijken 
geneigd te zijn om hun autonomic te bewaren en daardoor relatief klein te blijven omdat 
ze gewend zijn om via samenwerkingsarrangementen de nadelen van hun beperkte 
afmetingen te compenseren. Het is echter maar de vraag of deze formule nog lang 
succesvol blijft. Gezien de 'sterftegraad' onder kleine en middelgrote bedrijven en de 
steeds minder faciliterende institutionele omgeving, lijkt het erop dat deze bedrijven het 
risico lopen om gemarginaliseerd te raken ten opzichte van hun grote, internationaal 
opererende klanten en concurrenten. Om in de toekomst concurrerend te blijven zouden 
de Nederlandse bedrijven daarom het beste van twee werelden na moeten streven. Dit 
komt neer op het benutten van de voordelen van het vermogen tot samenwerking en 
tegelijk het nastreven van een omvang die beter in verhouding staat met internationale 
marktpartijen. 
IMPLICATES VOOR BRANCHEORGANISATIES. De positie van brancheorganisaties en 
industrieorganisaties wordt bedreigd door de trend dat ledenaantallen dalen en de 
behoefte aan collectieve actie afneemt. Daarnaast neemt door de internationalisering 
van beleidsontwikkeling zowel de concurrentie als de behoefte tot samenwerking toe 
tussen nationale branche- en industrieorganisaties. Het is daarnaast waarschijnhjk dat 
organisaties met een internationaal ledenbestand aan belang zullen winnen. 
Desalniettemin blijft er een belangrijke taak voor, in het bijzonder, de Nederlandse 
SUMMARY IN DUTCH 271 
organisaties over. Zij kunnen helpen om te voorkomen dat de agro-kennisinfrastructuur 
aangetast wordt door het veranderende karakter van sociale kerninstituties en dat de 
Nederlandse agro-voedingsindustrie haar leidende rol verliest. 
IMPLICATIES VOOR DE OVERHEID. De onderzoeksresultaten laten zien dat het karakter van 
de betrokkenheid van de overheid in de industrie een aanzienlijke invloed kan hebben 
op het relatieve gemak waarmee samenwerkingsrelaties tussen bedrijven tot stand 
komen. Er is ook aangegeven dat samenwerking tussen bedrijven van belang is om de 
concurrentiekracht van ondememingen en industrietakken te vergroten. In dit verband 
kan de faciliterende houding van de Nederlandse overheid ten opzichte van de 
aardappelindustrie als inspiratiebron dienen voor toekomstig beleid dat samenwerking 
stimuleert, in tegenstelling tot de eerst 'regulerende' en nu 'laissez-faire' betrokkenheid 
van de overheid in het Verenigd Koninkrijk. 
TOEKOMSTIG ONDERZOEK. Het huidige onderzoek kent de nodige beperkingen. Het is 
bijvoorbeeld de vraag in hoeverre de bevindingen gegeneraliseerd kunnen worden naar 
sectoren buiten de agro-voedingsindustrie. Daarnaast is de complexiteit van de 
fenomenen die bestudeerd zijn erg groot. Om die redenen zijn de onderzoeksresultaten 
overwegend exploratief van karakter. De bevindingen en beperkingen van deze studie 
geven daarom ook aanleiding tot verder onderzoek. Mogelijke onderwerpen en 
prioriteiten zijn: 1) de uitbreiding van de onderzoeksdatabase; 2) de uitbreiding van het 
analysekader; 3) de interactie tussen vertrouwen, macht, samenwerkingsverbanden en 
instituties; 4) de procesdimensie van de ontwikkeling van samenwerkingsrelaties - en in 
het bijzonder de managementaspecten hiervan - onder invloed van sociale kerninstitu-
ties; en 5) de rol van nationaal-specifieke kerninstituties op de ontwikkeling van 
samenwerking binnen en tussen multinationals. 
8 Afsluiting 
Dit proefschrift heeft licht geworpen op de invloed van sociale kerninstituties, met een 
nationaal-specifiek karakter, op de ontwikkeling van samenwerking tussen bedrijven. 
De resultaten geven aan dat, ondanks de voortschrijdende globalisering van de 
economie, het waarschijnlijk is dat tussen verschillende landen vele verschillende 
systemen van samenwerking blijven bestaan. Kennis over dit onderwerp is van belang 
voor managers van bedrijven die op een internationaal niveau opereren en die in 
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toenemende mate afhankelijk zijn van succesvolle samenwerkingsverbanden in zowel 
de thuismarkt als in het buitenland. Desalniettemin valt er nog veel te leren en te 
onderzoeken over het bewerkstelhgen van een 'fit' tussen vormen van samenwerking en 
de institutionele omgeving van bedrijven. Er is daarom behoefte aan verder onderzoek 
over dit onderwerp en, op basis daarvan, de ontwikkeling van management tools. 


CURRICULUM VITAE 
Martijn Rademakers (Rotterdam, 29 July 1968) studied policy and organizational 
Sciences at Tilburg University from 1992 to 1995, specializing in management and 
organization. Before that, he enjoyed secondary technical education at LTS Usselmonde 
Rotterdam between 1980 and 1984, continued with electrical engineering at MTS Zuid 
Rotterdam from 1984 to 1988, and studied electrical engineering and industrial 
marketing at The Hague Polytechnic from 1988 till 1992. In 1994 and 1995 he worked 
as a guest researcher at the Indonesian management institute Lembaga Pendidikan 
Pembinaan Manajemen in Jakarta. From 1995 onwards, he held a position as a research 
associate in the Department of Strategic Management and Business Environment at the 
Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam. Between 1995 and 
1999, next to his research on inter-firm cooperation, Martijn Rademakers acted as a 
member of the Faculty council from 1996 to 1998. He has published on forms of inter-
firm organization in Indonesia, the concentration process in the Dutch potato industry, 
the strategic developments and network formation in the UK and Dutch potato 
industries, and the role and functions of business associations in the agribusiness. 
275 



Stellingen 
Behorende bij het Proefschrift 
Managing Inter-Firm Cooperation in 
Divergent Institutional Environments: 
A Comparison of the 
Dutch and UK Potato Industries 
Martijn F.L. Rademakers 
Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam 
9 September 1999 
I 
Marktideologie is een vorm van economisch dei'sme. 
II 
De voortschrijdende concentratie van de detailhandel in de 
Europese agro-voedingsindustrie brengt een verschuiving 
teweeg van marktwerking naar supermarktwerking. 
Ill 
In een meer en meer individualiserende samenleving hebben 
mensen elkaar harder nodig dan ooit. 
IV 
Dalende communicatiekosten veroorzaken een stijging van 
onzinnige berichten die uitgewisseld worden. 
V 
Als patronen van bladnerven metaforisch zijn voor 
concurrerende organisatievormen, dan zijn netwerken van 
bedrijven belangrijke structuren. 
VI 
AiO's zijn doorgaans jeugdiger dan hun leeftijdgenoten. 
VII 
Als overleven een basiseigenschap van de mens is, dan 
varieert de wijze van rationed gedrag al naar gelang de 
omgevingsomstandigheden. 
VIII 
Aardappelen en kennis hebben als overeenkomst dat ernaar 
gewroet wordt. 
IX 
Een gepromoveerde bedrijfskundige is nog geen 
bedrijvendokter. 
X 
Het is zowel frustrerend als bemoedigend om te ontdekken dat 
de resultaten van jarenlang onderzoek uiteindelijk in enkele 
zinnen zijn samen te vatten. 



